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This book explores the challenges that disinformation, fake news, and post-truth 
politics pose to democracy from a multidisciplinary perspective. The authors 
analyse and interpret how the use of technology and social media as well as 
the emergence of new political narratives has been progressively changing the 
information landscape, undermining some of the pillars of democracy. 
The volume sheds light on some topical questions connected to fake news, 
thereby contributing to a fuller understanding of its impact on democracy. In the 
Introduction, the editors offer some orientating definitions of post-truth politics, 
building a theoretical framework where various different aspects of fake news 
can be understood. The book is then divided into three parts: Part I helps to 
contextualise the phenomena investigated, offering definitions and discussing key 
concepts as well as aspects linked to the manipulation of information systems, 
especially considering its reverberation on democracy. Part II considers the 
phenomena of disinformation, fake news, and post-truth politics in the context of 
Russia, which emerges as a laboratory where the phases of creation and diffusion 
of fake news can be broken down and analysed; consequently, Part II also reflects 
on the ways to counteract disinformation and fake news. Part III moves from case 
studies in Western and Central Europe to reflect on the methodological difficulty 
of investigating disinformation, as well as tackling the very delicate question of 
detection, combat, and prevention of fake news. 
This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of political science, 
law, political philosophy, journalism, media studies, and computer science, since it 
provides a multidisciplinary approach to the analysis of post-truth politics. 
Serena Giusti is Head of the Programme on Eastern Europe, Russia and Eurasia at 
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy, and Senior Associate Research 
Fellow at the Institute for International Studies (ISPI) in Milan, Italy. She also sits on 
the Advisory board of Women in International Security (WIIS), Italy. 
Elisa Piras is Postdoctoral Fellow in Political Philosophy at Dirpolis Institute 
at Sant’Anna School for Advanced Studies in Pisa, Italy. Her research focuses on 
contemporary political liberalism and its international implications for global justice 
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Preface 
What is the cost of lies? It’s not that we’ll mistake them for the truth. The real da g r is that if we hear enough lies, then we no longer recognize the truth at all. What 
can we do then? What else is left but to abandon even the hope of truth and content 
ourselves instead with stories? 
The words of Valery Legasov, as pronounced in the HBO Chernobyl miniseries of 
2019, perfectly reflect the disorientation produced by misinformation and by an 
intense flow of fake news that affects politics as well as everyone else’s everyday 
lives. While there is a more or less conscious acknowledgement that we are living 
in an epoch of post-truth politics, where everything can be true and false at the 
same time, the academic debate on the mechanisms and effects of this politics is 
still in its nascent phase, mainly because any comprehensive analysis on the phenomenon would require a solid expertise in different areas such as media studies, 
security studies, public opinion analysis, contemporary history, political communication, semiotics, ethics, informatics, and AI. 
This edited volume tackles this research gap by offering a multidisciplinary 
perspective with the purpose of touching upon (at least some of) the challenges 
that the manipulation of information poses to democracy. The idea of this book 
emerged during the international conference “Information at a time of fake news, 
disinformation and post-truth politics” organised by the research group Res/East 
of the Sant’ Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa. The conference, which ppen d in Pisa on the 6 and 7 of May of 2019, took place thanks to the fu di g of the Jean Monnet Activities Programme, “EU-Russia, Connecting People 
and Ideas: Revolution, Post-Soviet Space, Information”. The presentations and 
debates focussed on the topic of manipulation of information from an interdisciplinary perspective, with special attention to the post-Soviet space. 
Preface 
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for the realisation of this project. 
Serena Giusti and Elisa Piras 
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Introduction 
In search of paradigms: Disinformation, 
fake news, and post-truth politics 
Serena Giusti and Elisa Piras 
This book aims to contribute to the debate on how the manipulation of information, under different guises, can deteriorate the status of democracy. The title 
conveys the ambition and scope of our volume, which seeks to examine and 
problematise the diffusion of practices of information manipulation thanks to the 
opportunities provided by the newest technological tools used for communication 
and information purposes. Although manipulating information can serve iffere t goals, the authors who contributed to this volume focussed on its political 
implications and especially on the consequences that the diffusion of manipulated 
information can have on the quality of democracy. 
In his 1922 essay Public Opinion, after a thorough investigation of the nexus 
between information and democratic decision-making, Walter Lippmann claimed 
that the quality of news revealed the strengths and weaknesses of a democratic s ci ty. Disguising the truth and manipulating information were means used by a few 
economic and/or political actors willing to substitute their particular interests to 
the public interest in order to obtain some advantages ( Lippmann 1997 : 364–365). 
Lippmann’s pioneering intuition proves especially inspiring for current researches 
on the troubling relationship between information and democratic politics, not 
only in mature democracies, but also in those countries experiencing lengthy and 
stormy transitions from authoritarian rule. Moreover, the last century has pr vid d abundant evidence of the strategic mportance of the production and spread 
of information for the conduct of international affairs, facilitating or complicating cooperation among governments. Very recently, the global health emergency 
caused by the diffusion of Covid-19 has dramatically shown the importance as well 
as the difficulty of grounding policy-making on objective (i.e. unbiased) and r lia l  (i.e. verifiable, scientifically v lid) information. 
As we will show in our Introduction, the manipulation of information has a long 
history; however, the speed and extensiveness of the phenomenon has considerably 
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increased during the last two decades, thanks to the massive and continuous consumption of news that smartphones allow to large numbers of citizens of developed
and developing countries. Social media platforms, which are a particularly fertile 
breeding ground for amplifying any message, proved to be particularly effective 
means for detecting, targeting, and mobilising high numbers of individuals who 
would form their opinions on any piece of news which might serve to confirm 
and reinforce their preconceived ideas. The consequence is the viral diffusion of 
a plethora of mystified information products. Some of them – namely news propaganda, conspiracy theories, opinion pieces, pseudo-satire, etc. – are already part 
of the historical heritage of information manipulation, while others – such as hate 
speech, fake news, and deepfakes – constitute relatively new phenomena whose 
relationship to democratic practices and values is still unclear. 
Each chapter of this book contributes to shed light on a specific aspect of the 
information-democracy nexus, from its author(s)’ situated point of view. The first 
part of the Introduction will briefly present and discuss the main concepts that 
will ground the analyses and reflections presented in the chapters – namely disinformation, fake ews, and post-truth politics – outlining the main attempts at 
contrasting the different phenomena included under the umbrella term of infor ation manipulation. In the last part, the Introduction provides the readers with 
an analytical compass and a chapters’ breakdown, the aim of which is to guide the 
readers throughout the book. 
Disinformation 
Until recently, the term most commonly used in political discourse to identify 
issues concerning the manipulation of information was disinformation, from the 
Russian word dezinformatsiya, deriving from the title of a KGB black propaganda 
department responsible for producing false information with the intention of 
deceiving public opinion. Disinformation is a relatively recent practice in comparison to ‘propaganda’, which originated in the 1600s and generally connotes 
the selective use of information aimed at producing some desired political effects 
( NED 2017 ). Propaganda seeks to manipulate or influence the opinion of groups 
to support a particular cause or belief; it often promotes the benefits and virtues 
of one idea or group, while simultaneously distorting the truth or suppressing the 
counter-argument (as it happened, for instance, in Nazi Germany). 
While disinformation is to be intended as the product of the construction of 
a purposeful untruth, misinformation indicates an incomplete, vague, misleading, 
or ambiguous piece of information. Disinformation “can be composed of mostly 
true facts, stripped of context or blended with falsehoods to support the intended 
message, and is always part of a larger plan or agenda” ( NED 2017 ). Disinformation, a term which had been neglected for a while by IR (International Relations) 
and security studies, has recently known a revival, especially within the European 
Union (EU) ( la Cour 2020 ; Chesney and Citron 2019 ; Lanoszka 2019 ). Drawing 
Introduction: In search of paradigms 
on the ‘Action Plan against Disinformation’ issued in 2018, 1 several actions and 
programmes – including significant research funding – have been launched to 
detect and contrast disinformation on a variety of politically sensitive issues, such 
as Brexit, migration management, food safety, and health emergency management. 
For instance, the latest report published by the European External Action S rvic  (EEAS) on disinformation activities related to the Covid-19 pandemic reveals 
many troubling facts, such as the significant number of coordinated disinformation 
campaigns by the Russian and Chinese governments to spread false health information in and around Europe, and conspiracy theories and claims that only authoritarian political systems – not democracies – are best suited to deal with the current 
crisis ( European Commission 2020 ). The EU High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell has thus made clear that “intentional and 
coordinated disinformation campaigns should be treated as a hybrid threat to Europ n and global security” ( B rrell 2020 ). 
Fake news 
In the preceding section, misinformation has been defined as an incomplete, vague, 
misleading, or ambiguous piece of information. Accordingly, fake news could be 
understood as an advanced and technological version of misinformation, since with 
this term we mean pieces of intentionally manipulated information which appear 
on the Internet and in social media especially. At first, the diffusion of fake news 
was connected to political life at its most sensitive moments, such as elections and 
international crises; afterwards, the use of fake news rapidly expanded to concern 
every aspect of politics and life. The term ‘fake news’ was, for instance, used by 
both candidates to the US presidency in the 2016 elections. On 8 December 2016, 
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton made a speech in which she referred to “the 
epidemic of malicious fake news and false propaganda that flooded social media 
over the past year,” and stressed that “It’s now clear that so-called fake news can 
have real-world consequences” ( Wendling 2018 ). President Donald Trump, the 
Republican candidate, even gave out ‘Fake News Awards’ to reporters who had 
made mistakes or unfortunate predictions – “with a special nod to all reporting on 
the ongoing and very real investigations into collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia” (ibid.). 
Whereas the construction of a false, alternative, or altered reality and its diffu i  through media and/or word of mouth – wh ch depends on the contested 
nature of knowledge – is not a new phenomenon in politics, what is new is the 
massive worldwide use of digital communication systems and the extremely exten iv  reach of social media (see Corner 2017 ; Fuller 2018 ), which can spread news 
at a whirling pace, turning any message potentially ‘viral’. Social media platforms 
and instant messaging apps have proven to be extraordinary amplifiers for fake 
news and have therefore acquired a strategic political role far beyond their initial 
function as platforms for recreation and socialisation. They are, indeed, powerful 
political weapons. The combination of fake news and social media is particularly 
fit for producing subliminal effects that can reach the deepest and most emotional 
strata of people’s minds, with higher chances of persistence and persuasion c par d to disinformation spread through other means. 
Fake news can circulate in either a discrete or continuous way. In the first case, 
its appearance is inconsistent, even sporadic, while in the second, it may create a 
cluster or snowball effect. It can be diffused through many channels at the same 
time or in sequence, with different dosages of information manipulation. This 
bombardment of manipulated information generates a sort of ‘nebulous pheno enon’, capturing a potentially vast audience that can be a target to various waves of 
fake news attacks. When a flow of fake news reaches its target concomitantly, there 
is only a short time in which the recipients can stop to elaborate and discern the 
nature of the information they have been flooded with. This means that recipients, 
besides awareness, might also lack time and attention to rightly detect what has 
been transmitted. 
The disruptive force of fake news has been widely recognised and already his- 
toricised. It is quite telling that two anti-Brexit fake banknotes claiming to be from 
the “Bank of Brexit lies” and declaring themselves to be “for the privileged few” 
have been deemed of such historical value they have been added to the collection 
of the British Museum (BM). 2 Tom Hockenhull, the museum’s curator of modern 
money, said the notes belonged to its collection because “we capture history. By 
displaying fake banknotes, the British Museum recognises the relevance of the fake 
as testimony and protagonist of current politics” ( Addley 2019 ). The BM’s decision follows its previous acquisition of a Banksy artwork that depicts an equally 
fake banknote, designed in 2004 and displaying an image of Princess Diana. If even 
museums have transformed the falsification of reality and the diffusion of fake news 
into something to be exhibited, this means that the phenomenon is ubiquitous, 
powerful, and routinised. 
In politics, fake news is already so widespread to be acknowledged (although 
not publicly recommended) among the available tools for the politicians willing 
to obtain consensus and to seek power within the domestic, as well as the international, political arena. The deployment of fake news may help the rise of a certain 
faction/party or leader, while causing the decay or the defeat of its political adversaries/enemies. Those who man pulate information and diffuse it might remain 
unknown, and the absence of a single responsible person or group of people re d rs the faking activity less biased and condemnable; moreover, it discourages po si le reactions because of the lack of a clear target. The difficulty to neatly identify 
responsibility in such instances therefore makes the use of fake news an extremely 
powerful instrument of political influence and meddling. 
In their public statements, politicians in power generally tend to condemn fake 
news and the unfair and illicit gain in terms of consensus that it produces. How ver, the fact that people are so accustomed to fake news seems to allow both 
authoritarian and democratic leaders to deploy it quite often ( Farhall et al. 2019 ; 
Egelhofer and Lecheler 2019 ) in order to pursue their political goals: inter alia, to 
delegitimise troublesome journalists and media, to discredit political opponents 
or leaders of foreign states – as in the case of the Covid-19 crisis which will be 
mentioned later in this introduction – or even to contribute to the justification of 
especially grave decisions, such as the one taken by the US and the UK to invade 
Iraq on the basis of the alleged presence of weapons of mass destruction (later 
revealed to be unproven). 
Post-truth politics 
In order to portray the complex contemporary relationship in which reality, fals hood, and power interact and mix in the world of media and social networks, 
many scholars, commentators, and politicians employ the expression ‘post-truth 
politics’ ( Hannan 2018 ; McIntyre 2018 ; Corner 2017 ; Hopkin and Rosamond 
2017 ; Rose 2017 ). This expression indicates a political phase in which people are 
inclined to accept arguments based on their consonance to their own emotions 
and beliefs rather than based on facts, and consequently important political ci ions such as a vote in political elections or n a referendum are more related to 
emotional or ‘ideological’ impulses and superficial impressions rather than to the 
rational selection based on policy evaluations and economic considerations. The 
weakening of the relevance of rational reasoning opens up to the easy installation 
of counterfeit information. In this perspective, a lie is not necessarily something 
that is opposed to truth; it is rather a derivate of a distorted version of it, so that the 
boundaries between truth and lies are blurred. 
As Bufacchi (2020) explains, “While a lie subverts a specific truth, post-truth 
tries to subvert truth itself” and the “prefix ‘post’ in post-truth refers to the claim 
that a specified idea has become redundant and therefore can safely be discarded. 
Post-truth is the belief that truth is no longer essential, that truth has become bsol te.” Fake news does not necessarily negate facts or what can be defined as truth, 
but rather suggests misleading interpretations or invents facts that do not exist but 
are nonetheless plausible or close to what the public could expect. Fake news can 
be anticipated by the spread of some information/soft fakes (closer to misinfor ation) in order to prepare the terrain for the fake news to be credible and able to
produce long-lasting effects; a sort of “political astroturfing” ( Keller et al. 2020 ). 
As we have underlined, the rise of post-truth politics has been propitiated by 
the sheer ease of creating and diffusing fake news. Besides technological facilities, 
systemic changes that may have favoured post-truth politics have also occurred. 
The disappearance of well-established comprehensive and coherent worldviews or 
ideologies concomitant to the end of the Cold War has brought a period of fluidity 
and diffusion of power that has bolstered the emergence of new actors, both formal 
and informal. World politics has become more and more hectic and unpredictable. At the same time, flows of refugees, global movements, virtual groups, and 
networks have all contributed to moulding a de-territorialised form of citizenship, 
while states have progressively lost control over money flows, investments, information, security, and even warfare, which is becoming more and more hybrid. 
During the last part of the 20th century, the progressive erosion of sovereignty 
seemed to be a prelude to the end of the traditional state, opening to a neo- 
medieval phase in politics marked by fragmentation of power, with many different 
legacies ( Bull 1977 ). Instead, the 2008 financial and economic crisis, which caused 
the deterioration of the standard of living, therefore accentuating a sense of precariousness, has allowed a reinforcement of states, which have mostly intervened in the 
economy to remedy the negative effects of the crisis. States have, however, became 
the cradle of divisive politics: populist discourses and policies, the delegitimisation 
of competence, hate and resentment politics, the demonisation/enemisation 
of political adversaries, the personalisation and spectacularisation of politics, and 
processes of securitisation have now become common traits in both democratic 
and autocratic regimes ( Polyakova and Meserole 2019 ). In order to master all these 
techniques of divisive politics, access to information as well as multi-media communication skills are crucial. Th s, we suspect that if the political conflict raises, 
we may see an intensification of the recurrence to the practice of fake news as a 
political weapon. In principle, easy access to data and information can contribute 
to vitalising the public sphere and encouraging citizens’ participation in public 
decision-making, introducing new voices to the public debate and mobilising new 
actors willing to find alternative paths for political participation (see, for instance, 
the early stage of the so-called Arab Springs), but it can also be exploited to toxify 
the political and social sphere. Citizens would then become partisan of one side 
against another, or rather abandon any kind of civil and political engagement. 
We are also witnessing an increasing use of information manipulation and spread 
of fake news by external actors in order to interfere, especially in the occasion of 
important political elections or referenda, in third countries’ politics, emptying the 
concept of borders and eroding the principle of state sovereignty as a result. This 
is not simply about invalidating what should be a free and fair electoral competition but also the independency and security of states with serious implications for 
inter-state relations. When fake news is diffused by one country against another 
one, especially if the diffuser and amplifier is a high-ranking politician – such as 
President Trump, the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, or the foreign Minister 
of China, Wang Yi – then the perceived distance between truth and untruth dramatically contracts, with serious risks of tensions and conflicts among the countries 
involved. 3 
There is also another sensitive point to consider: in some countries (e.g. India, 
Nigeria, Brazil), fake news has circulated prevalently through WhatsApp, the 
most popular messaging app in Africa, Latin America, and many Asian countries 
(with 1.6 billion active users monthly, in 180 countries), which is mainly used 
to share information with family and friends ( Chinchilla 2019 ). Unlike other 
platforms such as Facebook, whose content can be monitored, encrypted peer- 
to-peer messaging platforms, for example WhatsApp, Messenger, Telegram, and 
Signal, escape any kind of formal control. While it is important to protect users’ 
privacy, this easily enables criminal activity and the cynical spread of falsehoods 
and mass manipulation (ibid.). 
We need also to pay attention to crises, because they produce both information 
voids and high demand of information. This combination further stimulates the 
construction of fake news and its dissemination, as the experience of Covid-19 
pandemic demonstrates. World Health Organization (WHO) officials themselves 
introduced, for instance, the term ‘infodemic’ to describe the flood of information 
circulating online about the virus. People might find it difficult to discern which 
information sources are trustworthy, especially when scientists are also pr vidi g different explanations and solutions. Moreover, while on complex specialistic 
issues such as pandemics the production of precise and detailed information can be 
expensive and time-consuming, fake news can cheaply and quickly fill the gap and 
satisfy the public’s demand for information, at least for a wide target. Therefore, 
the Covid-19 pandemic has, in a way, reinforced the idea that there is no certitude, 
even when scientists are charged with tackling a sanitary emergency. 
The delicate link between science itself and politics has blatantly surfaced; 
although the former is still considered as a reliable source of information, its trustworthiness is questioned by a variety of truthers and conspiracists. Presumably, 
accurate scientific information can be the ground for taking tough but legitimate 
political decisions that restrict citizens’ freedom. But to what extent can science 
declare a state of emergency and justify the adoption of extraordinary measures? 
Furthermore, on the basis of the same scientific studies, different governments 
have adopted different measures for the containment of the virus. Such a diversity 
might be the outcome of different political decisions, despite the common ground 
on which they are based, but also of a manipulation of scientific information for 
political purposes. The latter approach clearly poses threats to democracy. 
Another challenge linked to the diffusion of fake news is that of ‘social justice’: 
while almost anyone with access to technologies and social media can forge fake 
news (although her/his social status and know-how can affect the reach and impact 
of the fake news’ spread), the activity of recognising and interpreting fake news 
requires knowledge, expertise, and the capacity to use technological instruments. 
Therefore, there is a clear imbalance between the accession and detection phase, 
producing a situation of inequality. The risk here is that a weaker and less prepared 
part of the public might easily fall in the hands of professional fakers: a serious 
threat for any democracy. The advent of technology and social media has w k ne  traditional media gatekeepers, changed incentives for content providers, and 
promoted the rise of unprofessional and/or unscrupulous outlets capable of drawing large audiences at a low cost. The modification of the rhythms and language of
information experts ( Carlson 2018 ; Waisbord 2018 ) has accelerated the production 
of information, which impinges on people’s emotional sphere, and people do tend 
to rely on debunked falsehoods when these portray their own view ( Nyhan and 
Reifler 2010 ; Lewandowsky et al. 2012 ). So, even after fakes are denounced as 
such, they have already produced effects at a subconscious level that tend to persist, 
despite their possible disproval. 
Finally, we have to be careful about the use of fakes as a scapegoat for events 
which are actually determined by other factors. To put it more simply: is it r ali tic to assert that President Trump was elected thanks to the Russians (through 
hacking and leaking operations targeted at the Democratic Party, personal attacks 
on Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, cyberattacks on voter databases), 4 or is 
it plausible to claim that the Russians have helped the pro-Leave faction prevail 
in the Brexit referendum (anti-immigrant and pro-Brexit messages spread, arrativ s presumably spread by Russian bots and accounts)? 5 Even if the e actions 
were to be proved, the question is to what extent this kind of external interference can be deemed responsible for phenomena caused by a multitude of other 
factors. In other words, while not underestimating the political impact of the 
use of the technological tools available, we should avoid falling into the trap of 
oversimplified explanations of complex political events. To assess the impact of 
information manipulation, therefore, we need a perspective that can account 
for the complexity of politics. It is also very difficult to establish a correlation 
between the surge of fake news and the consequent change of the recipients’ 
political behaviour. The possible impact of fake news on actual electoral utcomes remains a highly contested issue, while it seems clear that electoral behaviour 
still depends primarily on socio-economic factors or people’s positioning 
within social systems. In one of the first academic studies about the consumption 
of fake news, researchers at Princeton, Dartmouth and the University of Exeter 
estimated that about 25% of Americans visited a fake news website in a six-week 
period around the time of the 2016 US election; nevertheless, the researchers 
also found that the visits were highly concentrated – 10% of readers made 60% of 
the visits. Crucially, the researchers concluded that “fake news does not crowd 
out hard news consumption” ( Guess, Nyhan and Reifler 2018 ). Further research 
in this field would be very valuable indeed. 
Contrasting fake news 
The debate on how to react to the omnipresence of fake news is lively, and 
solutions are very diversified. They range from legislating news media, to tw aki g algorithms and moderating content, to adopting ‘softer’ approaches such as 
fact-checking, debunking, and investing in media literacy education ( Fioriglio 
2019 ; Friesem 2019 ; Graves 2018 ; Council of the European Union 2016 ; Select 
Committee on Communications 2019). Automated verification of rumours using 
machine learning algorithms ( Vosoughi, Mohsenvand and Roy 2017 ) and r ltime fact-checks ( Bode and Vraga 2015 ; Sethi 2017 ) are also tools available for 
unveiling fake news. Recent scholarship has evidenced that false news spreads 
quicker and deeper than true information ( Vosoughi, Roy and Aral 2018 ). Th refore, a posteriori debunking and fact-checking tools might not be adequate to stop 
the flow of online fake news ( Chan et al. 2017 ; Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook 
2017 ). Some researchers are now considering pre-emptive ways of mitigating the 
problem ( van der Linden et al. 2017 ; Roozenbeek and van der Linden 2019 ). 
The main thrust of this research is to prevent false narratives from taking root in 
memory in the first place, focussing specifically on the process of pre-emptive 
debunking or so-called ‘pre-bunking’. 
Any attempt to fight fake news lies at the limen between control and fr edom. Control easily provides an excuse for authoritarian states to silence diss nting voices. The fight against fakes opens up another huge political problem: the 
role of transnational social media companies – e.g. Facebook, YouTube, Instagram 
and Twitter – which, by aligning with states’ and international organisations’ 
instructions, or by filling an international legislative gap, create their own codes of 
conduct, giving rise to a sort of (informal) governance in the field. By filling the 
legislative gap, they could become instruments of surveillance and control without 
any authority or political institution supervising their activity. After having initially 
downplayed the potential influence of fake news, Facebook has acknowledged the 
importance of detection and reporting, adding warning labels to untrustworthy 
pages, and ensuring a crackdown on for-profit fake news pages. Twitter also 
reacted, developing an experimental prototype feature that allows users to report 
fake news, and exploring the use of machine learning to detect automated accounts 
spreading political content ( NED 2017 ). 
It is clear that social media companies, by deleting, demonetising or disincentivising 
content that is deemed problematic, exert a backfiring potential, since 
algorithms are not yet extremely accurate in deciding what counts as problematic 
content. Fact-checking organisations such as Snopes, or dedicated task forces who 
work on debunking viral fake news stories – such as the East StratCom Task 
Force of the EU’s European External Action Service, 6 or the European Parliament 
Unit in Charge of Disinformation – are also pullulating ( Roozenbeek and van der 
Linden 2019 ). Lastly, media literacy initiatives are becoming quite widespread, 
but they only touch upon young people who are currently enrolled in education 
cycles. 7 
An analytical compass for exploring post-truth politics 
In the figure below, we have summarised the main features of the general pheno enon that we call i formation manipulation in an attempt to cover the differ nt stages of production, diffusion, detection, and counteraction of manipulated 
information, and point out the nature and identity of the producers and spreaders 
of manipulated information. Furthermore, the chart outlines the channels and tools 
used for the construction, diffusion, and detection of manipulated information, as 
well as the effects produced and the modalities available to fight the phenomenon 
and neutralise its political implications. The figure should offer readers a cognitive 
scheme of reference for better placing the phenomenon, while at the same time 
highlighting the complexity of the information manipulation circuit. It is exactly 
such a complexity that originates what has been called post-truth politics. 
FIGURE 0.1 Post-truth politics 
Outline of the book 
In order to navigate our way through the dark forest of disinformation and fake 
news, we have gathered a group of scholars from various disciplines (political scienc , law, political philosophy, journalism, and computer science) and practitioners who have contributed o highlight the many aspects of post-truth politics, 
each inspecting the different phases involved (creation, diffusion, detection) and 
the challenges they pose to democracy. The volume is articulated in three parts: 
I) Post-truth politics and the challenges to democracy, II) From disinformation to 
post-truth politics: Evidences from Russia, III) Dilemmas of contrasting disinformation and fake news. 
Part I helps in contextualising the phenomena investigated, offering some d fi itions and discussing key concepts as well as the aspects linked to the manipulation 
of information systems, considering in particular its reverberation on democracy. 
In Chapter 1 , Federica Merenda proposes a reflection on relevant concepts and 
paradigms elaborated in Hannah Arendt’s works, which contribute to clarify the 
relation between (the different kinds of) truth, (the different kinds of ) lying and 
politics in contemporary democracies. In Chapter 2 , Elisa Piras addresses the 
problem of how increasing inequalities affect the public sphere in contemporary 
democratic societies, reconstructing the main ideas in the ongoing discussions 
about the transformation of the public sphere and the implications of persistent 
inequalities for epistemic justice, highlighting the negative effects that spreading 
fake news, disinformation, and post-truth narratives can have for marginalised 
individuals and groups. In Chapter 3 , Liza Ireni-Saban and Maya Sherman bridge 
two topical academic discussions, commenting on the potential heuristic value of 
their interplay: on the one hand, the debate about the intersectional dimension of 
discrimination and oppression which stemmed from the recent contributions to 
feminist reflection; on the other hand, the ethical implication of the production 
and use of artificial intelligence. 
In Chapter 4 , Jennifer Cassidy shows how fake news and post-truth politics 
can impact on crucial decisions citizens are called to take, as in the case of the 
United Kingdom’s referendum of 2016 on the country’s place in the EU. The link 
between information and democratic policy-making is further explored in Cha t r 5 by Matthew Loveless, who underlines that the Internet, and social media 
in particular, continues to undermine rather than strengthen any substantive link 
between information and democracy. The chapter posits that fake news is the 
description of strategic emotional weapons that cultivate political division in order 
to maintain the status quo and that, despite this, fake news is merely a covariate, 
rather than a determinant, of the failed linkage between information and de ocracy. In Chapter 6 , Lugi Curini and Eugenio Pizzimenti investigate the possible 
impact of fake news on actual electoral outcomes. They argue that this remains a 
highly contested issue, with scarce empirical evidence to support the claim that the 
spreading of fake news changes electors’ choices. The available scientific literature 
seems to confirm that people will tend to consume the news (including fake news) 
that confirms their partisan ideas and, precisely for this reason, the impact of fake 
news on voting choice will be negligible. Chapter 7 , the last of this section, ben fit  from the experience of Alice Hazelton as a Science Programme Specialist at 
the World Economic Forum. The author discusses how the Covid-19 pandemic 
and the related political and economic crisis has highlighted science’s vital role in 
society, also constituting a perfect occasion for the intense production of fake news 
spurring on new tensions and competition among states. 
Part II considers the phenomenon of disinformation, fake news and post-truth 
politics in the context of Russia – an especially telling case for the present discussion, since it can be onsidered as a sort of laboratory for discerning the phases of 
creation and diffusion and for envisaging the ways to counteract disinformation 
and fake news. In chapter 8 , Anna Zafesova argues that, in Russia, the monopoly 
of the truth is a tool of power and disrupting this monopoly amounts to demolishing th  altered version of reality that the regime produces and reproduces daily. 
The author believes that the disclosure of an alternative truth is the main goal for 
the anti-Putin opposition in Russia as it was for the Soviet-era dissidents. Fighting the manipulation, the omission, and the ideological interpretation of the truth 
is the main weapon, not only to defend democracy from Russian attacks, but 
also to dismantle the Russian regime. On the same line, in Chapter 9 Francesco 
Bechis explains how the concept of sharp power is well suited for capturing 
Russia’s ‘information warfare’ as a foreign policy tool. According to the author, 
government-led propaganda is one of the pillars Russian ‘sharp power’ stands 
on. It can take the shape of disinformation campaigns channelled through official 
media or it can be fuelled through cyber-operations led by hackers affiliated with 
government agencies. Mara Morini, in Chapter 10 , evidences that the post-truth 
era is based on a variety of elements such as the spreading of fake news and cyberspace attacks that might reinforce Putin’s domestic legitimacy while det riorating 
the country’s external relations. Part II ends with Chapter 11 , in which Giorgio 
Comai points out that, while Russian meddling in other countries has obtained 
extensive media attention and has led to increased pressure on policy makers 
and big tech companies to find ways to protect democracy from undue external 
interference, we must also acknowledge that there is little of specifically foreign 
(or Russian) in the vulnerabilities that made Russian meddling possible. Russian 
activism should, in other ways, be an opportunity for other countries to take 
action against structural vulnerabilities which make them more permeable to any 
sort of foreign interference. The author underlines that detecting and reacting to 
external interferences is inextricably intertwined with the broader issue of ma ging and regul ting the privately owned online public spaces that have become 
a central component of contemporary democracies. 
Part III investigates how disinformation and misinformation are affecting 
Western and Central European political systems. Comparing cases is a difficult 
task: complete and standard data have yet to be collected, and the complexity of 
the phenomena poses non-trivial methodological challenges: individuals, groups, 
and states can easily produce and spread manipulated information from anywhere, 
and this can be used in a myriad of manners. As a result, contrasting manipulated 
information is a difficult task and it needs well-framed strategies; those, however, 
should not endanger the quality of democracy. In Chapter 12 , computer ci ntists and physicians Guido Caldarelli, Rocco De Nicola, Marinella Petrocchi, 
and Fabio Saracco use Twitter as a benchmark to analyse the flow of information 
within and between members of different communities and study the dynamics 
of interaction and the role of automated accounts in such exchanges. Specifically, they consider the propagation of Italian tweets concerned with two t i s: migration flows in the Mediterranean and Covid-19. Their analysis shows 
that bots play a central role in the exchange of significant content, and that the 
so-called hub nodes (i.e. the most effective accounts in significantly propagating their messages and therefore the most listened to) have high numbers of bots 
among their followers. This is particularly evident for the migration flows sc n rio. In Chapter 13 , Manuela Caiani and Pál Susánszky focus n how different 
types of radical right political organisations (both political parties and more inf rm l groups, such as movements) in four Central European countries (Slovakia, 
Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland) use the web. By conducting a formalised 
content analysis of their websites, the authors investigate, from a comparative perspective, the degree and forms of political activism with a particular attention to
visual and textual mobilisation and political engagement. The results are presented 
in a cross-regional perspective, as similarities and differences among the various 
organisations in the four analysed CEE countries are compared to the radical right 
cyber activism in Western Europe. In Chapter 14 , Mihail Stojanoski examines 
the effects of recent German legislation regulating the spread of disinformation 
and fake news by reviewing a recent example involving a prominent German 
journalist, Claas Relotius, who embellished and invented stories for Der Spiegel 
for years. It then briefly presents the basic elements of the new German piece of 
legislation which targets the spread of disinformation (NetzDG). The author su gests that individual responsibility of the news consumer should be prevalent and 
form the basis of any anti-disinformation policy if modern societies are to preserve 
and promote free press and freedom of expression, especially given the practical 
and legislative limitations that exist in this field. The reflection on how to fight 
fake news continues in Chapter 15 as Urban Larssen considers the strengthening 
of fact-checking routines within the journalistic ranks that is intimately linked 
with journalistic professional integrity. The chapter builds on ethnographic mat rial gathered in three Swedish news rooms on local, regional, nd national level
which formed part of a larger project aimed at developing a digital tool that can 
assist journalists in their everyday fact-checking routines. Through interviews and 
participant observation, the study enquired about the needs and interests for this 
kind of tool. The journalists expressed both need and interest, but they also had 
reservations regarding institutionalised forms of fact-checking, arguing, for xample, that it may lead to increased control over the employees from an employer’s 
perspective. Finally, in Chapter 16 , Matteo Monti offers a legal point of view on 
the legal instruments which are currently available for tackling disinformation and 
misinformation. The author analyses the legal tools enacted by the EU to cope 
with the spread of fake news on the Internet and to explore the limitations and 
risks implied. The EU’s actions are discussed in light of the question of the free 
speech constitutional guarantees provided by the member states, which can limit 
the EU Commission’s space of action in this field. The chapter will discuss the 
genesis as well as the aims of the ‘Code of Practice on Disinformation’ in regards 
to the issue of the privatisation of censorship on the Internet. Allowing Internet 
platforms to censor fake news without their procedure being in any way c ntroll d by public authorities could lead to the emergence of a situation where we 
could have the ‘privatisation of censorship,’ as the regime of semi-monopoly in 
which Google and Facebook are acting in Europe shows. 
Notes 
1 The fundamental document, which is commonly known as the Action Plan on Disinfor ation, is the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High 
Representative to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
(5 December 2018, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/- 
files/eu-communication-disinformation-euco-05122018_en.pdf ). 
2 The banknotes were produced by Bath for Europe – a grassroots group which campaigns 
to stop Britain leaving the EU – and have already been distributed in thousands at anti- 
Brexit rallies. They carry the faces of Boris Johnson and Jacob Rees-Mogg: the Johnson 
design, based on a £10 note, carries the slogan: “I promise not to pay the NHS the sum of 
£350m pounds,” while the “£50 guinea” Rees-Mogg version declares: “I promise to pay 
myself more than you,” and carries the fake motto: “Arrogantus Toffo Posterium”. 
3 See the video produced by BBC, Coronavirus: False claims by politicians debunked – BBC News, 
www.bbc.com/news/av/52299689/coronavirus-false-claims-by-politicians-debunked , 
16 April 2020, reporting some fake news on the origin of the virus and involvement of 
countries. 
4 US intelligence and special counsel Robert Mueller, for the investigation on Russia’s 
interference in the US 2016 presidential race, has affirmed that a broad effort by Russian 
intelligence and a Russian social media group, the Internet Research Agency, has helped 
Donald Trump and damaged Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presid ntial election. Mueller’s report, released in April 2019, documented attempts by Trump’s 
campaign to cooperate with the Russians. 
5 It is said that Russian trolls sent thousands of messages with the hashtag #ReasonsTo- 
LeaveEU on the day of UK’s referendum on EU membership. According to Twitter, the 
fake accounts tweeted 1,102 posts with this hashtag. The Russian-linked accounts tweeted 
the phrase “Brexit” more than 4,400 times during their period of activity, although mostly 
after the referendum had taken place. 
6 The East StratCom Task Force was created in 2015 with a mandate to combat fake news 
emanating from Russia, which had been identified as one of the biggest proponents of 
information warfare against the EU. In 2017, two additional Task Forces were established, 
focussing on Europe’s South and the Western Balkans. 
7 There are many programmes run by the EU (see the Media Literacy programme) 
and other organisations, such as UNESCO (e.g. Coalition of Information and Media 
Users in South East Europe, www.cimusee.org/mil-resources/organizations-initiatives-projects/european-charter-on-media-literacy/ ) or UNICEF ( www.unicef.org/geo gia - 
press-releases/developing-media-literacy-skills-young-people ). 
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Reading Arendt to Rethink 
Truth, Science, and Politics 
in the Era of Fake News 
Federica Merenda 
Introduction 
“No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each 
other, and no one, as far as I know, has ever counted truthfulness among the p litic l virtues” (Arendt 1967: 295). 
In spite of the success of such “commonplace” mentioned by Hannah Arendt 
at the very beginning of her reflections on Truth and Politics, in 21st century 
contemporary democracies truth, lies, and political opinions are very intertwined 
concepts. Expressions like “post-truth politics” and “fake news” by now entered 
the vocabulary of politics, and they are employed more and more to describe relevant dynamics of the contemporary political discourse. 
We live in times when it is not easy at all to distinguish between facts, mystification of facts –which contain some truths well-mingled with a high dose of distorted 
information – blatant lies, and political opinions. While reading the newspaper or 
scrolling through the social media newsfeeds of politicians directly speaking to “the 
people” through Facebook live videos – a habit which became particularly massive 
during the recent outbreak of Covid-19, when Facebook live-streaming in some 
countries replaced the usual institutional broadcasting on national television – we 
sometimes feel outraged as we spot blatant lies or traces of wisely hidden truths in 
political speeches (or tweets), or when we witness political leaders endorse information soon after unveiled as fake news. 
Sharing Arendt’s view that philosophy can help us to understand reality and 
to reconcile ourselves with the world we live in (Arendt 1994: 308), this chapter 
will consider relevant concepts and paradigms elaborated in Arendt’s works, which 
have been at the centre of modern and contemporary Western political thought 
even beyond Arendt. This conceptual toolbox purposely would help to clarify the 
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relation between (the different kinds of ) truth, (the different kinds of ) lying, and 
politics in contemporary democracies. 
Contextualising Arendt: On truth and politics 
in Western philosophy 
In order to examine the relationship between truth and politics, we move from 
Arendt’s distinction between different kinds of truth and even different degrees of 
lying. Identifying which truths possess a political value of some sort presupposes 
pondering even more basic questions that philosophers well before Arendt have 
tried to respond to: does truth exist as such? In case it exists, is it intelligible? And 
when it is not, is it dispensable? Can we talk about any knowledge at all beyond 
objective truths? Which kinds of truths are at odds with democracy and which are 
necessary for its wellbeing? 
The many different answers to these questions gave rise to different approaches 
to science, philosophy, and political theory. The discussions concerning whether 
truth can be deemed to exist as such and whether, in that case, it would be acc ssibl  to human knowledge are indeed deeply intertwined with the epistemological 
question of whether natural or philosophical truths could – and/or should – 
constitute the ultimate object of philosophical or scientific research and of the 
appropriateness of such pursuit as the qualifying characteristic of science. 
While pre-Socratic philosophers looked for the ultimate principle of natural 
reality, thereafter, spanning from the Cave in Plato’s myth to Schopenhauer’s Veil 
of Maya (Schopenhauer 1995) and through Kant’s Critiques, the idea that objective 
truth and the representation of reality by human beings, as a subjective perception 
or interpretation, may be two different things deeply affected the evolution of 
philosophical thought, and that of political theory. 1 
In the 18th century, Immanuel Kant shifted the focus of philosophical research 
from objective truth, as the study of an outer object, to the subject of knowledge 
and thus to human rationality, morality, and judgment (Kant 2007a; 2007b; 2012), 
to explore the way in which we, as human beings, perceive ourselves and the outer 
world. This brief premise shows the relevance of the subject we are treating in all 
the philosophical production; a philosophical production that our examination has 
not the ambition to analyse thoroughly but that constitutes the humus in which 
Arendt’s reflections on truth and politics – and contemporary further explorations – 
could emerge. 
In order to contextualise Arendt’s definition of truth and truths and their relationship with democratic politics, we adopt the di tinction drawn by Antonella 
Besussi (2013; 2015) in her work devoted to the concept of truth in contemporary 
political philosophy. Besussi usefully distinguishes between those political theories 
suggesting a banalisation of the relationship between truth and politics and those 
tending towards a dramatisation: it is in this second group that we find Arendt. 
The perspective of those allegedly banalising such relation is quite clear-cut in its 
premises: according to these thinkers, there is no objective truth at all to be found 
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out beyond our subjective interpretations. To bring this belief to its extreme would 
mean to say that there is no such thing as objective facts: subjective interpretations 
of reality are all we have. We can ponder whether it is convenient or not to attribute to our subjective interpretations of the world the characteristics of truth, that 
is to present them as undisputable. As an objective truth does not exist, to attribute 
the quality of truth to our subjective interpretations of the world will thus be a 
decision that we will take considering what truth does rather than what it is, 2 in a 
consequentialist perspective. 
On the other hand, political theorists who dramatise the relationship between 
truth and politics are not expressly excluding the possibility that an objective truth 
does exist. Facts do exist. What they point out is rather that, for different reasons, 
there is an incompatibility between truth and politics, supporting the idea that 
truth has no place in the political democratic realm, at least in ordinary circumstances. Such dramatisation, in Besussi’s taxonomy, assumed two different forms. 
The former is that of a “realistic conception of truth”. 3 In this view, truth does 
not concern politics in as far as the objective of democratic politics is not to asc rt i  which human representation of reality does correspond to truth. 
More specifically, politics should deliberate which principles a specific society 
gives priority to in a specific moment of its history, among those embodied in the 
programmes and policies proposed by the different competing political parties. 
These philosophers accept that individuals and groups can believe in comprehensive paradigms that give rise to the principles they support within the democratic 
competition, but once such principles enter the realm of democratic politics they 
become just alternative policies competing for consensus. As Norberto Bobbio 
would say, the discourse over the foundations of such principles is left outside 
the political arena which is just concerned about their possibility to be agreed on 
(Bobbio 1997). 
Quite differently, Hannah Arendt endorses, similarly to John Rawls, a “value- 
based conception of truth” by refusing to recognise truth as an absolute standard 
in the public sphere, from an anti-authoritarian stance. In Rawls’ Political Liber lism ( Rawls 2005 ), the principles of justice of a well-ordered society are proposed 
not because they are the true right principles per se, but because they are the ones 
that supposedly would be agreed on by individuals finding themselves in an ideal 
original position. The overlapping consensus is their source of legitimacy, and 
thus they are political principles, not moral ones. The function used by Rawls to 
identify them is political consensus, not truth, even if the first is conceived in an 
abstract way by means of a mental experiment. To accept truth within the well-ordered 
society would make the overlapping consensus impossible, as truth accepts 
no compromise. 
Such incompatibility between truth and democratic compromise is strongly 
perceived by Arendt as well: this is the element that will bring her in going deep in 
elaborating the taxonomy of truth, truths, and lying which we think does constitute 
a particularly useful conceptual tool for contemporary reflections. We will examine 
Arendt’s conceptualisation thoroughly in our next section, mainly referring to her 
works on Truth and Politics (Arendt 1967) and Lying in Politics ( Arendt 1969 ) but 
having in mind her much wider philosophical production. 
Factual truths, philosophical truths, and lying 
in politics: Arendt's perspective 
In her reflection on Truth and Politics, Arendt (1967) distinguishes between factual 
truths (facts, events) and rational truths (e.g. mathematical, scientific and philosophical truths) to specify the different relations they have with the political 
debate in a plural society and to investigate the consequences of their negation 
or mystification. 
In Arendt’s definition, factual truths are just factual statements which describe 
facts and events: with reasonable approximation – an approximation justified by 
common sense, a crucial concept in Arendt’s discourse ( Arendt 1982 ) – to say “It 
rains”, when it is actually raining, is a factual truth. Rational truths (a category 
which also includes philosophical and religious truths) are instead expressed in the 
form of statements like “two plus two is four” or “God exists”. 
What they both have in common is that they imply an element of coercion: 
Statements such as ‘The three angles of a triangle are equal to two angles of a 
square,’ ‘The earth moves around the sun,’ ‘It is better to suffer wrong than 
to do wrong’, ‘In August 1914 Germany invaded Belgium’ are very different 
in the way they are arrived at, but, once perceived as true and pronounced 
to be so, they have in common that they are beyond agreement, dispute, 
opinion, or consent 
( Arendt 1982 : 302). 
In Arendt’s view, any truth is coercive because it is beyond agreement, dispute, 
opinion, or consent, which are precisely those elements that, as we found in Rawls, 
make the democratic politics of the overlapping consensus possible. In this being 
undisputable and non-negotiable, truth is intrinsically anti-democratic. Yet, the 
distinction between factual truths and rational ones is crucial. 
Factual truths, while being at odds with the political debate, are necessary for 
the exercise of democratic power in a plural society. Also, this is the category 
which acquires critical relevance today with reference to the problem of fake news: 
it is factual truths that fake news denies On the contrary, according to Arendt, 
rational truths are both generally at odds with the political debate and also at odds 
with the exercise of democratic power in a plural society: as truth is not democratic, it does not allow for the plurality of opinions which is the essential nourishment of democracy. 
The content of rational truths can be admitted to the public sphere of democratic politics only in the form f a mere opinion among other opinions, which 
does not carry with its coercive value of truthfulness, and as long as it accepts 
to give up such claim for truthfulness. For instance, a political party can inform 
its action to religious values but it cannot do so by presenting its policies as the 
only true actions to take. Such religious values can enter the political arena just 
as opinions. 
On the other hand, factual truths, while being at odds with the political debate 
in their being uncontroversial, are not only totally compatible with democratic 
politics but even necessary for it. While this can appear contradictory, it works if 
we accept that facts belong to another dimension, which is placed underneath that 
of politics itself. “Facts and events [. . .] constitute the very texture of the political 
realm” (ibid.: 297), they are the ground political opinions can be built upon. 
If we do not agree on the facts at hand, we cannot appropriately start any discussion 
about how to deal with them, exchanging our opinions on the issue. 
While science and philosophy are the dimension of rational truths, politics is 
thus the realm of opinions, which is grounded on an underlying layer of factual 
truths. This ground is solid as long as it is not put into question, as long as its validity is not doubted. When facts are not universally recognised and their truthfulness 
is put into question, when the question “Is it really true that it’s raining?” is asked, 
deliberate lying can make its appearance in the public discourse and the ground 
which the political discourse is built upon, “the ground on which we stand and the 
sky that stretches above us” (ibid.: 313) starts shaking. 
Fake news: Mingling lies, facts, and opinions 
While we find Arendt’s definitions very useful, it is crucial to note that by driving 
distinctions between ordinary conditions and moments when “a community has 
embarked on organized lying on principle” (ibid.: 307) she was referring to totalitarianism. In that context, Arendt was able to identify more clear-cut dynamics and 
concepts than what are commonly at work today in post-truth democracies where 
populist forces are operating. 
To distinguish between a healthy relation linking truth and politics and the perversi  of such relation is more subtle if we want to apply Arendt’s categories not 
in the most radical context of totalitarian states but in the slippery slope between a 
well-functioning democracy and populist regimes. 
Still, rather than making our effort futile, such blurred conditions characterising 
the contemporary situation on the contrary make any attempt at a conceptual clarification even more necessary. In the public sphere of our contemporary 
liberal democracies, we can discuss, argue, and compare different opinions about 
how to deal with a particular fact or event, for instance climate change, only once 
we agree that climate change is a reality. Once we acknowledge that climate 
change is happening, each individual and each community involved can do their 
part to deal with the consequences of such an alarming fact. Experts can help 
to clarify the facts, identify the causes of the phenomenon, and the practices that 
are worsening it. 
Politicians can then propose different alternatives on how to face climate change 
in practice, with each alternative endowing competing values, rights, interests, and 
priorities. There are many possible alternatives to reach the same goal: for instance, 
according to their priorities and political values, to fight climate change politicians 
can propose policies on measures that do not disproportionally affect the most vul rabl  countries and individuals, or alternative ones that give priority to protecting the interests f the private s ctor. 
Journalists can provide the general public with accurate information both about 
climate change itself and about the policies currently under consideration by the 
different political parties and leaders. However, if some authoritative figure, let’s 
say the President of the United States, denies climate change as a fact by releasing 
declarations like “I don’t believe it” and “The concept of global warning was re t d by and for the Chinese in order to make US manufacturing non-competitive”
( Cheung 2020 ), at least part of the public debate is diverted from the confrontation between the different political options at disposal to fight climate change to a 
debate on whether climate change is actually happening or whether it is just a total 
mischief, an exaggeration, a plan of the Chinese government to disrupt the US as 
an economic power, a lie construed by those enterprises which have invested in 
green energy, and so on. 
This is a clear example of a negation of a fact: in this case, President Trump 
firstly put climate change into question and then created an alternative version of 
reality, a plain lie, that once pronounced by such an authoritative source entered 
in competition with the factual truth of climate change. Though the contemporary 
political regime in place in the US is not a totalitarian one, having the President 
releasing such declaration is still worrying for democracy. Unfortunately, we are 
witnessing similar dynamics in these very days with regards to Covid-19, not only 
in the US, but also in other Western democracies ( Soubhik et al. 2020 ). 
To reflect upon these contemporary cases, an operative way to think about 
truth which could be particularly useful, and that we find very much in line with 
Arendt’s conceptual toolkit that we have hereby adopted, has been elaborated 
by Franca D’Agostini in her work Introduction to Truth ( D’Agostini 2011 ). Here, 
she invites the reader to consider truth not as a substantial content per se (which 
would make it correspond to a specific truth) but as a conceptual function, a qu lity that statements may or may not have or acquire. In mathematical language, 
we would thus represent truth not as a variable x but as a function f(x) – as 
a question, rather than as an answer. By applying this definition, we can thus 
generally state that to think about truth means to think about whether the questi n “Is it tr e or not?” can be applied to our perceptions, representations, interpretations of reality. 
Once we ask such question, irrespective of the answer we get, truth has entered 
the dimension of our discourse. When, on the contrary, we implicitly assume a 
statement as uncontroversial, we are considering it a fact, by excluding the po sible debate on its truthfulness or falsity from our concern and thus leaving it in 
the background of our discourse, not applying the function. As an example, we 
can take the Preamble of the American Declaration of Independence. By writing 
“we hold these truths to be self-evident”, 4 Thomas Jefferson and his peers made 
the political-philosophical principles included in the Declaration, among which 
the principle that “all men are created equal”, uncontroversial; they transformed 
them into facts. The question “is it true that all men are equal?” is pre-emptively 
displaced because such principle is placed in the sphere of facts, which is beyond 
arguments. Facts are assumed as truths without the question on their truthfulness 
even being asked, because to ask that question would mean to doubt them. 
The question of the relation between truth and politics can thus be translated 
into the appropriateness of asking this question about statements expressed in the 
public sphere: is it appropriate to apply truthfulness as a standard in politics, to 
ask whether what a politician says is true or not? Whether the political solutions 
suggested are the true answer to political problems? Or should we just focus on 
whether we would wish those policies to be adopted in view of their consequences? Do facts have a place in politics? And what is the role of other subjects 
participating in the public debate, spanning from the common citizen to journalists, public figures or intellectuals? 
When there are politicians denying facts, truth makes its appearance within the 
political realm, where it does not belong. When political figures and those ex rcising public powers lie about factual truths, they bring facts from the background of 
the political sphere to the political arena itself, that as we said is the realm of o inion . In these cases, truth as a function is applied to facts which, as such, should be 
considered instead uncontroversial and accepted as they are. 
As the truthfulness of such facts is doubted or negated, they are brought by their 
detractors to the political arena, where they are attacked by fake news through the 
means employed in the competition between different opinions: in order to be 
chosen among competing ones, they are asked to be convincing. 
But truth is seldom convincing in its being accidental. Factual truths are not 
opinions resulting from accurate reasoning or reflections with a teleological scope. 
Therefore, facts cannot be exhaustively explained or thoroughly understood. 
In this sense they are accidental. They can only be witnessed and believed. It is thus 
more a question of faith, or at least trust, in the source of information than a matter 
of epistemic resources of the recipients of the information themselves. As Arendt 
warns us, lies are usually much easier to believe than factual truths and thus they 
can be far more persuasive: 
Since the liar is free to fashion his ‘facts’ to fit the profit and pleasure, or even 
the mere expectations, of his audience, the chances are that he will be more 
persuasive than the truth-teller. Indeed, he will usually have plausibility on 
his side; his exposition will sound more logical, as it were, since the element 
of unexpectedness – one of the outstanding characteristics of all events – has 
mercifully disappeared 
(Arendt 1967: 307). 
The more and more scientists, intellectuals, and scholars are called upon in the 
public debate to present hard data, “neutral” information that the audience can 
cling on to in such uncertain times when factual truths are blatantly negated by 
populist leaders and intellectually dishonest politicians. Experts’ action is crucial. 
In ordinary circumstances, stating facts is not to be considered a political action 
as acknowledging something that already exists does not give origins to anything 
new, which is the characteristic of human action in Arendt’s wording. Still, when 
a community has embarked upon 
organized lying on principle, and not only with respect to particulars, can 
truthfulness as such, unsupported by the distorting forces of power and 
interest, become a political factor of the first order. Where everybody lies 
about everything of importance, the truth-teller, whether he knows it or 
not, has begun to act; he, too, has engaged himself in political business, for, 
in the unlikely event that he survives, he has made a start toward changing 
the world 
(ibid.). 
The noblest contribution of intellectual labour: 
Conclusive remarks 
These reflections are deeply intertwined with Arendt’s peculiar idea of politics, 
which is very close to the isonomía of the polis in Ancient Greece, as she points 
out in all her works and she particularly explores in The Human Condition ( Arendt 
1958 ). Such idea of democratic power is in a way the contrary to dominion 
and totalitarianism and is therefore a good antidote to totalitarian tendencies in 
weak democracies. 5 
According to Arendt, philosophers, scientists, politicians, and common citizens 
are part of the same community of human beings precisely in virtue of sharing 
the common ground of facts, the world of things that connects yet holds us apart. 
It is the plurality of the human condition itself to be embroidered within “the 
common world that unites and separates us” ( Arendt 1958 ), the world of facts, 
events and accidents over and among which human action can be performed. 
The very existence of such a world makes us a plurality by connecting us through 
our sharing it. Still, such a world is common as long as we share a common sense that 
enables us to understand each other: the common sense that is necessary to name 
things and to discuss them, trusting the fact that when we say something the person 
we are talking to gets pretty much a similar idea of what we have in mind while 
saying the word. When lies are so widespread as to have become undistinguishable 
from facts, our common sense is lost. 
The loss of common sense would be such a radical problem that among contemporary reflections on post-truth politics, there are some th t consider it as just 
a symptom of a more fundamental problem: 
More than cause of the state of crisis of contemporary liberal democracies, post-truth is the visible symptom of a deeper problem, which in 
philosophical terms could be rendered as hyper-individualism or radical 
subjectivism, which is perhaps best expressed using a word from ordinary 
language: solitude 
( Alagna 2019 ). 
When factual truth is put into question, denied and substituted by deliberate lies, 
we may start to have reasons to worry about the ability of democratic guarantees 
to prevent any political discourse paving the way for an exercise of power that 
reminds us more of political dominion than of democratic power. 
More radically, when the practice of organised lying becomes systematic and 
we lose trust in political institutions and in each other as epistemic sources, we may 
worry that it is thus sociability and, as a result, politics itself that is endangered. 
Arendt is quite optimistic about the fact that, as long as there are witnesses and 
truth-tellers, in the long run truth will outlive organised lying (Arendt 1967). Yet, 
nowadays, direct confrontations between ‘experts’ and lying politicians do not 
too often end with the first category winning the debate and this is not seemingly 
managing to disrupt lying on factual truths as a political strategy. When thinking 
about the contemporary fake-news politics scenario as this book is seeking to do, 
we need to take into account elements which are peculiar to current times, c t xt al elements which have an impact on the success of the strategies to rebuild 
a stability for the shaking ground we stand on. First of all, we could provocatively 
ask how relevant ‘the long run’ in which Arendt puts her confidence in is in such 
times of short-sighted political propaganda, which usually aims at winning one 
debate today with all the arms at its disposal without caring that much about lies 
being uncovered afterwards. If we go from election to election, we risk ‘the long 
run’ to never come. 
Secondly, to have experts battling against politicians on social networks or 
onscreen television debates, extrapolated from their institutional environment, 
is tangibly bringing factual truth into the political dimension where it does not 
belong. When Arendt calls upon intellectuals, journalists, historians to be truth- 
tellers, she does not suggest that they engage in direct competition against the lying 
politicians, nor that they replace them by calling experts to take political decisions 
instead of politicians. The risk of further mingling facts with politics is high. This 
neither helps the authoritativeness of science nor that of politics itself. Experts and 
politicians have very different roles and even when the former play a ‘political’ role 
through their stating of facts, they do not at all exhaust politics as such. On the 
contrary, experts’ role should always be ancillary to that of politicians. For Arendt, 
stating factual truth is essential in helping us to understand what political actors 
should not do, rather than what they must (Sorrentino 2013: 90). 
Once facts are to a certain extent shared – and we are aware, as Arendt h r lf surely was, that considering factual truths undisputable is simplistic, as there 
can be disagreements on facts even among ‘experts’ – it is up to those exercising 
the political powers to propose policies on how to tackle them by taking into 
account different concerns at the same time and prioritising over certain values, 
objectives, issues instead of others. The contribution that the ‘science’ of political philosophy can offer to politics is to provide citizens, other than politicians, 
with conceptual instruments aimed at achieving clarity in their discourse. This is 
what Weber calls the “ethical achievement” of science in politics at the end on 
his lecture on ‘Science as vocation’ (Weber 2004). Once facts are restated, the 
democratic debate among different political opinions can – and must, to have a 
functioning democracy – restart; the responsibility for this stands with politics, 
not with science. 6 
Notes 
1 To contextualise Arendt’s reflections, which will be examined in the second section of this 
chapter, see Sorrentino (2017). 
2 In Besussi’s recollection, such premise is shared and differently articulated by Richard 
Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Bernard Williams and Ronald 
Dworkin. See Besussi (2013 : 9–27). 
3 According to Besussi (2013) , such perspective is shared by Hans Kelsen, Max Weber and 
Leo Strauss. 
4 Declaration of Independence: a transcription (1776) US National Archives, available at www.- 
archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript (last consulted 1 April 2020). 
5 See Cavarero (2019). 
6 “The objective knowledge of science is not just true, it is useful too: it provides us with 
notions to orient ourselves in the world and it trains us at thinking, teaching us a logical 
and methodological accuracy that is valuable notwithstanding the action we intend to perf rm [. . .] Also, it defies factual beliefs which are not objective, it unveils value-judgements 
disguised as factual truths, it solves moral disagreements resulting from lying on facts or 
reasonings which are logically unsound [. . .] This ability to achieve clarity through statements which re “true” is the meaning, the significanc , the major and noblest contribution of intellectual labour. And that is so mainly as, by fostering a sense of responsibility, 
it positively influences the behaviour of political actors” ( Ferrera 2013 : 52). 
References 
Alagna , M. ( 2019 ) ‘ The ground trembling under our feet. Truth, politics and solitude ’, Soft 
Power 6 ( 2 ): 111 – 29 . 
Arendt , H. ( 1958 ) The Human Condition , second edition, Chicago : University of Chicago 
Press . 
Arendt , H. ( 1967 / 2005 ) ‘ Truth and politics ’, in J. Medina ., D. Wood (eds), Truth: Engagements Across Philosophical Traditions , London – New York : Wiley-Blackwell . 
Arendt , H. ( 1969 ) Lying in Politics. Reflections on the Pentagon Papers , New York : Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich . 
Arendt , H. ( 1982 ) Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy , Brighton : Harvester . 
Arendt , H. ( 1994 ) (or. ed. 1954 ) ‘ Understanding and politics ’, in: Ead ., Essays on Understanding 1930–1954: Formation, Exile and Totalitarianism , New York : Schoke  Books . 
Besussi , A. (ed.) ( 2013 ) Verità e politica. Filosofie contemporanee , Roma : Carocci . 
Besussi , A. (ed.) ( 2015 ) Filosofia, verità e politica. Questioni classiche , Roma : Carocci . 
Bobbio , N. ( 1997 ) ‘ Sul fondamento dei diritti dell’uomo? ’, in: Id ., L’età dei diritti , Torino : 
Einaudi . 
Castelli , F. ( 2012 ) ‘ Le verità della Politica. Hannah Arendt sul rapporto tra Verità, Menzogna 
e Potere ’, in: A. Pirni (ed.), Verità del potere, potere della verità , Pisa : ETS . 
Cavarero , A. ( 2019 ) Democrazia sorgiva. Note sul pensiero politico di Hannah Arendt , Milano : 
Raffaello Cortina Editore . 
Cheung , H. ( 2020 ) ‘ What does Trump actually believe on climate change? ’, BBC , 23 
January 2020, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51213003 (last consulted 1 April 
2020). 
Cotroneo , G. ( 2012 ), ‘ L’avventura della menzogna politica ’, Filosofia Politica , XXVI ( 3 ): 
463 – 70 . 
D’Agostini , F. ( 2011 ) Intoduzione alla verità , Torino : Bollati Boringhieri . 
D’Agostini , F. , M. Ferrera ( 2019 ) La verità al potere. Sei diritti aletici , Torino : Einaudi . 
Ferraris , M. ( 2017 ) Postverità e altri enigmi , Bologna : Il Mulino . 
Ferrera , M. ( 2013 ) ‘ Max Weber: Verità e responsabilità. Il binomio virtuoso ’, in: A. Besussi 
(ed.), Verità e politica , Roma : Carocci , 48 – 65 . 
Kant , I. ( 2007 a) (or. ed. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1787 ) Critique of Pure Reason , London : 
Penguin Classics . 
Kant , I. ( 2007 b) (or. ed. Kritik der Urtheilskraft, 1790 ) Critique of Judgement , Oxford : Oxford 
University Press . 
Kant , I. ( 2012 ) (or. ed. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788 ) Critique of Practical Reason , New 
York : Dover Publications . 
Origgi , G. ( 2015 ) ‘ La verità, nient’altro che la verità? Piccola storia filosofica della menzogna ',
MicroMega. Almanacco di filosofia , 2015/ 2 : 83 – 97 . 
Rawls , J. ( 2005 ) Political Liberalism , New York : Columbia University Press . 
Schopenhauer , A. ( 1995 ) (or. ed. Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, 1818 / 19 [I] – 1844 [II] – 
1859 [III]) The World as Will and Representation , E. F. J. Payne (ed.), New York : Dover 
Publications . 
Sorrentino , V. ( 2013 ) ‘ Hannah Arendt. Verità, politica e mondo comune ’, in: A. Besussi 
(ed.), Verità e politica. Filosofie contemporanee , Roma : Carocci . 
Sorrentino , V. ( 2017 ) ‘ La politica tra visibile e invisibile. Sul concetto di sfera pubblica in 
Hannah Arendt ’, Politica & Società 2 : 259 – 74 . 
Soubhik et al. ( 2020 ) Evaluating COVID-19 Public Health Messaging in Italy: Self-Reported 
Compliance and Growing Mental Health Concerns , Working paper, 24 March 2020, https://- 
gking.harvard.edu/covid-italy (last consulted 1 April 2020). 
Urbinati , N. ( 2019 ) Io, il popolo. Come il populismo trasforma la democrazia , Bologna : Il Mulino . 
Weber , M. ( 2004 ) (or. ed. Wissenschalft als Beruf, 1919 ) The Vocation Lectures , D. Owen , 
T.B. Strong (eds), Indianapolis – Cambridge : Hackett Publishing Company . 
2 
Inequality in the Public Sphere 
Epistemic injustice, discrimination, and violence 
Elisa Piras 
Introduction 
Contemporary democracies rely on the delicate balance between two fundamental 
principles of politics: as we can read at the beginning of almost every democratic 
constitution, within a democratic system all citizens are considered free and equal 
members of the political community. Even if we frame democratic politics in terms 
of fairness or social justice – setting the bar higher towards a normative definition 
of democracy, as a large number of contemporary political theorists do – the two 
principles at the heart of any conception of justice do not change, although their 
alternative interpretations can produce very different political outcomes. Within the 
public sphere, communicative interactions between individuals and groups occur 
daily, alternative opinions interact, and the public debate unfolds as the result of the 
exchange, influencing the democratic game, i.e. the formation of electoral majorities 
and the governments. Social and political inequalities affect the structure and functioning of the public sphere – the arena where public opinion emerges as the result 
of the continuous exchange of information and opinions. Within the public sphere, 
inequality produces harm and injustice for the members of marginalised groups. 
Drawing on the contemporary debate among liberal political theorists, the chapter 
will analyse the formation of public opinion, highlighting its political implications; 
then, it will explain and connect the concepts of epistemic and structural injustice; 
eventually, it will advance the concept of dialogic injustice to depict the specific form 
of epistemic injustice which harms members of marginalised and oppressed groups 
when they experience credibility deficits or apparently insurmountable difficulties in 
acceding to the public sphere as free and equal members. 
How inequalities affect the public sphere 
Liberty and equality, the two principles lying at the heart of liberalism and democracy, do very often meet and at times clash within the relational setting widely 
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known as the public sphere: this is a domain of social life where public ini n is formed and where a sui ge eris social actor, the public, emerges (Habermas 
1991: 398). 1 Within the public sphere, information is spread/offered and obtained/ 
consumed. There, communication-based interactions between individuals and 
groups occur daily; alternative opinions are publicly stated, refuted, supported, and 
attacked. Moreover, since the public sphere is a filter between state and society, 
it is the domain of public reason ( Rawls 1993 ; Habermas 1995 ; Gaus 2011 ; Forst 
2014 ), where citizens’ requests for justifications for state laws and actions arise and 
justificatory accounts are presented in response by the representatives of state institutions. Every citizen is entitled to ask and receive acceptable answers (reasonable 
justifications) when they question the ratio of political rules, because obedience to 
any authority is acceptable insofar as this serves the preservation or enhancement of 
citizens’ liberty and equality ( Gaus 1999 ; Forst 2014 ). The entitlement to justification can be derived also from the conception of the state as the result of a contract,
or from the Kantian idea that all citizens are to be considered as co-legislators 
(Rawls 1999: 135–37). With respect to democracy, the public sphere is not only 
a filter, but also a fulcrum: allowing continuous communication between govern ent and citizens, it guarantees the equilibrium, stability, and functioning of the
system. There, political consensus can be built and eroded as part of the game for 
achieving political power; also, it is in the public sphere that the formation of electoral majorities occurs. 
There are two main assumptions for the existence of a public sphere. First, 
within a certain society there is a sufficient degree of liberty to allow the proliferation of ideas, pinions, beliefs, and tastes. Second, all these different ideas, opinions, beliefs, and tastes can be publicly spelled out and any citizen has equal right 
to express her/his own thought or to profess her/his faith. Ideally, a democratic 
public sphere is characterised by reasonable pluralism: there is a wide variety of 
doctrines about truth or about what is good, but each of them respects the others 
and none aims at defeating all alternative doctrines ( Rawls 1993 : 38 ff.; Gaus 1999 ). 
Again, the two assumptions reflect the core principles of liberalism and democracy: 
liberty and equality. Within the public sphere, from the debate among free and 
equal citizens, not only the specific policies and laws, but also the constitutional 
principles of any democracy are periodically discussed and evaluated, making ssibl  the participation of the public to the processes of constitutional reform which 
make democratic systems stable and resilient over time ( Rawls 1993 ). 
Several problems emerge when we shift from the ideal of the public sphere 
described above to the non-ideal conditions of existing democracies. In the next 
section, I will investigate how social and political inequalities affect the distribution of epistemic resources and how this unequal distribution negatively affects 
some individuals because of their belonging to marginalised groups, contributing 
to perpetuate their unjust marginalisation. However, another problem affecting the 
public sphere of existing democracies needs to be briefly mentioned here, since it 
is closely linked to that of epistemic injustice. Pluralism is not always reasonable: 
precisely because all doctrines and opinions can freely and equally circulate within 
the public sphere, also discriminatory and violent (non-reasonable) ideas can enter 
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the public discussion. As a matter of fact, they often come together with abusive or 
insulting language and sometimes they can serve as triggers for actions of violence 
carried out by individuals or by organised groups. The problematic reconciliation 
between freedom of expression and equal respect with regard to what is often 
called hate speech or ‘group libel’ ( Waldron 2012 ) is an especially thorny task, not 
only for political theorists, but also for politicians and for professionals working in 
the field of education as well as in the mass media system. Within liberal democracies, there is a trade-off between protecting freedom of expression for all citiz n  and combating discriminatory attitudes and discourses which are potentially 
harmful for marginalised minorities. There are at least two main solutions to this 
conundrum. The first solution is to set the boundaries to free speech and exclude 
from the public sphere any harmful speech which could undermine the dignity of 
the targeted people (ibid.). The second solution consists of evaluating on a 
case-by-case basis whether it is better to place a higher value on freedom of expression rather than on other liberal values (privacy, security, equality, or the prev nti  of harm), acknowledging the political ature of any l mitation to free speech 
( Fish 1994 ). 
The contemporary public sphere abounds of examples of discriminatory attitu s and discourses – among others, racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti- 
Gypsyism, ageism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, etc. – used to frame political 
narratives and build consensus for implicitly or explicitly discriminatory political 
projects. As Catharine MacKinnon explained, in similar cases “speech acts”; to put 
it differently, concern about the political implications of free speech is justified, 
since there is something hidden behind words: “In the context of social inequality, 
so-called speech can be an exercise of power which constructs the social reality in 
which people live, from objectification to genocide. (. . .) Social supremacy is made, 
inside and between people, through making meanings” ( MacKinnon 1993 : 31). 
Discriminatory discourses are powerful political resources, and they are esp cially easy to exploit within the contemporary public sphere, which is multimedia, fragmented, and rhizomatic. 2 In this environment, pace to Kant (1784) and 
Habermas (1991), philosophers and public intellectuals are not the only ones who 
have the ability and authority to influence public opinion and participate in debates 
about politics. This is so because the public – the community of citizens where 
public opinion coalesces – is larger and much more composite compared to the 
past; consequently, both the language, the cultural references, and the messages 
used to build convincing argumentation have changed. Rationality, reasonableness, reciprocity, and civility, the pillars of the most influential liberal accounts of 
the public sphere elaborated during the last two centuries and a half, seem to give 
way to new features of public discourse that we can easily spot in contemporary 
political debates: unrestrained appeal to emotions, spontaneity, simplicity, refusal 
of the politically correct ( Salmon 2013 ). 
At this point, one might ask: why is it so important how public opinion is 
formed? It is because in a democracy public opinion grounds political consensus 
for the actors who can acquire political power. While observing the democratic 
‘market of opinions’, it is paramount to detect which opinions look more peali g to the public, to trace the actors who back up those opinions and to identify
the social mechanisms favouring their diffusion. 3 Since they have a crucial role 
for the formation of individual opinions and then of public opinion and consensus, information and communication deserve special attention. This comes as no 
news: almost a century ago, John Dewey (1927) convincingly raised this point 
while he was looking for an answer to the question: why is the US, notwithstanding the military and economic achievements which made ts society great, 
a soulless and defective democracy? The answer is that the institutional mechanisms are not enough if the sense of community is mis ing. An ideal public sphere 
would present a fair market of opinions, based on reliable information provided 
by independent professionals sincerely committed to offer neutral accounts of 
the facts. Within such a public sphere, there would be an ideal public, capable of 
distinguishing the quality of the information, to collect it from different sources 
and to assess it thanks to critical reasoning. Public opinion emerging from the 
interactions among individual opinions would then support the best political 
option available, and possibly concur to its definition. Thus, in front of this 
public, there would be a government sustained by a (well-deserved) consensus, 
representing the interests of the society, pursuing the common good and reasonably justifying its actions. Both the conditions of reasonable p uralism and 
public reason would be realised ( Rawls 1993 ). Like contemporary proponents of 
deliberative and participatory accounts of democracy, Dewey assigned a central 
importance to discussion, consultation, persuasion, and debate for democratic 
decision-making; of course, in his theoretical account high-quality education 
and unbiased information available for all citizens are fundamental prerequisites 
for the life of a democratic community. 
Unfortunately, in non-ideal circumstances unequal access to good educ tion and biased information are two of the reasons why the public sphere is 
not equally accessible to all the citizens, while it is especially hospitable to the 
powerful actors who can mobilise resources and know-how to influence public 
opinion. They do so by producing and spreading biased information and disseminating opinions and narratives which are suitable to further their interests, 
either to achieve or preserve political power or to maintain the social status quo. 
The new communication media, especially the Internet and the social networks, 
are very useful in this respect, since they allow the replacement of rational discourses with emotional messages, selecting the information sources and opinions 
that each citizen is exposed to on the basis of her/his status within society and of 
her/his social connections. An effect of this would be the transformation of our 
democracies towards a model of bubble democracy: the public dissolves into a yri  of self-referential ‘bubbles’, each allowing its ‘inhabitants’ to hear and read 
only the information and opinions which match their pre-established personal 
opinion. Thus, the public sphere is more and more fragmented and polarised, 
and the epistemic fruitfulness of the debate within the bubble is nullified: the 
ideas circulating within each bubble are homogeneous and they do not change 
over time ( Palano 2020 ). This explains also why in contemporary democratic 
societies a vast majority of the citizens are unable to collect information, formulate their own interests, and mobilise; thus, they are governed by a restricted elite 
who is able to perform this tasks effectively ( Goodin and Spiekermann 2015 ). 
The first move for marginalised and oppressed groups to take an active part in 
the public debate could be to develop epistemic solidarity, the “strategy of pooling 
information with selected others” (ibid.: 440). This would help citizens to bypass 
two paradoxical problems of the insufficient exposure to alternative opinions 
which characterise contemporary communication: epistemic bubbles – the co dition of citizens who are limited in their attempts to formulate their own opinions 
because they have access to a small number of opinions, and echo chambers – the 
condition where some opinions are actively excluded and discredited ( Sunstein 
2009 ; Nguyen 2018 ). To simplify, “epistemic bubbles exclude through omission, 
while echo chambers exclude by manipulating trust and credence” ( Nguyen 
2018 : 2). The same social epistemic phenomena facilitate the dissemination of 
fake news, post-truth messages, false or misleading political narratives. 4 These 
are especially worrisome features of the contemporary public sphere, not only 
because they hamper the discussion about the common good, but also because 
in order to do so they tend to exploit and exacerbate existing social inequalities, setting some groups against other groups and reproducing marginalisation 
and oppression. 
Two effects of discrimination: Epistemic 
and structural injustice 
In the previous paragraph, some concepts of social epistemology have been taken 
into consideration. Social epistemology is a subdiscipline of epistemology which 
examines and critically evaluates “the processes through which beliefs, decisions 
and opinions are formed, maintained and revised by individuals, groups, institutions 
and, in the widest sense, social practices and social systems” ( Prijić-Samaržija 2018 : 
21). Similar investigations are particularly interesting for political philosophers: in 
1690, at the outset of liberal thought, John Locke formulated the ‘law of opinion 
or reputation’. 5 This explains how, by approving or disapproving of an individual’s 
ideas and actions, other people exert a pressure on her/him to conform to a certain 
way of thinking and behaving which is acceptable or mainstream in her/his social 
environment. Humans are social animals; they fear isolation and peers’ reprobation. Therefore, the majority of individuals will express their opinion in public 
only if they do not risk appearing as social outcast – this, of course, does not mean 
that divergent opinions cease to exist; they are hidden and in some cases they can 
resurface. In democratic contexts, we could observe the sudden appearance of 
hidden political opinions in numerous elections which showed unpredicted results – 
people use their quasi-statistical sense to understand the prevailing opinion in 
their social environment and, in case they have a different opinion, they tend to 
conceal it: this is the so-called spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann 1980). 
There are two insights in Locke’s reflection on the problem of individual opinions 
which are relevant for the present discussion: first, the coercive nature of society 
over the individual; second, the importance of personal reputation and esteem for 
any citizen who hopes to be integrated. 6 If we consider them carefully, we can see 
that, again, there are two principles at stake: liberty and equality. 
A serious threat to the principle of equality is connected to the importance of 
reputation and esteem: because of individuals belonging to certain groups, they 
may experience epistemic harm as a result of a negative identity-based prejudice. 
Epistemic injustice, as it has been defined in an influential essay written by Miranda 
Fricker (2007) , is a form of injustice which may assume two forms: testimonial 
injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice means that a person’s 
testimony is not considered reliable or is not taken seriously because of her/his 
identity, which is read in the light of prejudices and stereotypes that undermine 
her/his credibility. On the other hand, hermeneutic injustice applies when a p rson suffers injustice but is not fully aware of it – because of the cultural context 
in which one is marginalised – and therefore fails to recognise and denounce the 
injustice. To clarify these two concepts, it is helpful to consider two examples, 
both taken from the 2011 movie The Help, directed by Tate Taylor. The film is 
set in the US in 1963. One of the African-American service women protagonists, 
Aibileen Clark, is falsely accused of stealing three silver pieces of cutlery from the 
house where she works. Although Aibileen tries to prove her honesty by pr viding a (true and) plausible narrative of what happened, her testimony is not believed 
and the (white) landlady fires her. In this case, we can talk about witness injustice. 
Minny Jackson, another African-American maid, is a victim of continuous vi le e by her husband but has no clear perception of the injustice she is a victim 
of and the crime that is repeatedly committed by her husband against her, and so 
fails to improve her condition. She cannot put into words the injustice that she 
experiences; therefore, she does not consider herself as a victim. This second case 
falls into the category of hermeneutical injustice. 7 
Epistemic injustice is closely connected with structural injustice, a phenomenon 
which has been investigated by feminist and postcolonial scholars ( Young 1990 ; 
Lu 2018 ). This particular kind of injustice pertains to the whole socio-political 
system: 
A social structure can be said to be unjust when the rules perpetuated through 
it persistently disadvantage some social groups vis-à-vis others. Whatever 
baseline is chosen to help identify structural injustice, if the injustice is to 
count as structural and not merely a result of unfair or unequal distribution, 
it must express some more persistent or deeper power-differential between 
social groups 
( Jugov and Ypi 2019 ). 
Both forms of injustice are linked to the existence of a structural asymmetry of epist mic power: in society, some people have identities that give them an advantage 
in cases where credibility comes into play, while others are (consciously or unconsciously) considered as lacking in credibility by a large number of people. In proc ss s where conflicting narratives about a given event are weighed up, epistemic 
injustice can play a crucial role in the fate of the victim and the accused, and the 
dynamics of the economy of credibility can be more relevant than the determination of factual truth. 
Although Fricker focuses on the trial phase, it should be noticed that epistemic 
injustice can also have a significant impact in the investigative phase, in media 
coverage and in public reception of news about a certain criminal event. In other 
words, in the judgement, rather than an objective evaluation of epistemic cr dibility, which can be established if there is competence and sincerity in a testimony, 
an evaluation vitiated by the existence of negative identity-prejudicial stereotypes 
related to the identity of the witness prevails. This is an implicit epistemic distortion (bias) which may be potentially harmful for the members of marginalised 
groups and for the groups as such, because instances of “persistent and systematic” 
epistemic injustice reinforce and perpetuate the systemic marginalisation and discrimination of the whole group (ibid.: 28). 
Generalising from the case of testimonial injustice, we could say that in the 
process of formation of public opinion the members of marginalised groups experience dialogic injustice, that means that they ar  not considered as equal partners in 
the exchange of information or opinions which lead to the construction of public 
opinion. They lack the reputation and credibility – and very often the self-esteem – 
needed to actively take part in discussions concerning the political good. Because 
of hermeneutical injustice, very often a person who is unjustly marginalised in the 
public sphere fails to recognise it as an injustice and therefore is unable to react to 
the injustice. In a similar situation, the person is not ‘epistemically aware’, but her/ 
his capacity of analysing reality and of acting toward its transformation is reduced 
because of partial or total ‘epistemic opacity’ (ibid.: 14–17). Overcoming dialogic 
injustice is especially challenging, since the contemporary public sphere presents 
significant obstacles to the participation of members of discriminated and margin- 
alised groups on conditions of equality. In addition to the perceived credibility eficit and the self-c nsorship that this might bring about, the technological tools and 
skills needed to access the public sphere on a regular basis, the considerable time 
needed to acquire reliable information, the difficulty in identifying trustworthy 
epistemic authorities and the diffusion of discriminatory discourses and narratives, 
combined with the unbridled resort to hate speech, are some of the challenges 
ahead. Perhaps the first action needed in order to start a transformative process 
for changing the public sphere and making it more in line with the principles of 
liberty and equality is to organise collective action and activate epistemic solidarity 
in order to influence the formation of public opinion. 
Conclusion 
Looking at the socio-political implications of epistemic injustice, it is important 
to notice how it is linked to the unequal distribution of power within the society 
and how it harms the lives of the marginalised members, not only during police 
investigation or trials, but in how it reproduces and strengthens their condition 
of marginalisation and oppression. In particular, this chapter showed that credibility deficits due to negative-identity stereotypes affect members of marginalised 
groups even when they take part in any public discussion or when they abstain 
from participating because they think their opinion would not be heard. In a l gy with the epistemic injustice, this phenomenon could be called dialogic inju ti . The persistent and systematic credibility deficit, together with the lack of 
time, technological devices and skills, explains why often members of the margin- 
alised groups tend not to enter the public sphere or, when they do so, they do not 
participate on an equal foot – as Fricker notes, identity power “at once constructs 
and distorts who the subject really is,” conditioning her/his own understanding of 
the self ( Fricker 2007 : 55). 
It is important to point out that the absence or silence of marginalised people 
within the public sphere has a negative impact not only for their individual lives, 
but also for the formation of public opinion – which, as seen in the first section 
of the chapter, matters when it comes to supporting candidates for government 
positions. Public opinion emerges from the exchange of views about politically 
relevant issues; if the number of opinions is reduced, the diagnosis of the relevant 
problems and the search for viable solutions will be based on partial evidence and 
reflect the interests of a part of the society. 
Notes 
1 In the final part of his seminal work, Habermas maintains that the public sphere as he 
defines it has been functioning for a relatively short period in history – from the rise of 
the bourgeoisie during the 18th century to its crisis, which emerged by the half of the 20th 
century – and that it would have entered a situation of crisis with the advent of globalised 
capitalism and the simultaneous processes of depoliticisation/cooptation of labour, culture, 
and education. According to Habermas, public opinion would be more and more p liti ally irrelevant or prey of the manipulat ons of the powerful actors of the market. Non th less, the concept of the public sphere – analysed, criticised, and rea sessed – from many 
perspectives is still widely used by sociologists as well as by political philosophers not only 
for reflecting about the past, but also about the present (cfr. Fraser 1990 ; Calhoun 1992 ; 
Benhabib 1997 ; Palano 2020). For a critical reappraisal of the significance of Habermas’ 
contribution for the debate, see Genscher (2006). 
2 For a brief reconstruction of the main features of the debate on the conceptualisation of 
the public sphere for the digital era, see Casadei (2014). 
3 As Antonio Gramsci (2014) pointed out, looking at the experience of the coming to 
power of the Fascist party in Italy during the 1920s, the progressive construction of olitical consensus requires the widespread disseminat on within the public sphere of ideas and 
ideals (elements which combine to form a worldview, or a comprehensive political o trin ). The final goal is to acquire cultural hegemony and maximise consensus, eventually 
obtaining political power. Disseminating anti-democratic ideas, which implicitly u dermined the principles of liberty and equality, Mussolini and his party won the democratic 
game and made loot of democratic institutions and laws. 
4 A stimulating discussion on the evolving relationship between truth and politics emerges 
from the different political philosophers’ contributions presented in Bistagnino and Fum- 
agalli (2019). In particular, Antonella Besussi, Paolo Gerbaudo, and Valeria Ottonelli look 
from different angles at one main question that is crucial for the discussion presented 
in this book: the change of the truth-authority nexus that is occurring within democr tic soci ties. On the same topic, see also Stuart Sim’s discussion of the emergence 
of post-truth politics and the ambiguous transformation of liberal societies towards a 
post-liberal condition which might entail progressive or conservative developments 
( Sim 2019 : 139–53). Among the many recent reflections focussing especially on how 
post-truth affects contemporary philosophical thinking about politics, see Palano (2020) 
and Newman (2019). 
5 The problem of peer pressure and of the effects of conformism produced by the society 
has been explored more in-depth in 1859 by John Stuart Mill, who looked at its effects 
both on the cultural and political domain. In the latter, the concept of the law of opinion 
was translated into that of the tyranny of the majority, in which a democratic majority 
forces its will on the minority. For a reading of the history of political thought from the 
perspective of a theory of public opinion, see Noelle-Neumann (1980). 
6 Locke presents another thought-provoking idea: the diffusion of certain opinions is (also) 
a matter of fashion. This means that widely held opinions are more likely to be publicly 
stated than extravagant opinions. Moreover, as happens with any fashion, there is at least 
one trend-setter, who, consciously or unconsciously, triggers the diffusion of a certain 
opinion. 
7 In both cases, the discrimination is intersectional: both Aibileen and Minny are victims of 
discrimination for at least three reasons: because they are African American, because they 
are women, because they belong to the working class. For a discussion on how intersec- 
tionality works for epistemic injustice, see Hill Collins (2017). See Medina (2017) for a 
discussion of the different forms of hermeneutical injustice. 
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Incorporating 
Intersectionality into Ai Ethics 
Liza Ireni-Saban and Maya Sherman 
Introduction 
AI-driven devices have increasingly become mediators of our social, cultural, eco ic, and political interactions ( Rahwan et al. 2019 ). Therefore, the appearance 
of more nuanced and sophisticated aspects of diversity, as well as the emergence of 
new ways of thinking about identity, require that the notion of AI ethics establishes 
new tools and strategies for supporting and advocating diversity and inclusion in 
contemporary AI developments. 
Within this notion, it is important to mention that the growing impact of AI 
technologies in human reality has enabled the strengthening of the scope and scale 
of disinformation campaigns and fake news dissemination. The scholastic perc ption of AI in the disinformation sphere is ambiguous, as it accelerates data propagation online via social media pl tforms but also enables us to automatically detect 
false content and remove it at a relatively high level of accuracy. Consequently, the 
alleged nexus between AI and disinformation has amplified the ethical discourse 
regarding AI usage and implementation. 
Moral philosophers and applied ethicists often suggest using a ‘deontological' 
approach to moral norms as a starting point, while others suggest a teleological (consequ ntialist) ethical approach concerned with whether an action 
or decision leading to an outcome is good or bad to the society as a whole 
(Gomila and Amengual 2009). It is argued that for AI as machines with a more 
limited degree of autonomy, a rule-based approach may be sufficient, or even 
endorsed. Since these theories are based on explicit rules and norms external to 
the real world in which they are to be applied, they have limited practical value. 
In other words, these theories are, from a philosophical perspective, unable to 
fully explicate the complexities of moral considerations as these complexities are 
experienced in the world. This chapter suggests that deontological and utilitarian 
ethics cannot fully address the challenges that AI technological innovations pose 
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to contemporary ethics, which require a more flexible, context-dependent, and 
case-based approach to morality. 
For that, we offer to investigate how AI ethics can be enhanced through critical 
engagement with intersectionality. Ethical perspectives on intersectionality share 
normative ideals toward social justice. It is suggested that the development of AI 
systems has brought forth, with unprecedented clarity, the socioeconomic differences across all identities, and the recognition that the experience of privilege based 
on social groups and locations is fluid rather than static. The junction of intersec- 
tionality theory, ethics, and AI allows us to conceptualise and harness, for the first 
time, patterns of inequality as redistribution of power, and privilege is a core t na t of deliberative intersectional engagement. An intersectional framework for AI 
ethics can be used to scrutinise the algorithmic biases and issues rooted in existing 
AI-driven systems and applications. 
This chapter is organised as follows. In the first section, we introduce the t oretical lens of intersectionality and then move to a discussion on how AI ethics can 
benefit from insights of intersectionality. Finally, we present concrete examples 
depicting the challenges of AI to underscore the new and different insights inter- 
sectionality generates for AI ethics. 
Intersectionality: A new paradigm 
Albeit a fledgling analytical paradigm, the evolution and development of intersec- 
tionality have been long in the making. The concept of intersectionality owes its 
origins to the feminist movement, which sought to develop a more comprehensive and encompassing schema for recognising and appreciating the converging 
forces of oppression that affect women on different dimensions of identity. Inter- 
sectionality arose from the works by women of colour in the 1960s as a means 
for expressing the limitations of feminist theory to accurately portray the struggle 
of women across racial and class boundaries ( Samuels and Ross-Sheriff 2008 : 5). 
In fact, in its most essential form, intersectionality theory reflects a criticism of 
second-wave feminism, which was the preeminent mode of feminism in the 
1960s in the US. The second wave of feminism expanded the goals set out by the 
first wave, which primarily took up the causes of universal suffrage and repealing 
discriminatory legislation. The second wave of feminism focussed on broadening 
gender equality by addressing issues like sexuality, domestic rights, reproductive 
rights, and de facto discrimination ( Burkett 2016 ). However, opponents of the 
emergent movement asserted that the second wave favoured a historical narrative 
that “whitewashed” and homogenised the feminist struggle and ignored different 
voices of minority communities such as black women and queer women ( Orr and 
Braithwaite 2012 ). 
The term intersectionality was first coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989) , 
who used the metaphor of intersecting roads to illuminate how differing levels of 
oppression on the grounds of gender and race interact with one another to create 
a new and unique experience of marginalisation and discrimination. Crenshaw 
Ireni-Saban and Sherman 
offered the concept of intersectionality as redress to the singularity and unidimensional consideration of the phenom non of oppre sion. Although intersectionality 
theory’s origin is rooted in the struggle of women of colour for recognition within 
the big-tent feminist movement of the 60s and 70s, as Samuels and Ross-Sheriff 
(2008: 5) note, it went even further and called on scholars to acknowledge that 
“for many women of colour, their feminist efforts are simultaneously embedded 
and woven into their efforts against racism, classism, and other threats to their 
access to equal opportunities and social justice” (ibid: 5). 
The modern definition of intersectionality holds that “gender cannot be used 
as a single analytic frame without also exploring how issues of race, migration t tu , history, and social class, in particular, come to bear on one’s experience as a
woman” (ibid.). Consequently, the methodological approaches of researchers and 
academics employing an intersectional technique mandate that they explore the 
multitude of “the overlapping and mutually reinforcing” systems of oppression. 
The once-accepted universalist approach to the constructs of “woman” or “feminist" 
as singular, all-encompassing experiences has now been replaced by analyses 
that consider women as whole individuals whose identities may be informed and 
reinforced by multiple interlocking structures of oppression. Finally, current i t llectual pursui s of intersectional analyses incorporate not only mutu lly rei forci g systems of oppression but also the myriad of privileges which also inform the 
feminist experience. Since intersectionality was developed in reaction to and as a 
criticism of the tendency of feminist narratives to whitewash oppression experiences, the development of intersectionality theory evolved alongside the dialectical 
evolution of the feminist movement. 
Just as important as the subjects of intersectional analysis, one may mention the 
relationship between the myriad of systems of oppression and structures of power 
which interact to shape intersectional experiences. This paradigm states that just 
like different identity layers coalesce to create unique experiences of discrimination, the structures of domination which perpetu te systems of inequality inher ntly intersect with axes of oppression. Fellows and Razack (1998: 335) suggest this 
mechanism functions as mutually assimilated networks that “rely on one another” 
so that “systems of oppression could not be accomplished without gender and 
racial hierarchies; imperialism could not function without class exploitation, s xis , heterosexism and so on.” 
In addition to the myriad of levels of oppression, intersectionality acknowledges 
the varying degrees of privilege, which also inform the unique experiences of 
women. These privileges occur naturally from the deficits created by the structur s of oppression. An example of the symbiotic relationship between privilege 
and oppression is evident in Samuels and Ross-Sheriff’s research (2008) on black 
or multiracial young children adopted by white parents. Since there was a largely 
socioeconomic, ethnic, and cultural homogeneity within the interviewees’ neighbourhoods, 
they were inevitably a racial minority in their own community. Here, 
the interplay between privilege (socioeconomic status) and racism creates the very 
incubator in which the biracial children experience a unique system of oppression. 
Being a biracial or trans-racial adoptee in a white community meant that their 
experience of structural oppression was unique to their particular set of privileges 
and oppressions. Although having two white parents meant that they were transmitting the dominant group’s culture, and this ultimately allowed the adoptees to 
operate largely in white race contexts comfortably, few of them reported dating in 
high school because their appearance was devalued by the dominant “Eurocentric 
images of beauty” (ibid: 7). In this example, we see that while being raised in a 
white community endows certain privileges, it simultaneously and inherently cr t s situations of alienation. Samuels and Ross-Sheriff’s anecdotal re earch demonstrates that not only is oppression an integral component of intersectionality, 
but in order to fully appreciate the impact of systems of oppression on individual 
experiences, academics must also consider the networks of privilege. 
Although intersectionality theory is intrinsically related to the feminist movement, its methodological contribution reaches far beyond feminist debates. The 
intersectional methodology encourages researchers to investigate the multilayered 
effects of experiences of oppression in their unique and varied manifestations. 
This is a departure from traditional methodological techniques that often pursue 
a parsimonious quality in both variables and conclusions. The epistemological 
approaches to the different forms of oppression to this point had been discrete 
in nature – the exploration of patriarchy was a distinct pursuit, and therefore 
experiences of victimisation from institutionalised sexism were interpreted as if 
they existed in a vacuum. Likewise, racism was investigated as a stand-alone syste  of persecution. In many ways, the methodological inadequacies of research 
had a deterministic effect on the analysis of the experiences of oppression themselves. Crenshaw put forth that a “single-axis framework” failed to consider the 
compounded marginalisation that women of colour faced. Crenshaw’s foundation 
offered a theoretical schema for understanding not only bi-level discrimination 
but multiple layers of oppression ( Dhamoon 2011 : 231). This differed dramatically from the traditional single-group approach, which attempted to investigate 
the phenomena “by analyzing the intersection of a subset of dimensions of multipl  categories” ( McCall 2005 : 1787). Single subject design is a subgroup of the 
categorical comparative approach, and it is useful for streamlining analytical spaces 
which can become convoluted when multiple groups and levels are compared 
side-by-side (ibid: 1786). For example, if researchers want to compare specific 
ethnic groups within broader racial classifications – e.g. Vietnamese, Thai, and 
Laos subgroups within the more general grouping of Southeast Asian – it becomes 
necessary to restrict the breadth of analysis for the sake of comprehension. Th refor , a study of this nature would consider these S utheast Asian subgroups independently of gender or class. Naturally, this method has its advantages as it allows 
researchers to simplify the subject of their research for ‘big picture analysis’. H w ver, the very aspect which makes this analytical framework attractive – the ability 
to disregard intermediary layers of analysis – is also its pitfall. Research which i ol tes its subject fr m the multitude of intervening affective torrents of complexity
is ultimately reductionist in its analysis. 
The Southeast Asian research ignored gender and class in the investigation of 
Southeast Asians in order to maintain simplicity. However, an intersectionality 
study of Southeast Asians would employ an ecological model to identify the integr tive nature of th  myriad of Southeast Asian experiences. For example, it would
distinguish the experience of the middle-class, Vietnamese man in comparison to 
the low-class, Vietnamese woman, and so on and so forth. Although this type of 
multidimensional, ‘interaction effect’ modelling makes the research exponentially 
more complicated, it is arguably the only design equipped to deal with the confluence f multiple systems of oppression and paradigms of power. Furthermore, 
intersectionality allows researchers to investigate “how multiple and differing sets 
of interactive processes and systems vary at different levels of life and across time 
and space” ( Dhamoon 2011 : 237). This ideation of subjects of oppression and 
power as dynamic, multilayered, and complex is, of course, antipodal to the ositivist tradition which as umes that all phenomena are fixed, generalisable, and fully
conceivable. Instead, intersectionality values unpacking and evaluating processes 
and systems (ibid.). 
An additional methodological approach that strives to satisfy this call for co lexity is called anti-categorical complexity ( McCall 2005 ). This approach deconstructs the redu tionist analytical categories, maintaining that social life and social 
structures are infinitely too complex and dynamic to be fettered by fixed categorical definitions. Anti-categorical complexity has been applied in deconstructing once-finite categories such as sexuality or gender and examining how they 
are instead socially designed constructs ( Fotopoulou 2012 ). The anti-categorical 
approach which emerged from the critique moved to the tendency of white, big- 
tent feminists to frame women and gender as essential and homogenous cat gories embracing all women ( McCall 2005 ). The crux of the criticism was that no 
solitary category could aptly account for the host of experiences of the individual. 
Additionally, most intersectional experiences did not fit cleanly into these socially 
constructed categories. Critics also highlighted that the pro-categorisation camp 
was reinforcing inequalities by excluding experiences that did not fit comfortably 
into the socially eschewed constructions. 
The second approach to complexity is referred to as inter-categorical c m l xity (ibid.). This approach accepts the socially constructed categories pro tempore 
as a provisional means for tracking the disparities between social groups along 
multiple lines of intersecting identities, dimensions, and power structures. The 
fundamental assumption of inter-categorical complexity is that although the relationships and interstices of inequality are fluid and ever-shifting, by adopting c t gories and simultaneously considering their intersections, res archers are afforded 
the leverage granted by comparative modes of analysis ( Bauerband and Galupo 
2014 ). McCall (2005) puts forth intra-categorical complexity as a last approach to 
the complexity of intersectionality. Intra-categorical complexity falls somewhere 
in-between the anti-categorical approach, which wholeheartedly rejects categorisation, and the inter-categorical approach, which provisionally excepts categories, 
if only for the purpose of comparative analysis. The intra-categorical complexity 
approach appreciates the methodological potential of categories but tends to focus 
on “neglected points of intersection – ‘people whose identity crosses the boundaries of traditionally constructed groups’” ( Dill 2002 : 5). 
The contribution of intersectional methodologies, although they introduced 
new obstacles, was paramount for the poststructuralist movement and the larger 
popular movement to deconstruct social boundaries as a means of combating 
inequality. Ultimately, the methodological subgroups challenged the then- 
predominant mode of analysis which suffered from a blatant failure to reflect the 
loci of neglected experiences of oppression. 
However, the introduction of intersectionality methodology shall include 
its limitations. Although intersectionality offers a versatile theoretical basis for 
researching modes of oppression and privilege, it has simultaneously complicated 
methods of analysis. In fact, the defining aspect of the methodology of intersectionality 
studies is “the complexity that arises when the subject of analysis expands 
to include multiple dimensions of social life” ( McCall 2005 : 1772). Indeed, most 
scholars have accepted the legitimacy and necessity of intersectionality to onve  the intricacies of intersecting experiences of real life, and yet, intersectionality 
remains underdeveloped without a practical application. 
More recently, Reyes (2017) and Moore (2012) have advocated intersectionality 
as a useful lens for the shifted focus of code-switching to marginalised factions 
within society. This stream of research is especially relevant to the social identity 
framework of intersectionality underlying AI ethics offered in this chapter. We 
elucidate the development of AI by reference to the basic premises of social interactionism. 
They include the following assumptions: capturing reality by individuals 
is a social construction; individuals constantly affect one another as through their 
interaction over time; individuals are capable of deliberate actions and the way they 
interact with others and within ourselves; individuals define what exists and decide 
how to act accordingly. Therefore, we consider social identity as “the self as refl xiv ly understood by the individual in terms of his or her biography” ( Giddens 1991 : 
244). It should be noted that while one’s concept of the self may remain consistent 
over time, social identity is more familiar with a process of shifts and adjustments 
as it plays out in everyday life. Through a process of social interaction, we work 
to communicate our identities to others, while we attribute identities to them 
( Charon 2010 ; Gecas 1982 ). 
Contemporary issues of Al technologies in the ethical sphere 
Following the discussion presented above, we will elaborate upon the contemporary issues relating to AI technologies in the ethical sphere. Although there is 
no one accepted definition of AI, various scholars address the machine’s ability to 
exhibit intelligent behaviour, react to the environment, and learn from it ( Samoili 
et al. 2020 ). Nonetheless, this chapter will focus on the AI’s twofold functionality 
within the disinformation sphere. Meaning, AI as referable to complex algorithmic models allowing t  automatically generate, detect, and mitigate false contents 
online and impact on public opinion. 
Broadly, there are several disinformation-related affairs that revolve around 
the evolution of AI technologies. Among these incidents, various scholars ighlight the Cambridge Analytica affair and its hidden manipulation of ad targeting 
( Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison 2018 ). 1 Other notable disinformation affairs 
are the incitement of ethnic cleansing in Myanmar 2 and the emergence of masses 
of fake Russian accounts ( Eidelson 2018 ; Bloomberg Editorial Board 2017 ; 
Weise 2017 ). Notably, these affairs highlight the unprecedented implications of 
AI bias in the international community. 
One of the most prevalent bias types is the historical bias, which represents an 
existing inequality and socio-technical issues within the data generation process 
( Suresh and Guttag 2019 ). An example emerged in 2015, when academic and media 
sources revealed a clear gender bias within Google search engine. In the incident, 
the top results for ‘CEO’ image search showed mainly photos of men, and when the 
search engine identified the seeking user as female, it displayed fewer ads for x cutive positions. It represents a historical bias, since this kind of bias reflects an existing 
gender inequality in society ( Suresh and Guttag 2019 ; Yapo and Weiss 2018 ). 
The omnipresent spread of AI in the cybernetic and physical spheres has led to 
a broader discourse regarding its ethical implications. On the one hand, AI-driven 
interfaces enable the analysis of large sums of data and provide us with a tailored 
user experience and enhanced personalisation processes, as seen within various 
fields such as autonomous driving, predictive policing, and language translation. 
On the other hand, one must consider the ambiguous outcomes of AI usage from 
the legal, social, and ethical perspectives ( Doshi-Velez et al. 2017 ; Amodei et al. 
2016 ; Sculley et al. 2014 ; Bostrom 2003 ; McCarthy 1960 ). Interesting to note, a 
Deloitte survey of tech executives in the US ( Loucks, Davenport, and Schatsky 
2018 ) highlighted the potential ethical risks of AI, with emphasis on its falsification 
of contents and imagery and the increase of algorithmic bias. 
Therefore, discussing AI and disinformation requires a deeper analysis of the 
notion of algorithmic bias, including its different types as well as its main sources. 
The literature raises various bias types, which depend both on the data itself and on 
the user. Data bias may be the result of technical or computational matters, an inappropriate algorithmic deployment, or a user misinterpretation of the algorithm’s 
outputs. Danks and London (2017) highlight notable computational sources of 
bias, such as the training data bias, and algorithmic processing. For instance, the 
input data used may be biased and lead to biased outputs for the algorithmic tasks. 
Furthermore, the algorithm itself may be biased, such as in cases of a statistically 
biased estimator within the algorithm. 
As AI-driven algorithms have become highly prevalent in our decision-making 
processes and day-to-day practices, the risk of generating discriminatory and ffensive outputs rises significantly (ibid). In addition to bias and fake news, one can 
mention fairness and privacy violations as significant ethical loopholes. From the 
privacy prism, there is an ongoing conflict between data privacy and efficacy, since 
AI-driven models enable access to large sums of data and allows it to be analysed 
with greater accuracy ( Whittlestone et al. 2019 ; Zimmerman 2018 ). For instance, 
AI technologies such as sensor networks, social media tracking, and facial recognition enable us to broaden surveillance practices and threaten one’s right to privacy. 
These technologies in use may lead to discriminatory patterns and stigmatisation, 
even without one’s explicit consent or knowledge ( Whittaker et al. 2018 ). In this 
regard, Mehrabi et al. (2019) suggest: 
like people, algorithms are vulnerable to biases that render their decisions 
‘unfair’ [. . .] fairness is the absence of any prejudice or favoritism toward 
an individual or a group based on their inherent or acquired characteristics. 
Thus, an unfair algorithm is one whose decisions are skewed toward a p rticular group of people 
(ibid.: 1). 
For example, in the US one can count numerous incidents in which AI usage 
has exacerbated existing social inequalities, such as the gender bias of the Am zon recruiting tool ( Dastin 2018 ) and the notable discriminatory credit algorithms 
against minority groups ( Bartlett et al. 2018 ; Glantz and Martinez 2018 ; Waddell 
2016 ). In addition, the ProPublica investigation found that the risk tool used to 
create Florida risk scores was biased against black people and led to discriminatory 
outputs ( Angwin et al. 2016 ). 
Interesting to note, several scholars argue that these ethical constraints differ 
between cultures and languages. For example, Facebook misinterpreted a Palestinian man’s post in 2017 due to a machine-translation error, which led to his arrest 
by the Israeli police ( Hagerty and Rubinov 2019 ; Hern 2017 ). Therefore, this 
type of linguistic error might lead to significant implications due to cultural controversies. Another linguistic incident occurred within the ambiguous translation 
of the ‘like’ button, leading to algorithmic filtering of an indigenous collective in 
Brazil ( Ochigame and Holston 2016 ). 3 As Ochigame and Holston suggested in 
their article on this incident: “AI principles are inevitably value-laden terms, dense 
with significance. Such terms, even when thoughtfully translated, can have distinct 
connotations and meanings in different cultures” (ibid.: 10). 
Following the cultural perspective, Hagerty and Rubinov (2019) demonstrate 
that low- and middle-income countries might be more susceptible to ethical 
implications and not necessarily receive the potential AI benefits. This notion was 
highlighted by the World Economic Forum (2018 ), as it claimed that developing 
countries are prone to great risks of discriminatory patterns when using machine 
learning methods. From the policy perspective, Hashmi et al. (2019) emphasise 
the increasing ambiguity revolving around the AI implementation in the public 
service: “The advent of AI raises a host of ethical issues, related to moral, legal, 
economic and social aspects of our societies and government officials face challenges and choices pertaining to how to apply AI technologies in the public sector 
and in governance strategies” (ibid.: 8). 
In this regard, it is important to point out that the AI ability to manipulate and 
deceive human users online turns these ethical issues in the data-driven age into 
inherent loopholes, which should be properly moderated by policy makers and 
regulators. Interesting to mention, several scholars consider AI as a countermeasure 
against the rise of fake news on social media platforms due to its ability to identify 
fake bot accounts and automated fact-checking. Moreover, current deep learning 
models enable the enhancement of text classification and analysis of online co te t ( Sharma et al. 2019 ). According to Facebook, AI tools are responsible for the 
removal of 99.5% of terrorist-related content and 98.5% of fake accounts ( Marsden 
and Meyer 2019 ; Kertysova 2018 ). 
Nonetheless, one must consider the monumental contribution of AI to the cr ati n and p opagation of disinformation campaigns. With the adva ce of machine 
learning and NLP, one’s ability to automatically generate content and tailor it for 
unique users is amplified, and therefore AI enhances the microtargeting of v ln r ble audiences ( Kertysova 2018 ). As a result, AI represents an offensive instrument, 
and not only a defensive component in the detection processes of online bots 
( Yang et al. 2019 ). Remian (2019) highlights this dual perception of AI in the 
disinformation sphere: “Artificial intelligence has the potential to be used for the 
spread of disinformation, propaganda, and the shaping of social and cultural values. 
As with security, AI may play a role in both delivering and protecting from misinformation and attempts to manipulate” (ibid.: 31). 
These polar AI functions have been analysed by several scholars who look at the 
AI’s ability to create deepfakes, which undermine the authenticity of visual videos 
( Strickland 2018 ; Güera and Delp 2018 ). All the above demonstrates the symbiotic 
relationships between AI and disinformation, when despite the existing defensive 
function against bots and automation, one may abuse the inherent AI bias to spread 
incitement and manipulation within weakened populations. 
Conclusion: enhancing Al ethics through intersectionality 
According to the review of intersectionality research across disciplinary domains, 
positioning intersectionality as having an important role within AI ethics highlights 
two key areas of concern: advocating diversity and inclusion. First, advocating 
diversity requires that vulnerable and disadvantaged groups and outgroup members 
of various identity groups will gain a fair and just treatment by ensuring that AI bias 
will be moderated and diminished. 
Second, promoting inclusion contributes to a more appropriate and just representation of disadvantaged individuals’ involvement in designing and engi eering 
AI and algorithmic systems. Within AI ethics, the principle of inclusion encourages 
remedying “situations where people are believed to have been silenced or excluded 
from decisions which would directly affect them and which do not acknowledge 
their knowledge or expertise” ( Townsend 2013 : 36). 
Due to the vast phenomena of fake news propagation, there is an urgent need 
to provide a relevant ethical approach to dealing with the existing technical and 
moral issues arising from AI technologies. Intersectionality serves as a proper and 
adaptable mechanism for coping with the AI-augmented falsification processes. 
Notes 
1 The Cambridge Analytica affair is a salient event in the disinformation sphere, in which a 
data analytics firm was accused of profiling 50 million Facebook users and targeting them 
with tailored content in order to influence political outcomes in the 2016 US presidential 
elections. For a more detailed discussion, see Rehman (2019). 
2 In 2017, the publication of fake news imagery has aggravated the conflict between Rohingya 
Muslims and the military in Rakhine State in Myanmar. This false propaganda fueled the 
radical hatred of Rohingya Muslims and violence in Myanmar. This incident shows how 
Facebook has transformed into a platform for hate speech and online falsehoods aimed at 
vulnerable minorities. For greater detail, see Miles (2018) and Ratcliffe (2017). 
3 This algorithmic incident is the result of a semantic loophole of Facebook’s ‘like’ button. 
The anthropologists Rodrigo Ochigame and James Holston scrutinised an indigenous 
collective in Mato Grosso do Sul, which uses Facebook as its primary outreach vector to 
the public and often posts videos against the violence of private agribusiness militias. H w v r, in the Portuguese dialect in Brazil, the button is semantically translated as ‘enjoy’, 
and therefore, various users decided not to ‘like’ certain posts of violence and oppression. 
As a result, Facebook’s filtering algorithm reduced the group’s visibility and raised the 
challenges of the land right activists to spread their message online. For further detail, see 
Ochigame and Holston (2016). 
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How Post-Truth Politics 
Transformed and Shaped 




One could affirm that the examination of how post-truth politics transformed and 
shaped the outcome of the 2016 Brexit referendum would never have gained substantial traction as a research question, were it not for the new communication age
we now reside in. Especially during times of heightened divides, be it a domestic 
election, an international political crisis, or a national referendum, popular online 
platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, etc., are widely used by many 
politicians and commentators. 
The case of the Brexit referendum is very much worthy of examination since, 
over the past 20 years, the UK has crafted a strong reputation for the quality 
and standard of its scientific advisory system. This is demonstrated by its array of 
top-level scientific advisers in almost every department of government and by its 
willingness to experiment and innovate with new approaches to evidence-based 
policy-making. But this seemingly progressive arc towards the ever-greater uptake 
of evidence and expertise in decision-making took a major knock in June 2016 
with the result of the referendum on UK membership of the European Union 
(EU) swinging narrowly, 52% to 48%, in favour of Brexit. This happened despite 
a mountain of evidence and the near unanimous support of experts of all kinds for 
remaining in the EU. The referendum process itself was marred by exaggeration 
and the use of dubious facts and figures on both sides, but particularly by the Leave 
campaign, and by accusations of outside interference in the democratic process by 
a range of murky and unaccountable actors, including the Russian government. 
In short, Brexit quickly became one of the ‘ideal-type’ case studies when it 
came to discussing, exploring, and examining the role of post-truth politics in the 
21st century. Therefore, the aim and contribution of this chapter to the domains 
of diplomatic and information studies is three-fold: (1) to expose and confront the 
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historical and present nature of ‘post-truth’ politics; (2) to shed light onto often 
overlooked tools and mechanisms used in the 21st century playbook of ‘post-truth’ 
politics, with a focus on critical junctures of empirical cases such as the 2016 UK 
Brexit referendum that allows us to reconceptualise post-truth in an age of r ltime governance; (3) to suggest that the current political climate of post-truth politi  requires the broad promotion of a sort of democratic capability. Drawing on the 
epistemic aspects of Amartya Sen’s work – particularly on his concept of positional 
objectivity ( Sen 1993 ) – we will discuss and answer the questions, how, why, and 
should it matter to the challenges faced by our historic, but new, theatre of post- 
truth politics. This chapter, therefore, aims to offer conceptual and practical tools 
to help us understand and combat the rise of post-truth politics in the 21st century. 
The overall aim and the interconnected character of these three questions is to 
examine, expand, and illustrate through empirical moments in the Brexit campaig , th t the Leave vote was motivated by post-truth politics. Indeed, not only 
motivated by it, but actively engaging in its processes, mechanisms, and emotional 
control of the people it sought to influence. This chapter aims to support these 
claims by developing an argument about the extent to which the UK’s Brexit referendum has been shaped and is continuing to be shaped by post-truth politics. As 
a starting point for the discussion, the definition of post-truth as a type of “politics 
which seeks to emit messages into the public domain which will lead to emotionally charged reactions, with the goal of having them spread wide y and without
concern for the accuracy of the messages provided” will be investigated in detail 
( Marshall and Drieschova 2018 : 89). 
Post-truth: Historic concept, new theatre 
We want to find out if post-truth politics is simply a historical concept. Even if 
history is repeating itself, this does not mean that we have not learned the lessons 
of the past. It simply means that we have not recognised its patterns when they 
returned. That is the reason why we study it, analyse it, explore it, dissect it, scru- 
tinise it: so we can recognise it now, as it is today. This new face of ‘post-truth 
politics’ is currently akin to a bad artist seeking to help the police by drawing the 
suspect who has just robbed them. In short, the suspect’s features are ill-defined, 
and it is almost impossible to distinguish most, if any, detail. Yet despite these 
challenges surrounding clarity, this does not mean the police should stop looking 
for the suspect in question. As we have already seen with the new techniques and 
methods of 21st century post-truth politics, the ones we have seen being actively 
used by politicians, active governments, and organisations alike come with profuse 
damage and impact to our national and international governing sphere. 
The impact is not simply in the damage done to the elections due to fraud, but 
due to the polarisation of public discourse, and lies in the inability of many citizens 
who, bombarded with the terms ‘fake news’ or ‘crisis actors’ by governing politics 
daily, perhaps justifiably simply do not know what to believe anymore. And there 
is, of course, the issue of credibility. Despite the fact that the term ‘post-truth 
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politics’ is nothing new, as academics we need to reconceptualise and contextualise 
it. That is, we need to analyse, individually and comparatively, all new methods, 
tools, technologies that are challenging, impacting on, and shaping our international political system. 
Background to the 2016 Brexit referendum 
The UK’s referendum on the EU membership, now infamously known as Brexit, 
took place on 23 June 2016 in the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. The purpose 
of the vote was to gauge support for the country either remaining a member of, 
or leaving, the EU. Campaigning began immediately after the referendum’s calling. This is a very important thing to note, and indeed a strong variable of why 
the referendum, its outcome, and continued controversy remain today. Just like 
the historical roots of post-truth, the tensions connected to the Leave-Remain 
confrontation within the society and Parliament itself, were and are nothing new. 
These tensions have presented themselves in many forms since the UK’s official 
entry into the Union in 1973. Yet now the vote had been called. Divides established. With allegiances by politicians and citizens alike, largely known to all. 
The underpinnings of controversy, discontentment, and attachment with the 
UK’s continued relationship with Europe are clearly illustrated by a number of 
instructive examples. First, in 2013 Prime Minister David Cameron stated clearly 
in a long-awaited speech that if the Conservatives won the next election they 
would seek to renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU. Then, by the end 
of 2017 they would give the British people the “simple choice” between staying 
in the EU under those terms or leaving the EU. It would be a few years before 
the election was called, but the seeds of division had certainly not only been sown, 
but watered. Second, was the creation and emergence of clearly divisive institutions. One such example was the creation of a cross-party, formal group campaigning for Britain to Remain a member, called ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’. It was 
established in October 2015, directly after ‘The European Union Referendum 
Bill’ was unveiled in the Queen’s Speech. 1 Alongside this, there was the creation 
of two groups promoting exit which sought to be the official Leave campaign: 
Leave.EU (supported by most of the UKIP party, led by Nigel Farage), and Vote 
Leave (supported by Conservative party Eurosceptics). The Electoral Commission 
announced on 13 April 2016 that Vote Leave was the official Leave campaign. The 
UK government’s official position was to support the remain option. Before we 
examine, dissect, and explore the tactics, methods, and challenges faced in a post- 
truth world in an age of real-time governance, we will conclude by stating what 
many of us now know to be objective truth. On 23 June 2016, the people of the 
United Kingdom and Gibraltar were asked: “Should the United Kingdom remain 
a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” There were two 
boxes to answer this complex question: 1) Remain a member of the EU; 2) Leave 
the EU. The referendum turnout was 71.8%, with more than 30 million people 
voting. Leave won by 51.9%, while Remain got 48.1% of the votes. 
It should be noted that the Brexit campaign was distinct from other referendu s or elections because of the unexpectedly high turnout from voters who do 
not normally vote in British general elections. The voter turnout for the referendum was 72.2%. This is in comparison to a 68.8% turno t in the 2017 General 
Election, a 66.2% turnout in 2015, 65.1% in 2010, 61.4% in 2005, and 59.4 % in 
2001. The referendum was the first major UK vote since 1997 to go above a 70% 
turnout ( Electoral Commission 2017 ). From YouGov polls, to newspapers, all 
predicted a Remain vote. The higher turnout, particularly in the north of England, 
contributed to the miscalculation of the result ( YouGov 2016a ). People who did 
not normally vote decided to vote in the EU referendum, and they voted leave. 
This raises the question of what motivated the high turnout and what led the 1.2 
million previously disengaged voters to find the leave message more convincing. 
As noted by Moore and Ramsay (2017: 168), the Brexit campaign was “divi- 
sive, antagonistic and hyper-partisan (. . .)”, as its continued divisive nature and 
polarising rhetoric, which characterised both sides, has shown before, during and 
after the vote. To quote Hannah Marshall and Alena Drieschova (2018: 94), “Both 
‘sides’ actively accused each other of dishonesty and scaremongering, and these 
discursive tactics did little to inspire trust from the public in the debate as a whole. 
Rather, the public were encouraged to distrust political messaging based on co st t back and forth accusations and disparagement.” And yet, the two key mess g s the public remembered from the referendum campaign – that we will directly 
discuss and examine throughout this chapter – were components of key arguments 
belonging to Brexiters. 
1. “The UK sends £350 m per week to the EU” 
2. “Net migration to the UK had hit 333,000” 
These key themes of focus during the referendum became rapidly and increasingly 
significant in the national press ( Joyce 2017 ). The narrative of the Vote Leave c mpaign, a narrative based on these two core themes, gained traction, and not simply 
gained traction, but embedded itself in the hearts and minds of the public in a way 
the Vote Remain campaign did not. What the referendum therefore clearly de onstrated was that two single pieces of pro-Leave camp ign material – (1) a slogan 
on the side of a bus fallaciously implying that leaving the EU would necessarily 
free up £350 million a week for the NHS; and (2) a poster stating that Britain was 
at its “Breaking Point” purportedly due to an influx of migrants – proved highly 
controversial but successful in winning the hearts and minds of the British public. 
It is worth noting, particularly in a chapter dedicated to post-truth politics, that 
these themes, slogans, arenas of deception that won the heart of many voters were 
at best misleading, and at worst outright false. For example, the Leave side’s widely 
publicised claim that 
[t]he UK sends £350 million per week to the EU is wrong. [ . . . ]. This 
figure does not include the rebate, or discount on what the UK has to pay. 
In 2014, the UK would have paid £18.8 billion without the rebate but 
ended up paying £14.4 billion. The estimate for 2015 is £12.9 billion. 
This is £248 million per week, or £35 million per day 
( FullFact 2016b ). 
Yet, in an opinion poll conducted by “Whatukthinks” (2016c), asking the questio  “Is It True or False That Britain Sends £350 Million a Week to the European 
Union?”, 47% of respondents thought the former message was accurate (Whatuk- 
thinks 2016c). These examples point once again directly to the central thesis at play 
here: the influence that post-truth politics had on the UK’s Brexit 2016 referendum. In the next section, we will examine these cases and sketch the ‘key post- 
truth moment’ which ultimately and arguably shaped the voting outcome, not to 
say the future of Ireland and the resources and agenda setting power of the EU for 
the next three years. 
The NHS bus poster 
The now-infamous NHS bus was deployed by Vote Leave, the official campaign 
group for Brexit as designated by the Electoral Commission. It stated: “We send 
the EU £350 million a week, let’s fund our NHS instead”. In defence of this propagandistic slogan, or at best highly misleading statement, many Leave campaigners 
have argued that they simply used the figure of “the cost of an NHS hospital”. 
The Leave campaigners justified their claims further, stating that the stark slogan 
was necessary in order to illustrate how expensive remaining in the EU was. Conversely, those standi g firmly on the side of Remain, presented the argument that 
by using this slogan, the Leave side was presenting misleading and false information. Not only did they contend that such n act was morally objectionable, but 
that the consequence of this act would be momentous for the whole campaign. 
Their fears proved to be well-founded. The slogan sought to have appeared to 
convince many voters that Brexit would necessarily free up £350 million to spend 
on the NHS. Leave campaigners have consistently backed away from this claim 
since the vote ( Griffin 2016 ). 
Indeed, there have been some preliminary challenges to the use of the image. 
For example, the Advertising Standards Agency received 374 complaints. 2 
A group called Vote Leave Watch was formed with the single aim of holding 
the government and groups like Vote Leave accountable. They also sought to 
force the government, and as many Leave voters as possible, to admit that the bus 
was misleading. The group regularly brought up suggestions that the referendum 
ought to be repeated because of the dishonesty of the Leave side, and the belief 
that “the leave side won because they . . . promised something that does not exist” 
( Rothstein 2016 ). 
It is true that calculating the cost of EU membership for any country, let alone 
the UK, is a complicated task; however, the claim showed on the bus was in ccurate by any reasonable measure. A naïve defence of the Leave campaign emerged 
that because the figure was hard to reach, thus they went for the best possible 
figure for their cause. To quote Andrew Reid (2019) on this very point, he writes 
“A cynic would see it as a lie designed to convince voters of a simple untruth.” 
Such an interpretation would “seem inadequate, especially given that the state ents of key Leavers and commentators on the campaign suggest more ubtle and 
nuanced motivations.” Dominic Cummings, the political operative who acted as 
the campaign chief for Vote Leave, also noted in a personal blog that: “Pundits 
and MPs kept saying ‘why isn’t Leave arguing about the economy and living standards’. They did not realise that for millions of people, £350m/NHS was about 
the economy and living standards . . . It was clearly the most effective argument . . . 
with almost every demographic” (Cummings 2017). 
It should be noted that Cummings’ journal entry was not intended as a tool 
for convincing the people of his commitment to his ‘truth’. Instead, he denoted 
in tone and contested ideas to the aged-old act of telling “compelling stories”; in 
this case, connecting the EU to a general dissatisfaction with the economic state of 
the country (ibid.). The idea behind the slogan on the bus was arguably on refl ction, to exploit a widespread prejudi ial belief about the costs of EU membership, 
deviating the public’s attention from considering its benefits. As Shipman puts it 
in his account of the campaign, “[e]very time there was a row about the size of 
the cost to taxpayers of EU membership, it simply reinforced in voters’ minds that 
there was a high cost” (2017: 259). As Reid (2019) writes so clearly: “The idea 
here was that as soon as any Remainer responded to the NHS bus with a response 
of the kind: ‘actually, EU membership costs £X million instead’, they were already 
on the back foot because they were talking about costs not benefits.” Indeed, in 
a post-truth environment, none of these asserted points depended upon people 
being convinced of the specifics of the claim. Despite this, acts of this nature, falsehoods (whether contested or not) spread like wildfire through a nation, and are 
proved to have damaging effects on democratic discourse by ‘muddying the waters’ 
in factual deliberations. 
The key axes in the 2016 Brexit referendum can therefore be thought of as an 
example of what Yale philosopher Jason Stanley calls “undermining propaganda”. 
This refers explicitly to acts of speech that involve “erecting difficult epistemic obst cle  to recognising tendencies of goals to misalign with certain ideals” (2015: 57). 
The idea itself of “undermining propaganda” is applied broadly to the study and 
analysis of Stanley’s work, referring in many instances to the deeper ideological or 
moral commitments that underpin society. We can arguably draw on its conceptual underpinnings to examine the factual deliberations in this case. The key phrase 
in Stanley’s definition is “epistemic obstacle”. We can link this clearly to the NHS 
bus being introduced as such an obstacle, due to resulting consequences for m mber  of the public to establish what the costs and benefits of Brexit truly were. The
act of the slogan, and the creators behind it, did this by wrongly problematising 
the epistemic authority of some bodies and figures, and as a practical consequence 
eroded the set of common factual reference points in what should have been a fair, 
free, and open debate. 
The words of Andrew Reid (2019) on his work on Brexit and disinformation 
conclude it best when he writes: 
The troublesome function of the NHS bus, then, is to neutralise the discussion of the economic impact of Brexit by increasing scepticism of all factual 
claims, and presenting all predictions as equally bad. It nullifies the issue by 
reducing the set of commonly accepted, relevant facts and therefore making 
it harder to come to judgments about the effects of different policy option. 
The Breaking Point 
The Vote Leave campaign was led by individuals like Boris Johnson, who created 
a narrative, or historic reflection, of re-establishing Britain as a global hegemon. 
Indeed, many of the key leaders of the Vote Leave campaign articulated a narrative 
of British nationalism that was more insular and Powellite in tone. At the centre of 
this perspective lay the concerns and increasingly stirred fears surrounding immigration. According to Nigel Farage, the figurehead of Leave.EU, the EU had done
insurmountable harm to Britain by facilitating uncontrolled immigration: “Open- 
door migration has suppressed wages in the unskilled labour market, meant that 
living standards have failed and that life has become a lot tougher for so many in 
our country” ( Farage 2016 ). 
This actively and carefully constructed narrative creation played on people’s 
fears, whilst weaving perfectly into the nationalistic tone of ‘Britain First’ that the 
Leave leaders were exalting across the country. Comparatively, this is not too di similar from what is occurring across the water, where we see slogans of ‘Make 
America Great Again’ capture voters in their droves, changing the landscape of 
the ‘shining city on the hill’ forever. Furthermore, according to what Virdee and 
McGeever (2018: 1806) argued in their article entitled ‘Racism, Crisis, Brexit’: 
“the construction of the migrant as economic threat to the domestic working 
class was married to a second set of representations that understood the migrant 
as security threat to the British population.” The authors conceptualise this pr c  of misrepresentation into three distinct elements. First, the terrorist attacks in 
France and Belgium and the onset of the migration to Europe of displaced Syrians 
and others escaping war in 2015 and 2016 were purposely linked by Farage to 
make the argument that the “EU’s open borders make us less safe” ( Farage 2016 ). 
This created a gateway for him to imply that by getting “our borders back, our 
democracy back” through exiting the EU we could also restrict the entry of such 
“undesirables” and make Britain safe again. According to Virdee and McGeever, 
the second element integral to this construction of migrant as security threat was 
that leaving the EU would effectively prevent refugees from seeking sanctuary 
in Britain, since it would no longer be party to the EU’s central benefit freedom 
of movement between EU member countries. This argument reached its zenith 
with the creation and posting of the Leave.EU’s “Breaking Point” poster. A poster 
showing Middle Eastern refugees queuing at Europe’s borders. The subheading 
read: “We must break free of the EU and take back control.” This was a message 
of ‘island retreat’ ( Winter 2016 ): if Britons voted Leave, they could successfully 
keep such people from entering the country. Finally, the third component concep- 
tualised by Virdee and McGeever on the nature of post-truth narratives of racism, 
was highlighted when recently arrived migrants were alleged to have committed a 
series of sexual assaults in Germany – the EU country which had accepted almost 
a million refugees in 2015. Leave.EU “campaigners contributed to a moral panic 
that understood refugees as ‘sexual predators’, reinforcing the message that r m i ing in the EU would place British women at risk” ( Virdee and McGeever 2018). 
While the Breaking Point poster, and the integrated narratives and acts surrounding it, may lie at the margins of hateful speech, they have not been subject 
to criminal sanction. However, according to Reid (2019) , although it may not be 
regarded as hate speech, he justifiably writes: 
[Such acts do] transgress the norms expected of political campaigns because 
of [their] potential effect on political voice, so should be subject to limited 
sanctions within this sphere. Such hate speech can, when practiced by politi l elites, have harmful effects on the democratic forum, and as such might 
be subject to measures that amount to partial censorship when practised by 
political parties or recognised campaign groups. 
Indeed, although recent migrants would not have been able to vote in the referendum, it remains evident that their voice is valuable and warranted on this subject 
matter. Thus, the persistent use of nationalistic and discriminatory imagery like that 
of the Breaking Point poster by those in positions of relative authority can, and 
do, invariably cause a shift in public perceptions that leads to certain target groups 
being silenced, their voices not being heard, or when they do choose to speak up, 
the consequence is that they are not taken seriously in political deliberation. This 
amounts to what is deemed a de facto exclusion from the process of deliberating 
over laws due to the loss of an effective political voice. 
These consequences have been discussed in other works on hate speech, for 
example when Jeremy Waldron, in a very influential essay on the issue, discusses 
“group defamation” or “group libel” (2012: 39–40). This is the spreading of mistrut s about groups within socie y that causes them to be treated unfairly or unjustly. 
Waldron also emphasises the loss of dignity that occurs when we are frequently 
part of a “disfiguring social environment” where such ideas persist (ibid.: 117). 
The “disfiguring social environment” I am concerned with is one that contributes to a situation where some are treated as inferiors in political deliberation: this 
undermines their effective political voice, because it causes others to treat them 
differently. The loss of esteem in the eyes of other citizens can lead to members 
of groups targeted by hate speech suffering epistemic injustices ( Fricker 2007 ). 
One manifestation of epistemic injustice is “testimonial injustice”, the injustice of 
being doubted as a knower, or of having the integrity of one’s knowledge challenged (ibid.: 1–2). Minority groups can therefore be forced to deliberate as if such 
stereotypes are true in order to facilitate a productive dialogue; Stanley uses the 
example of African Americans who end up participating in debates where racist 
stereotypes that they are lazy or violent persist (2015: 163). This analysis can be 
applied to the Breaking Point poster, which depicts non-white citizens and recent 
migrants as a hostile force, and a drain on the national community’s resources. 
Deliberating when these traits are assumed at the outset means accepting disrespectful falsehoods, and a concurrent loss of perceived credibili y. It is to deliberate 
at a disadvantage, as it requires the internalisation of a norm that the speaker is less 
trustworthy or able. Such is the world of post-truth politics in the 21st century. 
Conclusion 
By referring to Brexit as an ‘ideal-type’ case study for understanding the mechanisms and the effects of post-truth politics, the chapter has shown how the Vote 
Leave campaign around the referendum was built on misleading narratives that 
touched very sensitive topics such as the NHS and immigration control. Though 
neither of the two topics are directly related to EU membership, some of their 
aspects were exaggerated and framed as though they were part of the overall disco rs  on permanence in the EU. 
The referendum was a quite divisive political instrument per se, and by appealing 
directly to the people it favoured the diffusion of manipulated narratives for pure 
electoral ends, neglecting the overall good of the country. The themes, slogans, 
and arenas of deception that won the heart of many voters were misleading at 
best, and outright false at worst. Furthermore, both factions actively accused each 
other of dishonesty and scaremongering, nourishing confusion and distrust among 
the electorate. And yet, the two key messages the public remembered from the 
referendum campaign were components of key arguments belonging to Brexiters: 
a slogan on the side of a bus that fallaciously implied that leaving the EU would as 
a direct consequence free up money for the NHS, and a poster stating that Britain 
was at a “Breaking Point” because of an immigration crisis. The path to the Brexit 
referendum was thus riddled with difficult epistemic obstacles that kept the people 
from understanding the real implications of their choice. 
Notes 
1 Before the vote had cleared Parliament and become law, the serving government twice 
saw off attempts in the House of Lords to lower the proposed voting age in the in-out poll 
to 16. Their attempts, as history has shown us, proved unsuccessful. 
2 See Parker (2016) for a journalistic discussion of this issue. 
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Information and Democracy 
Fake news as an emotional weapon 
Matthew Loveless 
Introduciton 
In the field of Political Science, the role of information – whether through e ucation, exposure, content availability – h s been taken, normatively, as a linchpin of 
a democratic society ( Dahl 1989 ). A quote widely, if erroneously, attributed to 
Thomas Jefferson is often used to underscore this important relationship, “An educat d citizenry is a vital requisite for our survival as a free people.” 1 This is an int itive a d widely shared notion within Political Science, Sociology, Economics, and 
Psychology – as well as in popular culture. It makes intuitive sense that an individual 
or collection of individuals are better able to make appropriate decisions for themselves by und rstanding what is happening around them. In the field of politics, 
having both a sense of the ideological landscape and the positions of parties and their 
policies can only serve to improve the quality of democratic governance. Better 
and more information produces better individual and, in turn, collective decisions. 
Yet, the evidence does not appear to bear this out. In the late 1950s, a team 
at the University of Michigan – Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes – set 
out to survey the American public and to assess their political attitudes, choices, 
and behaviours. The resultant publication, The American Voter (1960) , showed that 
Americans’ political attitudes appeared to originate from such profoundly unstructured political beliefs that the authors reported a stunning lack of sophistication and 
rationality. Key’s book, Public Opinion and American Democracy, the following year 
(1961) as well as Butler and Stokes’ book, Political Change in Britain (1969) did little 
to challenge these findings, showing that, in the latter case, Americans were not 
unique in such under-informed political states. 
Political Science has taken one of two approaches to deal with this ‘discovery’. 
One approach has been to either say that democratic outcomes appear – at least 
in the aggregate – ‘rational’ ( Page and Shapiro 1992 ) or to call individual political 
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choices ‘reasoned’ to the extent that individuals must have some process through 
which information is both gathered and (more importantly) incorporated to make 
decisions ( Lupia and McCubbins 1998 ). Others searched for answers at the i dividual level. Zaller (1992) was among the first and most influential scholars to 
argue that how individuals process information explains how they formulate their 
opinion but that most of the information used to do so was heuristically driven; 
that is, more or less directly from elites and media. In other words, internal pr c sses and external cues compensate for low concrete and specific political knowledge in the same way that knowing how to do multiplication saves you from having 
to memorise all possible combinations of any two numbers ( Lodge and McGraw 
1995 ). Yet, and still, Americans and Europeans continue to show low levels of 
both political knowledge and sophisticated processing skills ( Sniderman, Brody, 
and Tetlock 1991 ; Lupia, McCubbins, and Popkin 2000 ). 
In terms of information and democracy, while attention is scarce and the ability to process information is low, the sources of information have increased. The 
exponential growth in the availability of information stresses the need for i dividuals to develop some method for sorting the growing torrent of information. 
In addition to the ability of legacy media to broadcast to a near comprehensive 
audience over the past 40 years, a (slim) majority of the world’s population has had 
at least some access to the largest repository of collected knowledge: the Internet. 2 
Yet, over precisely the same period, the once solid footing of post-war democratic 
institutions has begun to deteriorate. In other words, greater availability to greater 
absolute amounts of information does not appear to resolve the information and 
democracy dilemma. In fact, it appears to have made it worse. 
Fake news is a key debate in this dilemma. Fake news is an emotional weapon 
which refers not to discrete instances or stories, but rather to the strategic effort to 
cloud current debates with the aim of manipulating audience’s feelings to dercut any potential for collective (political) action. As increasingly recognised by 
the mainstream literature on political sophistication and cognition, such tive appeals often overwhelm individuals’ at empts to reason with political topics 
( Druckman 2012 ; Edelson et al. 2017 ; Flynn, Nyhan, and Reifler 2017 ; Karp, 
Nai, and Norris, 2018 ; Prior, Sood, and Khanna, 2015 ; Redlawsk 2002 ; Suhay 
et al. 2015 ). Fake news is weaponised by appealing directly to people’s emotions 
rather than their intellect. The driving force for using and supporting fake news is 
to scramble and divide public opinion in order to benefit from the resultant chaos, 
whether financially or politically. 
How fake news disrupts democracy 
In addition to greater availability of information, the Internet has opened up greater 
opportunities for misinformation. One of its most common forms is fake news. 
The term ‘fake news’ is both specific and broad. Fake news is not propaganda or 
‘spin’ in which a group, such as a political party, might try to reframe events so 
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that the group is seen in a more positive light (Uscinski 2019). Fake news is similar 
to a hoax, in that it is a deliberately fabricated falsehood made to masquerade as 
truth (ibid.). Although presented as being factually accurate, fake news has little or 
no basis in fact (or is a dissembled fusion of bits and pieces of factual things). Its 
distinguishing feature is that fake news is strategically deployed with an ostensive 
financial incentive or damaging purpose (Walker 2018). As such, it is a weapon. 
The efficacy of this weapon corresponds with the transition of citizens from p s iv  consumers to active selectors of political cues ( Prior 2007 ). This self-selecting 
exposure depends on previous patterns and goes by names that vary by discipline: 
selective exposure, informational congeniality, pro-attitudinal information search, 
or confirmation bias, inter alia. Simply, in a sea of information, consumers cling 
to what they know. In terms of searching for information, this process has led to 
the silo-ification of consumers, informational bubbles, filter bubbles, echo cha rs in w ich individuals’ understandings of the world are decreasingly exposed to 
counter-narratives, critiques, and outright challenges. 
Information silo-ification originated with the idea that the information systems 
could be constrained from freely communicating with other information systems, 
i.e. operate in a silo. Applied to individuals, information silo-ification refers to 
a situation in which that person is unable to freely communicate with – or be 
exposed to – alternative information sources ( Garrett 2017 ). Silo-ification is c m only the result of Internet search filters and histories that increasingl  narrow 
online searches, in turn developing decreasingly varied algorithmic selectivity and 
thus lower exposure to other (i.e. unlike) information sources. The individual is 
thus increasingly constrained to an informational environment in which one’s own 
beliefs about the world are amplified and reinforced in a closed communication 
system. While the various steps of the process overlap, they refer to the decrease in 
alternative information and the increase in the repetition and fortification of one’s 
own worldview. In this environment, fake news finds a fertile field of targets. 
Polls show that conspiracy theories and fake news are popular everywhere, 
including Europe, in which popular perceptions of the extent of both in the public 
sphere are similar if not greater than in the US ( Uscinski 2018 ). At the same time, 
public attention to fake news and misinformation has grown, because of recent 
controversial and divisive events such as Brexit and the 2016 US presidential ele tion (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Karp, Nai, and Norris 2018 ; Flynn, Nyhan, and 
Reifler 2017 ; Lazer et al. 2018 ; Lewandowsky, Ullrich, and Cook 2017 ). Yet, the 
crucial issue is less about the consumption but rather the strategic deployment of 
fake news as a weapon to shape politics. That is, fake news offers a means for some 
to circumvent a reality which disallows others’ preferred outcome. For democratic 
politics, this is deeply problematic. 
One of the core tenets of early Internet evangelism was the democratisation 
of voices ( Dahlgren 2000 ; Shirky 2011 ; Valenzuela, Park, and Kee 2009 ; Ward, 
Gibson, and Lusoli 2003 ; Weber, Loumakis, and Bergman 2003 ; Zhang et al. 
2010 ; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela 2012 ). However, this has had the 
unintended consequence of undermining the role of expertise. Information and 
data are, on their own, not equal to knowledge. There must be some process by 
which information and data become useable, and that process is the competent 
application of knowledge (i.e. expertise). The equalisation of all voices – the deterioration of expertise – does not naturally transform into a free market of ideas in 
which ideas compete for constituents. Not all ideas have equal standing. There 
must be a justifiable process for distinguishing between ideas that are allowed into 
the market and those that must be discounted and possibly excluded. The Internet 
has introduced previously unforeseen issues that have created a difficult landscape 
on which to fight fake news. Thus, the use of fake news finds a welcome home 
on the Internet as many of the traditional definitions associated with media have 
melted away: Who is a ‘reporter’? Who is an ‘expert’? What constitutes ‘news’? 
This atrophy of expertise corresponds to the rise of emotional politics, in which 
facts are allowed to be replaced by what one believes or feels to be true. There is 
a growing body of scholarly work that shows that knowledge – i.e. information 
about the world – is simply less important in determining individual choices than 
what individuals believe it to be ( Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013 ; Hart 
and Nisbet 2012 ; Suhay et al. 2015 ; Druckman 2012 ; Kunda 1990 ; Kahan 2016 ; 
Lodge and Taber 2000; Redlawsk 2002 ). 3 As the distance between political sophistication and political behaviour grows, that is, as people rely less on key and reliable 
information sources, they tend to base political decision-making on feelings and 
emotions ( Lau, Andersen, and Redlawsk 2008 ; Luskin 1987 ; Sniderman, Brody, 
and Tetlock 1991 ; Taber and Lodge 2006 ). Simply, facts have become either secondary, debatable, or ultimately inconsequential to what one believes – or feels – 
to be true. The loss of expertise and concomitant rise in preferring feelings to facts 
converge to create an environment in which fake news – as a strategic, emotional 
weapon – can thrive. 
The implications of competing subjective realities as the basis for orienting 
oneself to the world are not hard to imagine. At the broadest level, it has been 
observed that greater numbers of citizens are acting against their own (observable) self-interest ( Achen and Bartels 2016 ). Yet the deterioration of the ability 
for – small ‘t’ – truth to outweigh fiction fits a broader pattern that has been 
more recently formalised. Kavanagh and Rich (2018) call this phenomenon “truth 
decay”. 4 From the Introduction to their book, they define it as a set of four c cted and observable trends (2018: 3): 
1. Increasing disagreement about facts and analytical interpretations of facts and 
data; 
2. A blurring of the line between opinion and fact; 
3. The increasing relative volume, and resulting influence, of opinion and p rso al experience over facts; 
4. Declining trust in formerly respected sources of factual information. 
Each on its own represents an independent challenge to distinguishing fact from 
fiction (or, opinion). However, as the authors point out, it is their synergistic 
convergence and strategic deployment, with increasingly sophisticated means such as 
message micro-targeting in social media, that has allowed for truth decay to grow 
rather than be contained. 
The message from Kavanagh and Rich is that, while the contest between facts, 
opinion, and outright fiction has a long history (in their examination, in the US, 
but with clear application to Europe), it is the ability to outright control information flows and target the most susceptible that distinguishes the present from pr vious periods. That is, fictions and opinions are used as weapons to actively challenge 
what may seem to be demonstrable reality. And the means most appropriate, and 
what Kavanagh and Rich (ibid.) cite as drivers in the US, are employing means to 
manipulate individuals’ psychologies via cognitive processing and built-in biases 
(e.g. which concepts, beliefs, and rules one applies to the evaluation, Kunda 1990 ; 
Sniderman 2000) as well as their emotional profiles (i.e. galvanising individual 
partisanship as well as cultivating negative partisanship) in the context of greater 
political polarisation. 
The US is not alone. The rise of regional autonomy movements, Brexit, the rise 
of soft dictators in Eastern Europe, the migration question, the rise of both extreme 
and new parties, and terrorism represent only the most visible contemporary and 
concurrent events that directly challenge democratic states’ abilities to respond. 
Thus, the most insidious effect of fake news’ impact on the weak bond between 
information and democracy is the negative downstream effect it has had on de ocratic political culture by de-legitimising democratic institutions. 
In the context of European democratic systems, and specific to the relationship between information and democracy, the limitlessness of digital platforms in 
the age of fake news/disinformation is a substantive problem. At minimum, it 
has created more opportunities for financially or ideologically motivated pr duc rs. Non-state political actors have the capacity not only to initiate cross-national 
links with like-minded parties but also to roll out coordinated public ‘information’ 
campaigns. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, early Internet evangelists promised that by 
making social media widely available – that is, democratic, inasmuch as anyone can 
participate equally – we would not only strengthen our own democratic cultures 
but spread democratic inspiration to non-democratic countries ( Dahlgren 2000 ; 
Shirky 2011 ; Valenzuela, Park, and Kee 2009 ; Ward, Gibson, and Lusoli 2003 ; 
Weber, Loumakis, and Bergman 2003 ; Zhang et al. 2010 ; Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, 
and Valenzuela 2012 ). More Internet, more social media, more democracy. How v r, over the past two decades, the only coherent social media effect to have been
clearly identified is the silo-ification of information provision and the construction 
of echo chambers. This has led, instead of in the direction of more democracy, 
towards greater polarisation and separation. 
A broader perspective suggests that the loss of expertise and the ability to speak 
with one another about the same set of facts is the results of the strategic deployment of the emotional weap n of fake news. Namely, rather than simply individuals’ information silo-ification, we can see a torrent of half-truth , conspiracy 
theory, and misdirection in the news-sphere. The strategic goal is to drown any 
signal with an over-abundance of noise. 5 In this way, the inundation of the p blic space with every variety of specious ‘news’ resu ts in an emotional toll on the 
consumer who begins to not only question every story – true or fake – but also 
considers resigning from the increasingly difficult task of differentiating real from 
fake news altogether. 6 At the individual level, exposure to and acceptance of misinformation, fake news, and conspiracy theories correspond with individual negative 
epistemic motives (e.g. seeing self-reinforcing patterns where none exist) or n ativ  existential motives (e.g. alienation, Douglas et al. 2019 ; Clarke 2007 ); a d ficiency in the ability to reason clearly or apply logic ( Ståhl and van Prooijen 2018 ); 
a propensity toward delusional ( Freeman 2007 ) or dogmatic thinking ( Berinsky 
2012 ); or even experiences of hallucinations ( Dagnall et al. 2015 ). 7 Thus, fake news 
is emotional in the sense that it has very real, negative individual psychological 
correlates, creating individual disincentives to the collective action that meaningful 
democratic politics requires. 
Fake news threatens the democratic process in myriad ways but none so eff ctively as being aimed at influencing outcomes counter to popular will (Uscinski 
2019). There are those who benefit from using fake news despite its impact on 
information and democracy, one might argue, precisely because of its impact on 
information and democracy. We should recognise that periods in which econ mics and politics merge have historically all been followed by popular anger, extreme 
politics, indiscriminate and racial violence, economic sluggishness, and a sapping of 
any collective energy to achieve anything civil or ambitious or necessary (such as 
punish the culprits). In addition, and possibly more disconcerting, is the discernible 
difference from previous periods in the increasing amount of fake news found in 
governmental information or national news outlets which ‘benefits’ from the speed 
at which fake news can travel ( Lazer et al. 2018 ; Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral 2018 ). 
As such, fake news can be used in a manner resembling propaganda (Radnitz 2018; 
Garrett 2017 ; Oliver and Wood 2014 ; Weeks, Ardèvol-Abreu, and Gil de Zúñiga 
2017 ; Oreskes and Conway 2010 ). 
The motive for perpetuating quasi-truths, half-truths, non-truths is not particularly obscure. Wielding an emotional weapon to cloud clear thinking and obj ctive observation is motivated in order to achieve an outcome. The political, social, 
and economic shifts that have taken place over the past several decades – such as 
more openly hostile and polarised politics, growing economic burdens on greater 
numbers of citizens – open up new, potentially unimagined areas for generating 
money. Conflict, uncertainty, and having mechanisms in place for extracting any 
remaining profits from a politically weak and divided country are the goal. Those 
who stand to profit (in the strictest sense of the word) understand this. As fake news 
sows discord and division, this keeps broad-based political action, such as redistribution or coordinated responses to climate change, at arm’s length and undermines 
attempts to change the status quo. In an environment in which the strategic deploy ent of fake news profits political and economic incumbents, an effective ‘top- 
down’ institutional response is unlikely. 
Such a development is a fair description of the three-year process of Brexit, the 
recent 2016 US elections, and even the immigration issue during the refugee crisis 
of 2015–17 in the EU. Demobilising swaths of voters by emotional attrition and 
mobilising others to a reality designed to distort actually existing problems accrues 
power to those already in place. Thus, if and when fake news floods the news- 
sphere, the resulting inability to have even-footed discussions benefits the political 
and economic incumbents. 
What is to be done? 
Our defenses against such deployment are weak. As the Center for Media Plurali m and Media Freedom at the European University Institute in Florence has 
pointed out, at present, most EU countries do not have specific requirements 
that ensure transparency and fair play in online campaigning. 8 Attempts have been 
made to measure, at a minimum, the enactment/enforcement of new neutrality 
law(s) and active (public) efforts to confront fake news/disinformation. However, 
as acknowledged by the European Commission, what are national and supranational governments to do about the rise of new problems, such as the exposure 
of citizens to large-scale online disinformation efforts and micro-targeting of voters 
based on the unlawful processing of personal data? 
However, there are reasons to be confident in a collective and individual 
response to fake news. Most news in general, including fake news, is consumed by 
a minority of politically active people who already have highly skewed information diets. Both c nspiracy theories and fake news attract their own customers as 
those predisposed to them will actively search for them ( Edelson et al. 2017 ; Clarke 
2007 ; Uscinski, DeWitt, and Atkinson 2018; Uscinski, Klofstad, and Atkinson 
2016 ). For an institutional response, one might propose to identify a means to 
regulate the Internet on impartiality, transparency, equal opportunities in media 
access, political advertising, and labelling political ads. At the same time, providing 
more information or ‘facts’ does not appear to have had a significant impact on 
the levels of political information or knowledge. Research in Political Science and 
Psychology has shown that providing evidence, even motivating that information 
with incentives, provides only occasional change and little lasting impression (see 
Bolsen and Druckman 2015 ; Lewandowsky et al. 2012 ; Nyhan and Reifler 2015 ; 
Prior, Sood, and Khanna 2015 ). More challengingly, if we are to support the idea 
of regulating the Internet, we require an answer to the question: who should be 
the arbiter of what is real and what is not? That question may be too difficult to 
answer and any resulting gatekeeper derived from asking this question would be 
too powerful. 
Thus, an institutional response to fake news is likely to be ineffective and demonstrate an incomplete understanding of the problem. If this is the case, one might 
propose individual immunisation; that is, to cultivate individual immunisation 
from the intended effects of ‘fake news’/disinformation through the promotion 
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of ‘media and digital literacy’ courses; raising public awareness about the exis-
tence and dangers of ‘fake news’/disinformation; and building human resilience 
(Roozenbeek and van der Linden 2018). Which may in turn help us make better 
policy choices.
In the case of Europe, how do citizens of the EU see fake news? Using the ques-
tion, “In your opinion, is the existence of news or information that misrepresent 
reality, or is even false, a problem? (Response categories: Yes, definitely; Yes, to 
some extent; No, not really; No, definitely not) from the Eurobarometer 464 (2018, 
Question 4), we can see the EU citizens’ answers to this question (Figure 5.1). In 
every country, more than 50% say, “Yes, Definitely” and “Yes, to some extent”.
However, one disquieting aspect of the results in Figure 5.1 is that in Greece, 
Malta, Italy, Cyprus, Spain (almost Portugal), more than 50% responded only ‘Yes, 
definitely”. That is, despite five response categories ranging from a strong disagree-
ment to strong agreement, the majority responded with fake news is ‘definitely’ a 
problem. Lowering the threshold to 45% of respondents, these Southern European 
countries are joined by Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, and Slovakia. Remarkably, estimating a simple model with this question 
as the dependent variable,10 there is very little correlation with socio-demographic 
or socio-economic profiles of respondents. What is more important is the region-
ality of these perceived issues. Southern and Eastern European countries rank 
lower on measures of democracy, such as civil liberties and political rights.11 Taken 
fIgure 5.1  Is fake news a problem?9
Source: Eurobarometer 464: Feb–Mar 2018.
together, we can see that countries with shorter histories of democracy, less well- 
developed civil societies, and recent national economic struggles also have majoriti s (or solid pluralities) of citizens responding that fake news is a problem. This 
correlation is troubling. However, in the same survey, not only does every single 
EU member state country exhibit concern about fake news, but a vast majority 
of respondents report having seen fake news at least once a week, 12 and most are 
somewhat to very confident that they can identify it. 13 This may offer a faint p sitiv  note that not only do European citizens report that that they see a lot of fake 
news but rather that they think they can. 
Conclusion 
Fake news has exposed the disconnect between information and democracy and 
highlighted the importance of the relationship between feelings and information 
and democracy. Our normative theories of democracy require a great deal from 
citizens. It feels ‘more correct’ to say that people should be more intelligent and try 
to understand politics. Yet, even the amount of staggering political unsophistication previou ly observed in the US ( Campbell et al. 1960 ), corresponded to a time 
considered by many a golden era of US politics. The use of fake news has taken 
advantage of the delivery system of the Internet and how it connects us to sow 
discord and create disunity. It exploits and amplifies our fears and concerns, app li g to how the world makes us feel rather than how it is. Yet, this strategy rests 
neatly on the tectonic fault lines of social, political, and economic shifts, which 
have been growing for the past several decades. In this way, while a challenge, it is 
predominantly an unfortunate covariate rather than a determinant of the problem 
between information and democracy. 
Notes 
1 While the exact quote may not have been written by Thomas Jefferson, the widely 
‘quoted’ sentiment underpins his views on education, knowledge, and republican self-governance 
(Source: The UNESCO World Heritage Thomas Jefferson Monticello, 
www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/educated-citizenry-vital-requisite-- 
our-survival-free-people-spurious ). 
2 53.6% of the global population has access to the Internet. For Europe, it is 82.5% (Source: 
International Telecommunications Union; https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/- 
Documents/facts/FactsFigures2019.pdf ). 
3 I call this the George Costanza defense: “It’s not fake news if you believe it.” 
4 Kavanagh and Rich (2018 , 4): “It is worth noting that although we are calling the 
phenomenon “truth decay,” we are not talking about “truth” in the philosophical 
sense . . . Instead, . . . the term “Truth Decay” [is] a shorthand for . . . the importance of 
facts and fact-based analysis rather than on “truth”. 
5 In an interview with Michael Lewis, Steve Bannon said, “The real opposition is the media. 
And the way to deal with them is to flood the zone with shit.” ( Lewis 2018) 
6 The Russian dissident and chess champion, Garry Kasparov, once commented on Soviet 
‘news’ thusly, “the point of modern propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda. 
It is to exhaust your critical thinking, to annihilate truth” (emphasis mine). 
7 Put differently, if a citizen of a democratic country is genuinely upset by the ‘news’ that 
‘George Soros eats Christian babies’, fake news is not the number one problem for that 
person, nor for us. 
8 Their o wn Digital Monitor provides an inverse media pluralism measure, the Resilience 
Index, defined by the availability of and access to informational options. The digital 
monitor identifies macro- and individual-level measures that distinguish the availability 
of and access to informational options of the Internet by nations. 
9 Data sourced from Eurobarometer Flash Survey 464, European Commission, Brussels 
(2018) Flash Eurobarometer 464 (Fake News and Disinformation Online). TNS opinio , Brussels [ roducer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA6934 Data file Version 1.0.0, 
https://doi.org/10.4232/1.13019 
10 The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is not shown for space but is available from 
the author. 
11 Freedom House: Freedom in the Worlds. Source: https://freedomhouse.org/reports . 
12 (Q3) “How often do you come across news or information that you believe misrepresent 
reality or is even false?” Response categories: Every day or almost every day, At least once 
a week, Several times a month, Seldom or Never. 
13 (Q2): “How confident or not are you that you are able to identify news or information 
that misrepresent reality or is even false?” Response categories: Very confident, Somewhat confident, Not very confident, Not at all confident. 
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6 
Searching for a Unicorn 
Fake news and electoral behaviour 
Luigi Curini and Eugenio Pizzimenti 
Introduction 
Recent evidence shows that: (1) elections across the globe have been characterised 
by a swing towards populism – from the 2016 US presidential elections to the 2018 
Italian parliamentary elections; (2) populist politicians appear to rely more on their 
online communication on fake news than any political counterpart. Putting these 
two facts together, a number of commentators have suggested that the spread of 
fake news is somehow responsible for affecting electoral results (for examples, see 
Parkinson 2016 ; Read 2016 ; Hall Jamieson 2018 ). Still, it remains unclear if we are 
witnessing a causal relationship between two distinct phenomena or merely a t mp r l correlation that does not imply any causation. In fact, while numerous studies 
analyse different types of fake news campaigning, including their relative spread, 
their impact on the public remains an open question ( Guess et al. 2020b ). Our aim 
in this chapter is to give a critical review of the current literature, by focusing on 
a specific issue: can the exposure to false news actually affect people’s attitudes and 
behaviour, and especially voting? 
A definition of fake news 
Today’s fake news furore should be evaluated against the backdrop of long-standing 
political and commercial efforts to persuade and influence citizens through propaganda and political marketing ( Bakir and McStay 2018 ). Fake news in some 
form has in other words long been with us ( Pennycook and Rand 2019 ). 
However, fake news seems to have gained an unprecedented level of prominence through the rise of social med a. Thanks to some distinguishing features char- 
acterising the latter (low barriers to entry and reliance on user-generated content), 
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the digital media ecology has in fact proliferated, democratized, and intensified the 
scale of this phenomenon ( Allcott and Gentzkow 2017 ). 
Two main motivations appear as the main engine for producing fake news. 
The first one is pecuniary: there is a growing number of people that financially 
capitalise on algorithms used by social media platforms and Internet search engines. 
Fake news articles that go viral can in fact draw significant advertising revenue or 
increase the value of one’s own domain. The second motivation is ideological. 
Some fake news providers seek to advance politicians they favour. Regardless of 
the reason, we define fake news as either wholly false or containing deliberately 
misleading elements incorporated within its content or context ( Rampersad and 
Turki 2020 ). That is, we intend fake news as intentionally fabricated information 
characterised by its politically charged content. 
Understanding the causal path 
To understand the possible causal linkage between fake news and voting, we 
need to better understand at least three aspects that are directly interrelated 
among themselves: the voting determinants, the psychological reasons behind 
consuming news, and the role of campaigning in affecting voting. As we will see, 
reviewing such aspects allow us to develop our expectations linking fake news 
with voting decisions. 
The voting determinants 
First, we need to develop a manageable map to orient readers on the steep t rr i  of the determinants of voting behaviours: this preliminary step will allow us 
to assess the (potential) weight of fake news and to place their (eventual) impact 
among the classical factors raised by the literature. 
Voting behaviour is a core topic in contemporary Political Science. The d t tio  and the study of the determinants behind people’s electoral attitudes and voting
choices gave birth to a vast literature, which is virtually impossible to summarise 
in this contribution ( Fisher et al. 2017 ). However, to a merely heuristic aim it 
is possible to classify the classical theories of voting into three main approaches: 
(1) Sociological; (2) Psychological; (3) Rational Choice. According to the Sociological Approach (SA) – whose main pillar rests on the classic book by Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) – voting behaviour is deeply entrenched in people’s 
belonging to social groups. From this perspective, the sociographic properties of 
individuals (such as religion, race, gender, generation, occupation, class, geographical location) have an impact in orienting and stabilising, in time, their electoral 
preferences. Also the Psychological Approach (PA) emphasises the role played by 
individuals’ characteristics – in particular: childhood, social background, and adult 
socialisation – in determining their party identification ( Campbell et al 1960 ), which 
is considered the main cognitive map through which people frame politics and 
cast their vote accordingly. Finally, the Rational Choice Approach (RCA) builds 
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on the assumptions of methodological individualism and on an economic theory 
of democracy ( Downs 1957 ). Individuals are expected to behave rationally: once 
translated into the study of voting behaviour, this implies that citizens choose candidates/parties like consumers choose commercial products, by selecting the one 
whose policies best fit their preferences. 
As this brief and incomplete introduction to voting behaviour theories should 
have suggested, there is no single way to address the puzzle of voting determinants, 
which proves more counter-intuitive than commonly expected. To deal with such 
a complicated issue, we opt to resort to the bi-dimensional approach elaborated 
by Rokkan (1970) and refined by Bellucci and Whiteley (2005) . This analytical 
framework considers two different dimensions: a Macro-Micro dimension for the 
study of the characteristics of the political system on the one hand, and those of 
the voters on the other; and a Temporal dimension along which it is possible to 
distinguish between Distant and Contextual processes/factors that impact on voting 
behaviour (see also Bellucci and Segatti 2010 ). 
By combining these two dimensions, we obtain four different quadrants within 
which it is possible to place the most recurring factors that impact on voters’ final 
decision (at the centre of Figure 6.1 ). The quadrants placed on the left refer to the 
long-term determinants of voting behaviour. In the left-upper quadrant (Macro- 
Distant) we find the main characteristics of the political system: the structure 
of socio-political cleavages, the format and mechanics of the party system, the 
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‘rules of the game’ of the political-institutional arenas, etc. These determinants are 
exogenous, as they represent the set of systemic constraints and opportunities that 
bind voters’ choices. In the left-lower quadrant (Micro-Distant), the sociographic 
properties, the social position, the moral and political values, and the political predispositions of the individuals are included. Here we find those social/economic/ 
religious characteristics that are supposed to have an impact on voters’ political 
attitudes. On the right side of the figure, the quadrants contain the contextual 
factors that shape a specific election and the related individual’s voting decision. 
In the upper quadrant (Macro-Contextual), the main determinants of voting refer 
to the specificities of the electoral competition: the state of the economy, the patt rns of parties’ alignmen /strategies, the most debated political theme  and policy 
issues, the role of the political leaders during the electoral campaign, the pr vailing campaigning style, etc. In this respect, voters are expected to be driven also 
by their own evaluations about these aspects, such as the quality of the political 
class, the representativeness/cohesion of parties, the performances of the outgoing 
government, as well as by their expectations about the future and the reliability 
of the debated issues. Finally, in the lower quadrant (Micro-Contextual) we find a 
number of individual behaviours (exposure to campaigning, social interactions) 
and cognitive processes at the basis of a specific voting decision. Different voters 
adopt different decision-making heuristics through which they frame the political 
messages they are exposed to, according to their emotional involvement. In this 
respect, the role of mass-media – as well as that of other intermediation agencies, 
whether collective or individual ( Gunther, Montero, and Puhle 2007 ) – is crucial. 
This does not mean that other factors – such as the kind of campaigning exposure, 
the informal debates within the circle of relatives, friends, and colleagues – are 
irrelevant; on the contrary, they constitute powerful filters between political news 
(whether fake or not) and voters. 
As we will discuss more in depth in the following sections, the recent debate 
on the impact of fake news on voting behaviour tends to emphasise the relevance 
of the determinants placed on the right side of the figure, while overlooking the 
others. In particular, the underlying idea that peoples’ votes are largely conditioned 
by the contextual information they gather during each specific electoral campaign 
seems to be consistent with the hypothesis of the ‘individualisation’ of voting 
(Dalton 1996). According to this interpretation, as far as traditional social pillars 
and partisan identifications have progressively evaporated, citizens tend to adopt 
personal decision-making schemes based on their own assessments and perceptions 
of the political environment. No longer determined by traditional social/political 
identities (which represented powerful constraints in orienting voting decisions), 
voters are now considered free to select the information that best fits with their 
individual preferences and to vote accordingly. If this is the case, voters will be more 
‘contestable’ by competing parties and, in general, more willing to change their 
preferences depending on the contextual characteristics of the electoral campaign. 
Within this scenario, the weight of the fake news seems to be crucial, as deliberately fals  information that circulates during the electoral campaign is supposed 
to produce relevant impacts on voters, whose social and political background is 
considered a sort of tabula rasa. 
However, neither the socially determined nor the hyper-individualised model 
of voting are satisfactory. In fact, if it seems undisputable that the de-freezing of 
the long-standing socio-economic-cultural cleavages (Dalton 1996), the decline of 
the traditional party organisational models ( Katz and Mair 1995 ; 2009 ), the parallel 
erosion of the traditional social pillars ( Dalton and Wattenberg 2002 ), as well as 
the information technology revolution (Ward and Gibson 2009) have contributed 
to the individualisation of political participation, it does not necessarily follow that 
contemporary voters are completely deprived of any social identity and/or that 
they are insensitive to the influences of the wider groups they still belong to. 
If voters were completely individualised and impressionable by contextual factors 
we should register exorbitant levels of volatility at every election, everywhere, 
which is not the case in liberal democracies. Thus, as (substantial) stability c tin es to prevail, it seems plausible that voters’ choice is still affected by their socially 
constructed and rather homogeneous social networks (Dalton 1996), whose 
boundaries do not vary dramatically over time. 
The psychological reasons behind consuming a news 
Rather than confining the debate on voting determinants to the clash between 
socially determined and individualised voters, we probably should build our 
assumptions on a model of voters’ behaviour that stands “in between: for sure 
more strong-willed and strategic in choosing his/her affiliations, but still identified 
and socially situated” ( Corbetta and Cavazza 2009 : 371, our translation). On this 
basis, it is possible to elaborate an analytical framework on the relevance of fake 
news that eschews the widespread (deterministic) conventional wisdom about its 
impact. First, we need to examine whether exposure to fake news actually affects 
voting behavior or if it only reinforces predetermined political beliefs. To this aim 
we will focus on how ordinary citizens experience misinformation on social media 
platforms. 
That sizable populations reading fake news on social media doesn’t, in fact, 
necessarily mean that such messages influenced public attitudes. The concept of 
‘selective exposure’ is enlightening in this respect. Research shows that people 
tend to prefer congenial information, including political news, when given the 
choice ( Iyengar and Hahn 2009 ; Iyengar et al. 2008 ). Why does it happen? Because 
selective exposure enables people to defend their attitudes, beliefs, and behav- 
iours by avoiding information likely to challenge them and seeking information 
likely to support them ( Hart et al. 2009 ). Moreover, such ‘defense’ motivation 
is strengthened by individuals’ commitment to such pre-existing attitude, belief, 
or behaviour ( Kiesler 1971 ). This creates a linkage with the world of politics. 
In contrast to other topics, those individuals with strong political leanings may in 
fact be particularly likely to engage in selective exposure because their political 
beliefs are accessible and personally relevant ( Hart et al. 2009 ). Politics, on the 
other side, often yields an affective response, and this is another factor that has been 
shown to matter to inspire selective exposure ( Stroud 2008 ). 
Today, it is moreover far easier engaging in selective exposure, i.e. in the sel cti  of media sharing one’s political predispositions, compared to times past ( Stroud 
2008 ). The existence of social media has, of course, just further strengthened this 
dynamic, not only on a quantitative but also on a qualitative basis. In particular, the 
human confirmation bias discussed above is favoured by the algorithm employed 
by social networks, which reinforces the creation of ‘filter bubbles’ where users are 
subjected to a limited exposure to, and lack of engagement with, different ideas 
and other people’s viewpoints ( Bessi et al. 2016 ; Sunstein 2001 ). 1 
The role of campaigning in affecting voting 
The previous two sections should warn us about the complex mixture between 
consolidated attitudes and contextual factors in orienting peoples’ behaviour. 
Among the latter, the role of political advertising deserves specific attention. 
Research suggests two broad reasons why campaign advertising might have effects 
on voters’ choices (see Kalla and Broockman 2018 ): (1) by providing voters new 
arguments and/or (2) by heightening the salience of existing arguments. Still, there 
are reasons to take both aspects with care. 
When it comes to providing voters with new arguments and information, by 
the time election day arrives, voters are likely to have already absorbed all the 
arguments and information they care to retain from the media and other sources 
beyond the political campaigns themselves ( Gelman and King 1993 ). This is not 
to say that voters will know all the relevant information campaigns could provide 
them, but that they are likely to have been exposed to all this information and that 
they will have chosen to retain nearly all they care to ( Kalla and Broockman 2018 ). 
In such an environment, it may be difficult for campaigns to change voters’ minds 
by informing them about a party’s positions, as voters are likely to agree with their 
party on any issues on which they have opinions in the first place (Berinsky 2009; 
Lauderdale 2016 ). Accordingly, there are few considerations campaigns can pr vi e that would lead voters to abandon their party, in particular as lection day is 
approaching ( Kalla and Broockman 2018 ). 
What about the possibility for a campaign to make certain considerations more 
salient as people decide what they think ( Zaller 1992 )? The salience-raising effects 
of communication diminish in the presence of clear cues ( Druckman, Peterson, 
and Slothuus 2013 ) and when individuals are exposed to competing arguments 
and information ( Druckman 2004 ). This is, however, the typical situation we meet 
in general elections wherein a partisan perspective makes generally other frames 
irrelevant to many voters. 
In this sense, what a campaign typically does – providing information voters are 
already being exposed to and attempting to increase the salience of this information – 
is very unlikely to lead voters to cross partisan lines. And, in fact, Kalla and Broock- 
man (2018) convincingly show in their meta-analysis that campaigns have “minimal 
effects;” actually an effect that is not statistically different from zero. Field experiments 
testing the effects of online ads on political candidates and issues have also found 
such null effects ( Nyhan 2018 ). 2 In sum, such findings offer an important caveat to 
the widespread notion that people can easily manipulate citizens’ political choices. 
By building on the three sections discussed, we can advance two main expectations: 
E1) people will tend to consume the news that confirms their partisan ideas. This also should 
happen within social media, and, most notably, with respect to fake news; 
E2) precisely for this, the impact of fake news on voting choice will be negligible. 
These considerations bring us to the review of the main findings of the literature 
on fake news and voting. 
Much ado for nothing? Fake news and empirical evidence 
Spreading and consumption of fake news 
Many statistics have been produced about how many times fake news was shared 
on Facebook or Twitter. These statistics, however, should be taken with care. 
First, they obscure the fact that the content being shared may not reach many 
voters (most people are not, for example, on Twitter and consume relatively little 
political news). Second, and most important, they do not adopt a relative framework, i.e., they do not consider how much these numbers mean when compared 
to the statistics related to the consumption of more typical mainstream news. Our 
review of some of the most quoted works with respect to the ‘consumption’ of 
fake news on social media shows results that are quite consistent among themselves 
in their conclusions, irrespective of the specific social media platform considered. 3
Let’s start with Twitter. Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral (2018) have studied the 
spread of false stories on this platform between 2006 and 2017 by following 126,000 
distinct stories covering different topics. They show that these stories were tweeted 
and retweeted over 4.5 million times by three million people. Among these stories, 
those that were false diffused significantly faster, more broadly (to a larger number 
of users), and deeper (with a larger number of re-shares) than those that were true. 
The difference between the speed and the width of spreading false vs. true stories 
was particularly pronounced for political news. The authors suggest that the degree 
of novelty (higher for false news) and the extent to which the news is emotionally charged (also higher for false news) may be responsible for why Twitter users 
retweet fakes more. 
In a related study, Törnberg (2018) models fake news as a complex contagion 
highlighting the role played by the echo chamber effect. He uses a metaphor in 
this respect: if we think of the viral spread of fake news in a social network as akin 
to a wildfire, an echo chamber has the same effect as a dry pile of tinder in the 
forest; it provides the fuel for an initial small flame that can spread to larger sticks, 
branches, trees, to finally engulf the forest. In other words, fake news spreads easier 
in networks where there is a presence of an echo chamber. This ‘trigger’ that helps 
us to explain why fake news spreads fast, however, is also the key to understanding 
who is reading this type of news. 
Grinberg et al. (2019) , for example, studied the exposure of Twitter users to 
false news during the 2016 US presidential election. They found that false politi al stories constituted a significant share of all news consumption (about 6%) on 
Twitter. For the average Twitter user, however, content from fake news sources 
constituted only 1.2% of political exposures. Finally, the circulation of false news 
was highly concentrated, with 1% of all users exposed to about 80% of false 
news exposure. The retweeting of false news was even more concentrated, with 
about 0.1% of all users responsible for 80% of the retweets of fake political stories. 
Individuals most likely to engage with fake news sources were conservative leaning 
and highly engaged with political news. Moreover, despite the significant presence 
of false stories on Twitter, for people across the political spectrum, most political 
news exposure still came from mainstream media outlets. 
A similar story appears if we focus on a study that analyses the interaction with 
Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) accounts on Twitter, that have been considered as one of the major sources of fake news during the 2016 US presidential 
elections ( Hall Jamieson 2018 ). Twitter reported that 1.4 million of its 69 million 
monthly active users had interacted with IRA accounts in early 2018, or approximately 2%. In their study Baila et al. (2020) show the vast majority (80%) of active 
partisan Twitter users did not interact with any IRA account. And for those who 
did, these interactions represented a minuscule share of their Twitter activity – on 
average, just 0.1% of their liking, mentioning, and retweeting on Twitter. The trait 
that turned out to be the best predictor of interaction with Russian trolls on Twitter 
was, by far, the strength of a user’s pre-existing echo chamber. That is, Twitter users 
who followed political figures almost entirely from their own party were the ones 
most likely to engage with IRA agents on the platform. 
Let’s turn now to Facebook. Guess, Nagler, and Tucker (2019) studied the 
characteristics of the sharers of false news on Facebook during the 2016 US presidential election campaign. They merged survey data with respondents’ Facebook 
profiles to measure sharing activity. First and foremost, they found that sharing 
this content was a relatively rare activity. The vast majority of Facebook users 
in their data did not share any articles from fake news domains in 2016, and this 
is not because people generally do not share links. While 3.4% of respondents 
included in the authors’ data shared 10 or fewer links of any kind, 310 (26.1%) 
respondents shared 10 to 100 links during the period of data collection, and 729 
(61.3%) respondents shared 100 to 1000 links. On the contrary, over 90% of the 
respondents in this study shared no stories from fake news domains. Moreover, and 
once again, the sharing activities were partisan. Indeed, the authors find evidence 
that the most conservative users were more likely to share this content. 
If we now turn on fake news consumption, Guess, Nagler and Tucker (2019) 
find that approximately one in four Americans visited a fake news website (27.4%) 
during the final weeks of the 2016 election campaign. Fake news has been defined 
in this research as recently created sites that frequently published false or misleading 
claims that overwhelmingly favour one of the presidential candidates in the weeks 
before the 2016 election. The previous percentage seems impressive, but these 
visits overall made up only about 2% of the information people consumed from 
websites focussing on hard news topics. The consumption was disproportionately 
observed among Trump supporters for whom its largely pro-Trump content was 
attitude-consistent. However, this pattern of selective exposure was heavily concentrated amo g a small subset of people – almost six in ten visits to fake news 
websites came from the 10% of Americans with the most conservative information 
diets who were responsible for approximately six in 10 visits to fake news websites 
during this period. Even in that group, however, fake news made up less than 8% 
of their total news ‘diet’. 
Moreover, the reach of fake news declines dramatically in the period before 
the 2018 midterm elections (see Guess at al. 2020b). In fall 2018, only 7% of the 
public read an article from a fake news site. The only thing that remains constant 
if we compare the 2016 and 2018 campaigns is related to who does consume fake 
news. As in fall 2016, fake news consumption in fall 2018 is disproportionately 
concentrated among the 10% of Americans with the most conservative news 
diets. 
Summing up, the above reviewed articles arrive at the same conclusion, which 
can be summarised in two main points. First, the prevalence of fake news on social 
media seems to be overstated, which would suggest that it is unlikely to cause as iv  changes in public opinion that many commentators have feared. Second, the 
results suggest that fake news sources seem to have been a niche interest. In other 
words, their impact on political discourse might be limited by the same mechanism 
that helps their posts find traction and spread: the algorithms and filter bubbles that 
ensure people see political content they were already inclined to agree with. The 
citizens most likely to interact with Russian trolls or to consume fake news were 
those the least likely to be influenced by them – because of their more entrenched 
political views. 
Fake news and voting behaviour 
Compared to studies focussing on fake news spread and consumption, the studies 
linking fake news exposure with voting are far fewer. Usually, the discussion brings 
forward an indirect evidence rather than a direct one. With respect to former studi , for example, Nyhan (2019) illustrates how there remains no evidence that fake 
news changed the result of the 2016 election. The reason is that any such claim 
must take into account not just the reach of fake news, but also the proportion of 
those exposed to it whose behaviour could be changed. As noted above, approximately six in 10 visits to fake news websites came from the 10% of Americans with 
the most conservative news diets – a group that was already especially likely to vote 
for Donald Trump. 
Similarly, Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) stress that even assuming that a fake 
news article is as persuasive as a TV campaign ad, which is per se a very strong 
assumption, the effect of fake news exposure was most certainly not enough to 
be decisive to the 2016 election outcome given the total amount of consumption 
of fake news in that election (and, once again, the specific type of users that most 
heavily consumed such news). 
More indirect evidence of the scarce impact of fake news consumption on voter 
decisions, comes from fact-checking literature. Several studies ( Nyhan et al. 2019 ; 
Swire et al. 2017 ) based on an experimental framework show that journalistic 
fact-checks can reduce belief in fake news items. However, supporters of a specific 
politician appear not to change their attitudes towards him/her after receiving fact- 
checks, suggesting that voters’ preferences are not contingent on their perceptions 
of the factual accuracy of the candidates (being it true or just fake). In other words, 
factual corrections can achieve the limited objective of creating a more informed 
citizenry but struggle to change citizens’ minds about whom to support. 
One of the few studies focussing on the direct relationship between fake news 
and voting is the work by Cantarella, Fraccaroli, and Volpe (2019) . Interestingly, 
this study is not based on the US case, but on the Italian one, i.e. it looks at a 
country where populist parties are strong, and wherein fake news seem to have 
been largely consumed. 4 For example, a survey about the 2018 elections showed 
that the likelihood of sharing so-called fake news was found to be higher for v t rs of two Italian populist parties (Movimento 5 Stelle and Lega) than for voters 
of other parties. Second, this is one of the few attempts to study the phenomenon 
of fake news using a quasi-experimental methodology in order to account for 
the possible reverse causality issues between voting preferences and exposition to 
misinformation. 
In particular the authors compares two different provinces located in the Tren- 
tino Alto-Adige/Südtirol region in Italy. This region, which is located on the 
border with Austria, is home to a German-speaking linguistic minority and f tures some degree of language segregation: a parallel German-language media m rk t exists, and effective bilingualism is not particularly widespread ( Ebner 2016 ). 
In this respect, the authors select the province of Trento and the province of 
Bolzano. In this latter province, German-speaking citizens are by far the majority. 
Therefore, we have two different areas next to each other, comparable in terms 
of economic and demographic conditions, but wherein one province (contrary to 
the other one) is exposed to a peculiar filter bubble where exposure to fake news 
concerning Italian politics is limited. In fact, it can be reasonably assumed that fake 
news disseminators may have little or no incentive to produce fake news especially 
targeted to the (small) German-speaking population living in Italy. Through that, 
it becomes possible to exploit the language differences across the two provinces 
as an exogenous source of variation in exposure to fake news. The authors then 
gathered municipality-level data on electoral outcomes, demographics, and social 
media usage from the two provinces and exploited a natural experiment occurring 
in the region to randomise exposition to fake news. 
The authors’ main finding was that the persistence of very similar differences 
in voting behaviour, especially as far as the support for populist parties is considered, conditioned by linguistic grouping and broadband penetration, indicates that 
exposure to fake news is entirely dictated by self-selection, meaning that the causal 
channel between voting and fake news goes in a single direction, with individuals 
being exposed to fake news because of their prior political presences. A result, once 
again, consistent with the previous studies that we have discussed. 
Conclusion 
How easy is it to change people’s votes in an election by disseminating fake 
news? Much remains to be learnt about the effects of these types of online a tiviti , but people should not assume they have huge effects. This is at least the 
conclusion of our review. A conclusion that is coherent, inter alia, with our starti g expecta ions grounded in the litera ure on voting behaviour, psychology, 
and campaigning. 
We have highlighted how voting behaviour cannot be just considered the byprod ct of contextual factors, limited to the peculiarities of an electoral campaign, 
in a specific moment in history. On the contrary, despite the declining impact of 
the traditional social, cultural, and partisan identities on voting, and the parallel 
‘self-determination’ of voters, the sociographic factors are still relevant in tr cing voters’ profile and political attitudes, as they constitute the pre-conditions of 
their contextual decision-making heuristics. Unsurprisingly, then, people tend to 
consume the news that confirms their pre-established partisan ideas and the impact 
of campaign advertising (including fake news) on voting seems rather poor. Note 
that the sociographic factors developed in the 1950s could be easily extended as a 
category to include also the current ‘online life’. 
Accordingly, social media information bubbles can matter independently of the 
presence of fake news precisely for their being an incarnation of shared narrations 
within groups of citizens with extended (virtual) social interactions. The ironic 
thing about all the fake news discussion would be therefore our ‘rediscovering’ of 
the important role of a classic issue very well known in the literature on voting 
behaviour. 
This conclusion may sound jarring at a time when people are concerned about 
the effects of fake news that flooded social media. Observers speculated that these 
so-called fake news articles swung the election to Trump. Similar suggestions of 
large persuasion effects have been made about Brexit and the rising of populist p rti s (in Italy as elsewhere). So why did it happen? Probably for the same reasons 
that determine the success of the hoaxes: it offers a simplistic explanation (a kind 
of straw-man concept) for a complex problem and lends itself to be an effective 
propaganda tool. 
None of these findings indicate that fake news isn’t a worrisome sign for a 
democracy. Fake news can have negative effects that extend beyond election 
outcomes. It can mislead and polarise citizens, undermine trust in the media, 5 
and distort the content of public debate. But we need (more) evidence and data, 
not hype or speculation. Measuring the causal effect of exposition to fake news 
is indeed far from trivial, as simple correlations do not provide much infor ation on their effect on voting. If people with given political views both vote and 
consume news accordingly, there is much of the raw correlation that is not causal 
from fake news to vote. 
We end this chapter by highlighting a possible further avenue for the research on 
fake news and politics. Influencing vote choice is very difficult because likely voters 
have strong prior beliefs as we discussed. However, experiments demonstrate that 
persuasive interventions can affect voter turnout (albeit the evidence here is also not 
so straightforward: see Kalla and Broockman 2018 ). That is, campaigns can also aim 
to influence whether voters bother to vote at all (Ansolabehere 2006). 
Of course, when assessing the possible relationship between fake news and t r out, it is important to remember that v ting is habit al. Effective manipulation, 
therefore, likely requires targeting occasional rather than regular voters. In social 
media, however, this type of targeting is possible and, according to some observers, 
it took place during the 2016 US presidential election. Analysis of the precision 
of targeting efforts is, therefore, essential to understanding voter turnout effects, 
in particular to identify both the possible direct effects of fake news consumption on turnout and indirect spillover effects (e.g., word of mouth from reci i nts to peers). However, studying the relationship between fake news and turnout 
requires a sophisticated causal approach ( Aral and Eckles 2019 ), rather than an 
analysis based upon qualitative analyses or anecdotal evidence; something that quite 
often has been lacking in the public discussion. 
Notes 
1 Note, however, that the fears of widespread online ‘echo chambers’ remain a highly discuss d topic. Behavioural data indicates, for example, that only a subset of users – once 
again characterised by their degree of strong political leaning – have heavily skewed media 
consumption patterns ( Gentzkow and Shapiro 2011 ; Barberá 2015). 
2 This, of course, does not imply that political campaigns are not important. See Kalla and 
Broockman (2018) for a discussion. 
3 We are presenting in this section only works based on the USA case, given the relevance 
that the 2016 US presidential elections has generated when it comes to the possible role 
played by fake news. See for example Hall Jamieson (2018). 
4 Il Sole 24 Ore (2018) ‘Fake news: quando le bugie hanno le gambe lunghe’, 4 May 2018, 
www.infodata.ilsole24ore.com/2018/05/04/fake-news-le-bugie-le-gambe-lunghe/ . 
Note, however, that we should be aware of the results we get when focussing on surv y  alone, in particular post-election survey recall. For example, Allcott and Gentzkow 
(2017) show that 15% of survey respondents recalled seeing false news stories during 
the campaign and 8% recalled both seeing a false story and acknowledging that they 
believed it. However, a question about exposure to placebo false news stories – untrue 
but plausible headlines that the authors invented which never actually circulated – 
gives almost the same responses as a question about false news stories that actually did 
circulate: 14% of people reported seeing placebo stories and 8% reported seeing and 
believing them. This highlights the limitations of recall-based surveys about fake news 
consumption. 
5 This outcome can also be the by-product of an unintended process. Indeed, it has been 
shown that when people are exposed to tweets and press articles containing the term ‘fake 
news’, their ability to tell real from fraudulent stories decreases (see Van Duyn and Collier 
2018). 
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Once Upon Covid-19 
A tale of misleading information going viral 
Alice Hazelton 
Introduction 
First detected in Wuhan, China, a pneumonia of an unknown cause was reported 
to the World Health Organization (WHO) country office in China on 31 D cember 2019. The outbreak was declared a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern on 30 January 2020 and on 11 February 2020, the WHO announced a 
name for the new coronavirus disease: Covid-19, the word that will define 2020 
for many of us. One month later, “deeply concerned both by the alarming levels 
of spread and severity”, the WHO declared Covid-19 a pandemic ( World Health 
Organization 2020a ). 
Covid-19 is the name of the infectious disease caused by the virus known as 
severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (Sars-CoV-2). At the time of 
writing, on 6 June 2020, the virus has infected over 6.75 million people in almost 
every country and claimed the lives of 395,328 people. Almost three million peo l  have recovered after the infection ( Johns Hopkins University 2020 ). With diff ri g testing capabilities across different ju isdictions, the true toll of the virus on 
human lives will not be known for some time, if ever. 
Along with an escalation of cases and deaths, life as we know it has ground to a 
halt. Millions of people around the world have found themselves under lockdown 
measures and quarantined to their own homes. Border closures and travel bans have 
severely disrupted supply chains, businesses are teetering on the brink of collapse, 
and record levels of unemployment loom. The magnitude and speed of collapse in 
economic activity is unlike anything ever experienced for many of us and, as long 
as containment measures are necessary to further prevent the spread of Covid-19 or 
the development of therapeutics and vaccines comes about, the worse are the pr sp cts for economic recovery. The ‘Great Lockdown’ will see the world economy 
experience the worst recession since the Great Depression ( Gopinath 2020 ). 
Covid-19: Misinformation going viral 
As the virus has spread around the planet affecting both lives and livelihoods, so 
too has an overload of information, including misinformation – incorrect but not 
deliberately misleading – and disinformation – purposefully misleading ( UNESCO 
2018 ). Day-to-day conversation, social media feeds, front page news, television, 
and radio are dominated by stories about Covid-19 and it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to look past sensational headlines and separate facts from fiction. From tales 
of the virus starting with a woman eating bat soup, to the President of the United 
States touting drinking bleach as a cure ( Taylor 2020 ), how does one know what 
to believe and what not to? 
“We’re not just fighting an epidemic; we’re fighting an infodemic”, Tedros 
Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the WHO, said on 11 February 2020 
at the Munich Security Conference in Germany, referring to the fact that fake 
news “spreads faster and more easily than this virus” ( World Health Organization 
2020b ). Indeed, a lack of reliable information and trusted sources can be as dangerous as the virus itself. Inaccurate information does not only mislead people, but 
it can endanger lives by encouraging people to ignore public health advice, take 
unproven drugs, or refuse a vaccine, should one become available. 
Written during the midst of the pandemic, this chapter aims to briefly docu nt the rise of misinformation and disinformation related to Covid-19 to date 
and to consider some attempts to thwart it, along with offering suggestions for 
future work and discussion. As the situation is rapidly evolving and changing on 
a day-to-day basis, it is by no means an exhaustive account but instead showcases 
several illustrative examples. A thorough analysis should be undertaken if and when 
the pandemic subsides. 
History repeats itself: Disease narratives 
“We know that every outbreak will be accompanied by a kind of tsunami of information, but also within this information you always have misinformation, rumours, 
etc. We know that even in the Middle Ages there was this phenomenon,” said 
Sylvie Briand of WHO’s Health Emergencies Programme ( Zarocostas 2020 ). 
Misleading information is nothing new. Before diving into the details of the 
Covid-19 pandemic, it is perhaps worth briefly looking at what history tells us 
about the way news travels during outbreaks, why falsehoods originate, and how 
they spread. While a scientific approach is vital to helping us understand the virus 
itself, lessons from folklore – the study of culture – can offer an understanding of 
the reasons behind human behaviour; in this case, how and why inaccurate information spreads during disease outbreaks. Both approaches are equally important to 
the study of information dissemination, but it is often the difference between how 
the scientific world views or tells the story of an epidemic event – the evidence – 
and the story that circulates in public discourse where rumours begin. 
Only humans tell stories. In his unified theory of storytelling, Gottschall (2012) 
argues that stories help us navigate life’s complex problems and have evolved over 
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time to ensure our survival. He notes that, “Of course, our story instinct has a 
darker side. It makes us vulnerable to conspiracy theories, advertisements, and narr tiv s about ourselves that are more ‘truthy’ than true” (Gotschall 2012). 
Looking back at past epidemics reveals a similar truth about the role of storytelling and he ability of humankind to beli ve one story over another. In his 2014 
book, An Epidemic of Rumours: How Stories Shape Our Perceptions of Disease, folklorist 
Jon D. Lee sets out to examine the story-making process that underlies the arratives which circulate, and draws n unparalleled similarity between historical and 
modern disease narratives. 
Lee (2014) uses the severe acute respiratory syndrome (Sars) as a case study 
but suggests that one could easily replace the words Sars and China with H1N1 
and Mexico and the same narratives would hold. Unsurprisingly, doing the same 
thing today with Covid-19 reveals that, once again, the same narratives have been 
recycled, modified only by specific details that are necessary to link the narrative 
to the current situation. 
Where did it come from? How does it spread? How can it be prevented? How 
can it be treated? Why do we not have a cure? In the absence of scientific evidence 
as answers to such questions, humans have a natural tendency to create their own 
answers in the form of stories in a bid to fill the void. For example, to date, ci ntists have not determined the exact origins of he Sars-CoV-2 virus yet numerous 
stories are filling the void, including that the virus escaped from a laboratory at the 
Wuhan Institute of Virology ( Singh et al. 2020 ) or that the United States military 
brought the virus to Wuhan ( Sardarizadeh and Robinson 2020 ). During the Sars 
epidemic in 2003, in the absence of scientific evidence regarding the origins of the 
virus, similar narratives circulated, including that Saddam Hussein had released Sars 
as part of a biological warfare campaign ( Lee 2014 : 58). 
Some studies on disease narratives have revealed the common themes that one 
is already seeing during the Covid-19 pandemic and that we can expect to see 
used again in future outbreaks. Rooted in how different social groups perceive 
and represent reality, themes of xenophobia, racism, government deception, 
secrecy, and misconduct are commonplace. All revolve around the emotion of 
fear, which fuels the spread of rumours as individuals within a particular group 
sharing a common belief system are likely to pass it on to members of the 
same group in order to warn them of danger and protect them (ibid.: 171). 
“Rumours are often grounded in prejudices and misunderstandings so old that 
they are not recognised as inaccurate, so any attempt to challenge the rumour 
inherently challenges deeply ingrained belief systems and ideas,” states Lee 
(2014: 172). 
In the absence of scientific evidence, rumours and disinformation serve the purp  of filling an information vacuum and this in itself is strong enough to continue 
to support the existence of the narrative. Eradicating false narratives is likely to take 
as long as it takes to eradicate the disease and this is evidenced from Lee’s study on 
the Sars epidemic: “As soon as the virus disappeared and ceased to make headlines, 
the stories died” (ibid.: 173). 
It goes without saying that during public health emergencies this approach is 
not useful when evidence-based information is essential to contain the disease and 
ensure public safety. Unfortunately, there are already instances from the Covid-19 
pandemic where misleading information has resulted in unnecessary death. Just 
one example is that of a couple in Arizona, United States, who ingested chloroquine p osphate that they had left over from treating their koi fish, after seeing a 
televised briefing where President Trump talked about the benefits of chloroquine 
as a treatment for Covid-19. Chloroquine remains unproven as a treatment for 
Covid-19 and to great regret, the man died and the woman was left in a critical 
condition ( BBC 2020 ). 
If eradicating misleading information does not seem possible, then containment strategies are necess ry, just like with the virus its lf. When Lee wrote 
the book An Epidemic of Rumours in 2014, some previous studies had already 
shown that historical methods of controlling rumours were generally ineffective 
and resulted in further spread of the misleading information. Initial research at 
the time pointed to repeating evidence-based information rather than denying 
the misleading information: “For best results, the accurate, positive information 
should be repeated frequently to help solidify its public recognition and familiarity” ( Lee 2014 : 179). Certainly, organisations that disseminate information 
through society, such as the media, have a role to play in adopting this approach, 
but, as the next section will show, the rise in social media use makes this task 
ever-more challenging. 
Social media as a disease vector 
While many of the themes surrounding disease narratives and the associated misleading information undoubtedly appear to remain the same during the Covid-19 
pandemic as in the past, the mediums by which such information spreads are iff rent. Take the Internet, for example. One of our most tra sformative technologies 
had just 413 million active users in 2000, a number which has now grown to 4.57 
billion people, encompassing 59% of the global population ( Clement 2020 ). 
Just over a decade after the creation of the Internet, 2004 marked the shift to 
Web 2.0 – a shift towards user-generated content – and with it, the dawn of social 
media. At the time, MySpace was the first social media site to reach one million 
active monthly users but fast-forward to today and Facebook, established in 2004, 
is the dominant social media platform with 2.3 billion users. YouTube, Insta- 
gram, and WeChat follow, with more than a billion users. Tumblr and TikTok 
come next, with over half a billion users ( Roser et al. 2020 ). Note that during the 
Sars epidemic that formed the case study for Lee’s (2014) book, social media was 
nascent. 
As well as increased access to the Internet, the proliferation in the rise of smart- 
phones around the world has led to a growing number of people spending time 
online and using social media platforms. In fact, one in three people worldwide 
and two thirds of all Internet users are on such platforms ( Roser et al. 2020 ). 
It is not hard to imagine how misleading information can go viral with an 
increased use in social media, exacerbated by more time at home online due to 
lockdown situations around the world. One example from the current Covid-19 
pandemic is that dubbed the ‘Uncle with master’s degree’ post. The earliest version 
of the post was found on Facebook on 7 February and read, “My classmate’s uncle 
and nephew, graduated with a master’s degree, and work in Shenzhen Hospital. He 
is being transferred to study Wuhan pneumonia virus. He just called me and told 
me to tell my friends . . .”. It was shared with a group called Happy People that had 
nearly 2000 members. The post included advice that is not scientifically or m dic ll  proven. Several days later, the same post was shared with minor modifications 
by a man in India and then again several weeks later by a man called Peter in the 
UK who had also altered the post to include new information. This time it caught 
the attention of fact-checking organisations but by then it was too late. The post 
had already been shared 350,000 times and contained false information like the virus 
hates the sun but also included factually accurate information about the importance 
of hand-washing. Since then, the post has spread across languages and the source 
has changed from the Uncle with the master’s degree to board members of Stanford 
hospital and a friend’s nephew in the military ( Robinson and Spring 2020 ). 
As we know from past studies of rumour formation and spread, it is likely that 
the post was not shared with bad intention but indeed through fear and with the 
intention to protect friends and family. After all, social media platforms allow lik minded people to connect from anywhere i  the world. Therefore, the spread of
misleading information can be faster and go further than ever before, especially 
when taking into consideration that platforms take account of user preferences 
and attitudes, and rely on algorithms to mediate and facilitate information, thus 
perpetuating the polarisation of views. Studies have shown that when polarisa- 
tion is high, misleading information is high and can spread faster and further than 
evidence-based information ( Vosoughi et al. 2018 ). 
Recognising the extent of the ‘infodemic’ in hampering an effective public 
health response, the WHO, businesses, and governments around the world have 
united in their response to provide the public with trustworthy sources, reliable 
guidance, and evidence-based information. Specifically, the WHO established the 
Information Network for Epidemics (EPI-WIN) to “unite technical and social 
media teams working closely to track and respond to misinformation, myths and 
rumours and provide tailored information and evidence for action” ( World Health 
Organization 2020c ). 
The WHO is tackling the infodemic under the four themes listed below: 
1. The causes of the disease: How did it emerge and what is the reason? 
2. The illness: what are the symptoms and how is it transmitted? 
3. The treatment: How can it be cured? 
4. The interventions: what is being done by health authorities or other 
institutions? 
Working with some of the world’s biggest search and social media companies, such 
as Facebook, Google, Tencent, Twitter, and others, the WHO is trying to c u t r the spread of rumours including that consuming ginger and garlic can prevent 
the virus, that the virus cannot survive hot weather, and that introducing bleach 
to your body will protect against Covid-19 ( World Health Organization 2020d ). 
Over the last weeks and months, it’s not been unusual to be directed to official 
guidance (based on evidence) when undertaking an Internet search for “Covid-19” 
or logging on to social media platforms. Facebook includes an ‘Information 
Center’ sharing official medical advice, Instagram delivers a pop-up urging US 
users to go to the website for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) – or UK users to the NHS – rather than look at the memes and pictures 
tagged with #coronavirus, and on Pinterest, the only memes and infographics to 
be found related to Covid-19 are those made by internationally recognised organ- 
isations ( Wong 2020 ). In an unprecedented move, Facebook and Twitter have 
both removed content from a head of state falsely stating that a drug could treat 
Covid-19 ( Ball and Maxmen 2020 ). As of 5 March, Twitter introduced a new 
labelling system for tweets containing synthetic and manipulated media and, more 
recently, tweets containing potentially harmful, misleading information related to 
Covid-19 are also labelled ( Roth and Pickles 2020 ). 
All these efforts rely on fact-checkers at independent media organisations to 
verify and raise the alarm on misleading information. Back in January, 88 media 
organisations joined together to record their fact-checking activities with regards 
to information related to Covid-19. The database, which contained more than 
6000 samples in May, is maintained by the International Fact-Checking Information Network – the Network is part of the Poynter Institute for Media Studies in 
St Petersburg, Florida ( Ball and Maxmen 2020 ), and it is just one group among 
many which are banded together to sift through countless claims in a bid to weed 
out accurate, evidence-based information. 
Despite the valiant efforts of social media platforms to control the narrative on 
Covid-19, misleading information continues to spread mostly on social media compare  to ther sources. An analysis conducted by Brennen and colleagues (2020) 
which looked at 225 pieces of information considered misleading by independent 
fact-checkers showed that, while the social media companies have removed or 
labelled misleading content, 58% of false posts remained active on Twitter, 27% on 
YouTube, and 24% on Facebook. It should also be noted that while independent 
fact-checking can go some way in identifying misleading sources of information, 
fact-checkers are limited in their resources and cannot assess the veracity of information that spreads in private channels, closed groups, and messaging applications; 
a phenomenon that misinformation scholar Joan Donovan refers to as ‘hidden 
virality’ ( Donovan 2020 ). She states that researchers have access to less than 2% 
of the spaces where misleading information circulates; this makes it impossible to 
investigate, let alone counter, the huge influx of misleading information that is 
circulating. 
While we know that misleading information is exacerbated by social media, it 
is not limited to these platforms. It should be noted that Brennen’s (2020) analysis 
found that 20% of claims known to be false came ‘top-down’ from high-level 
politicians, celebrities, and prominent public figures, and 36% of these instances 
included speaking publicly or to the media. 
Although the public is increasingly aware, and increasingly concerned, about 
the problem of misleading information ( Fletcher et al. 2020 ), this new attitude does 
not equate to an ability to be less susceptible to misleading information. For that, 
science and scientists can help. 
Flattening the curve of misleading 
information through science 
While the Covid-19 pandemic to date has shown that a myriad of stakeholders – 
from social media platforms to governments and public health authorities – are 
willing to step up their efforts to combat the spread of misleading information, 
raising the profile of evidence-based information can only go as far as how much 
individuals trust the source it is coming from. 
“If people think the WHO is anti-American, or Anthony Fauci is corrupt, or 
that Bill Gates is evil, then elevating an alternative source does not do much – it just 
makes people think that platform is colluding with that source,” says Renée diResta 
from the Stanford Internet Observatory in California ( Ball and Maxmen 2020 ). 
Some suggest that those sharing evidence-based information, such as public 
health authorities, could do a better job at explaining how the evidence base that 
ultimately resulted in public health recommendations was built up (Ball and Max- 
men 2020). For example, rather than just sharing the results of scientific assessments, it would help to explain how and why the evidence was collected and 
evaluated. Indeed, Lee (2014: 186) concludes the final paragraph of his book by 
stating that, “Unfortunately no herbal remedies can fix the media; no vaccines 
can cure racism. Only concerted, intelligent efforts to educate people in the delicat  intricacies of cause-and-effect relationships stand any chance of succeeding.” 
Therefore, the need to increase scientific literacy among different publics could not 
be a more urgent and important task. 
Doing so could avoid widespread phenomena such as ‘vaccine hesitancy’, which 
has gained momentum over the years despite evidence that vaccines are effective 
in preventing infections by deadly diseases. (This indeed is an especially worrying 
trend considering that a vaccine, when developed, will likely contain the Covid-19 
pandemic). Misleading information is also slowing prior momentum towards 
an international agreement on climate change, which will likely have disastrous 
consequences worldwide later this century ( Hopf et al. 2019 ). The Covid-19 
pandemic is just another instance in this string of recent examples where misl ading information can result in harm. Indeed, in a ‘post-truth’ era, experts are also 
questioned and opinions towards some scientific issues remain polarised among 
religious and political lines. Without equipping individuals with the knowledge 
and skills necessary to be able to autonomously evaluate scientific evidence, we 
risk undermining trust in science and evidence-based decision-making for better 
outcomes. 
But why should we trust scientific evidence? Since its introduction by Francis 
Bacon in the 17th century, the scientific method has evolved but is guided by 
unbiased observations that are evaluated for reproducibility and subjected to careful 
self-criticism before being offered for scrutiny by the scientific community through 
the peer review process and publication in scientific journals. If disproved, pr v iling models and theories would be replaced by new ones more consistent with the 
contemporary state of knowledge ( Hopf et al. 2019 ). More recently, historian of 
science Naomi Oreskes (2019) has argued that it is not necessarily the scientific 
method that makes science trustworthy, as many of us assume, but it’s the ‘social 
character’ of science that makes it trustworthy: “All scientific claims are subject to 
tough scrutiny, and it’s only the claims that pass this scrutiny that we can say co stit te scientific knowledge.” Scientific authority is not based on any individual, but 
rather on the collective wisdom of the community ( Oreskes 2019 ). 1 
Science will provide us with an ‘exit strategy’ from the pandemic when a vaccin  is finally developed, but until then researchers around the world are working 
to help understand the origins of the Sars-CoV-2 virus, how it spreads, what treatments are most effective, and indeed if a cure is possible. Sure, there are no definite 
answers to these questions yet but as more evidence is gathered and consensus built 
through the collective wisdom of the scientific community, public health advice is 
likely to change and adapt. As Hopf et al. (2019) note, “this provisional character 
of science is not a weakness but is one of the key reasons for its strength.” 
As purveyors of evidence, scientists and members of the broader scientific ec syst m have multiple roles to play when it comes to fighting both the Covid-19
pandemic and associated infodemic: 
• Contributing to knowledge and evidence 
Scientists around the world have mobilised, formed new collaborations and r irected their research agendas to help support the response to Covid-19. In fact, 
processes that normally take months or years have moved at lightning speed and 
researchers have already made progress in identifying the virus, deciphering its 
structure, testing treatments, and trialling a vaccine. In January, the first scientific 
paper related to Covid-19 was published but since then, scientific literature relating 
to Covid-19 has reached more than 23,000 papers and is doubling every 20 days 
according to one count ( Brainard 2020 ). 
As well as contributing to evidence to inform the public health response, 
research has an important role to play in charting the spread of misleading information related to the infodemic. Numerous studies are already underway including, 
for example, a team at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles sharing 
a data set containing more than 120 million tweets about Covid-19, and in Trento, 
Italy, a team at the Bruno Kessler Institute using automated software to track 
4.7 million tweets a day about Covid-19 to evaluate the content, determine where 
they were sent from, and to estimate their reliability ( Ball and Maxmen 2020 ). 
Finally, there is a need for a new research agenda into ‘the science of science 
communication’. Future research should study the measures put in place by social 
media platforms and health authorities during Covid-19 to combat misleading 
information to see what effect they had. As we know, susceptibility to any information, whether evidence-based or not, is highly driven by cultural context, and 
scientists and scientific institutions need to use cultural literacy to better engage 
communities with science and its evidence. These communication and engagement strategies should themselves also b  subject to analysis to better understand 
what works and what doesn’t. 
• Communicating and engaging the public 
Just as important as explaining the evidence itself, is explaining the process it took 
to get there. It is also no secret that explaining science is complicated and unintentional communication errors can result in misleading information. One such 
example from the COVID-19 pandemic is when a German newspaper reported a 
study that was yet to undergo scientific peer review and ultimately led to a change 
in policy ( Lahrtz and Serrao 2020 ). 
During a time when we need individuals who can critically evaluate and clearly 
communicate evidence, it is discouraging to take note of the decline in both professional fact-checkers and science journalists in newsrooms around the world 
( Scheufele and Krause 2019 ). As such, coverage of scientific issues has become the 
responsibility of political reporters, business writers, and journalists in non-scientific 
beats, sometimes leading to the dangerous phenomenon of “balance as bias” coined 
by Boykoff and Boykoff (2004) : equal coverage and weighting is given to opposing 
views according to journalistic norms; this contributes to further exacerbate views 
not based on evidence, resulting in a biased account of the situation. For example, 
reporting on US elections involves giving equal weighting to opposing parties but 
reporting on climate change should not give equal weighting to climate scientists 
and those who do not believe in anthropogenic climate change. Science communicators and science journalists are well placed to undertake his job as they have 
been trained in how to properly evaluate evidence, interpret jargon, or report on 
statistics. Investment in these professions is urgently needed, as well as the upskill- 
ing of scientists in order to represent their own work in an accurate, engaging, and 
easy-to-understand manner. 
Education systems should also be reformed to place more emphasis on the 
culture and values of science and its processes. Durant and Ibrahim (2001) also 
make an important point about the power of informal outreach and engagement 
with science and suggest that nations should celebrate the culture of science and 
its values of reasoning, openness, tolerance, and respect for scientific evidence, 
just as they celebrate the arts and humanities that enrich peoples’ lives. With 
this in mind, it should not go unnoticed that traditional channels of science 
communication outside of the education system included newspapers, television, 
and science museums, which tend to reach more educated and higher income 
audiences. Going forward, it will be crucial to make sure that under-served udi nces are also reached. 
• Advocating for science and science literacy 
As well as contributing to scientific knowledge and communicating the ‘what’ and 
‘how’, scientists must advocate for science and be ambassadors for the scientific 
community at large. Scientists must be ready to stand up against misleading infor ation and call out those who dismiss valid scientific evidence when they see it 
( Hopf et al. 2019 ). Increased and improved capacity for science communication 
and public engagement will help with this, but scientists remain important stakeholders in upholding and sharing these values with society at large. 
Conclusion 
Seven months on from when the first cases of Covid-19 were reported, the pand mic is far from over. A week before the end of June 2020 and the world is seeing 
some of the biggest numbers of daily cases while countries remove lockdown asur s in a bid to restart their economies. The aims of this chapter were to briefly 
document the rise of misinformation and disinformation related to Covid-19 along 
with some of the attempts to-date to thwart it. It finished by offering thoughts on 
steps forward, which may well end up being undertaken in the time that it takes to 
publish this book. When the pandemic finally subsides, I look forward to working 
with others from different fields to analyse the story of Covid-19 in further detail, 
take note, and share the lessons learned in the hope that history will not repeat itself 
in the same way again. 
Note 
1 It should not go unmentioned that during the Covid-19 pandemic there have been 
instances of influential scientific papers being retracted. For example, a study into the 
efficacy of hydroxychloroquine – touted as a treatment by several public figures – was 
found to be flawed, retracted, and clinical trials were halted ( Davey and Kirschgaessner 
2020). One can only assume that the pressure to find a treatment resulted in some editorial oversight and in normal circumstances this would not, and should not, happen. The 
chapter is written on the assumption that proper checks and balances are in place to avoid 
these sorts of instances. 
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Lie to Live 
The production of a faked reality as an 
existential function of Putin's regime 
Anna Zafesova 
The need to be believed 
Once upon a time, a delegation of the Italian Communist Party went to Moscow 
and, as it was customary at the time, the Italian comrades were to meet the Soviet 
comrades. They were received by comrade Boris Ponomariov, the head of the 
Foreign department of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the 
Soviet Union, and they told him about their concern about the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan. They told him it was really difficult, nearly impossible, for them 
to justify this invasion before their followers and voters, that it was a brutal and 
completely counterproductive move. In response, comrade Ponomariov repeated 
to them all the explanations of the Soviet propaganda, such as the need to respond 
to a call of international solidarity from Kabul, and the urge to occupy Afghanistan before the US did. The Italian comrades expressed their disappointment to 
be treated like fools and objected to the obvious piece of propaganda. At that 
point, Ponomariov looked them intensely in the eyes and said gravely: “You must 
believe us.” 1 
More than 30 years later, in the autumn of 2014, the Italian government made 
an attempt to bring Vladimir Putin to negotiate the Ukrainian crisis with his West rn counterparts, inviting him to an international summit in Milan. As a former 
East German citizen and somebody who learned Russian at school, Angela Merkel 
was chosen as the chief negotiator for the West. Mrs. Merkel waited for Putin 
almost until midnight. The Russian president was late as usual: he went to Belgrad , where he was welcomed with a milit ry parade, and he was still awaited for 
a truffle dinner at the country villa of Silvio Berlusconi ( Yardley and Herszenhorn 
2014 ). When he finally appeared, Mrs. Merkel, a little bit annoyed, asked him to 
expose his ‘real’ reasons and requests about Crimea and Ukraine ( Buckley et al. 
2015 ). Putin, at 2 a.m., being alone with the most powerful woman in Europe, 
a unique opportunity to negotiate without witnesses and restraints, started again 
Anna Zafesova 
to expose his usual propaganda: the ‘Nazi coup’ in Kiev backed by the West, the 
danger to the Russian-speaking population in Crimea, and so on ( Dempsey 2014 ). 
He did not ask for any realpolitik concessions, for example, to exchange the recognition of Crimea and the Donbass as Russian territories for some guarantees against 
Russian missiles aiming at Europe, or oil and gas discounts, or other potentially 
tradable issues. Putin was in need of something entirely different: “You have to 
admit we are right,” he told the chancellor. The two leaders had more or less the 
same conversation again a month later, at the G20 summit in Brisbane ( Barkin and 
Rinke 2014 ). Then, Angela Merkel called Barack Obama and told him that it is 
impossible to negotiate with Putin because he “lives in another world,” as she put 
it ( Baker 2014 ). 
These two little true stories help to define better the problems we are facing 
in our newsrooms. There are many recent researches about the strategy and the 
tactics of the fake news interference inspired by Russians in the Western politics 
and media environment, which present them as a tool of a ‘hybrid war’ against 
the West; something invented and promoted specifically to undermine the enemy. 
For fake news we usually mean altered or completely wrong facts, and we suppose 
that people who are spreading them do so intentionally. In other words, they lie 
and they know it. From the fact-checker’s point of view, it is quite simple: you 
consider a statement, you research it, you find out it is a fake, you tell it, and people 
open their eyes. The reality is much more complex, as we are starting to find out 
now that fake news is becoming an issue of concern in the West. We Westerners 
have our own trolls, both on payroll of some political forces and volunteers, and 
while they can be linked in some ways to their Moscow colleagues, they are an 
expression of our homegrown disease and vulnerabilities. 
Telling the truth from lies 
When we are speaking about Russia, however, we are dealing with something 
we are not prepared for: an entire alternative reality, for which being believed and 
promoting the regime’s very own different truth is one of the main goals, one of 
the tools of survival. The fake news Moscow’s agents are spreading in the West 
is not a byproduct of Putin’s regime; rather, it is the main staple Russia produces 
and consumes. The main target of the faked picture are not the Westerners, but 
Russians themselves, even the same members of the power system that produces 
it. As Dr. House would say, everybody lies: to their voters, to their diplomatic 
counterparts, to the Western public, but first of all to themselves. Some of them, 
sometimes, know they are lying: somebody obviously knew the truth about the 
Malaysian Boeing, 2 for example, about who shot it down and how. But a lot of 
opinion makers – Russian journalists, Duma members, diplomats etc. – do believe 
what they are saying, at least to some degree. For them, fake news is not fake at all. 
Instead, they think and affirm that Western information is entirely and intentionally faked, or at l ast biased. The lies they are telling to the world are the same they 
are telling to themselves. In a way, they are not lying: they may be wrong, but they 
think they are right. 
Lie to live in Putin’s Russia 
Sometimes we can doubt that even Vladimir Putin can always tell the truth 
from the false: when he showed Oliver Stone on his phone a video of a Russian 
raid in Syria that later was revealed by the fact-checkers as being a footage of an 
American raid, 3 or when he cited as a crucial witness for the Russian version of the 
Malaysian Boeing disaster a “Spanish air traffic controller,” a fake Twitter account 
that at the time of the interview was already debunked as fake ( Schreck 2018 ), was 
he consciously lying to the American filmmaker, or was he an unconscious victim 
of his own masters of fakes? And who was responsible: the Minister of Defense Sergey 
Shoigu? Some smart people from the army’s press service? Some trolls from the 
St Petersburg ‘factory of trolls’ created by Evgeny Prigozhin, the so-called ‘Putin’s 
cook’? Did Putin just see the video on the web? And how do we have to deal 
with it? Must we consider a fake statement from the Russian president that Crimea 
was not annexed by Moscow but ‘reunited’ with its homeland (Golubeva, Chernous, 
Ehrman 2019)? The journalists of free media in a world of free speech may 
have a problem reporting statements of propaganda without commenting on them, 
although we also cannot just call a head of a foreign state a liar. But, if we explain 
that it’s just his own opinion, are we giving a lie a more honorable status? Do we 
need to stop interviewing Russian officials so that we do not help them spread fake 
news? Would it be correct to object to things they are telling us without forgetting 
the rules of the objective interview? How do you quote somebody who is part of 
a system in which the main product is fake news, in a way the crucial exporting 
Russian industry sector? 
But the relationship of the Russian – and before, of the Soviet – regime with 
the truth is not only its beating heart and its strongest weapon; it is also its we k t point. The Soviet Union collapsed when it became impossible not to face the 
obvious truth of its failure. It is a system without negative feedback: if you’re not 
allowing the existence of a truth that contradicts the official one, if sticking to the 
right truth becomes a matter of loyalty, and career, for the members of the establishment as well as for the ordinary people, t en the very meaning of the fake disappears. Thi  self-destructive behaviour was most obvious during the Chernobyl 
disaster, for example, when the long habit of hiding unpleasant truths from high-ranking 
officials delayed rescue operations in the affected area and put millions 
of Soviet and Western citizens in danger. The truth about Chernobyl, mostly 
revealed in the following months by increasingly free press of the perestroika, was 
a relevant component of the loss of trust in the regime, and it is really odd to see 
that, even more than 30 years later, the Russian officials can still become angry at 
the critical depiction of the Chernobyl incident in the HBO series ( Meduza 2019 ), 
considering this TV fiction as yet another attack on contemporary Russia, which 
wants to identify itself with the late Soviet Union rather than see it as belonging 
to the past. 
Another example of this attitude to defend the one and only official truth as a 
political weapon is President Putin’s campaign to “defend the truth on the Second 
World War,” which was even included in the amendments of the new version of 
the Constitution ( Interfax 2020 ). Russian leadership sees the imposition of its rh toric on Moscow’s special rights as one of the winners in the war as a legitimisation 
of its own ambitions to former Soviet zones of influence, and wants to simply ban 
any theories that dismantle this narrative, like the resolution of the European Parli ment on the 80th anniversary of the beginning of WWII (European Parliament 
2019 ). Again, it is very difficult to understand how much the Kremlin is manipulating the historical truth and to what extent Putin and most of his fellow citizens 
truly believe something they were taught for half a century. 
Truth as a prized asset 
The truth in the Soviet Union was something of a privilege, reserved to the happy 
few: even Mikhail Gorbachev was absolutely convinced that the Katyn massacre 
was perpetrated by the Nazis, until his chief of staff Valery Boldin showed him 
the top secret file. The legend that newly sworn US presidents receive a thick file 
with the ultimate truths – who shot JFK, were there really aliens at Roswell, and is 
Elvis still alive – was true in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev, the first and last Soviet 
president, already the Secretary General of the one and only ruling party, the leader 
of the country, the plenipotentiary who went to negotiate the end of the nuclear 
threat with US presidents, even he was ignoring a lot of hidden truths ( Taubman 
2018 ), included the Katyn reports and even the secret protocols on the partition of 
Europe signed together with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Who did know them? 
Boldin? The archive employees? High-ranking KGB people? Not even them, as 
it seems Vladimir Kriuchkov, in his very first days as KGB chairman, launched an 
inquiry on the ‘real’ state of things in the country, asserting after his mentor Yuri 
Andropov that “We ignore the country we live in” ( Bondarenko 2004 ). Later, in 
August 1991, both Boldin and Kriuchkov became leaders of a doomed hardliners’ 
coup against Gorbachev, 4 which ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet Union 
instead of saving it: it seems that they were not so well informed after all. 
As the abovementioned examples from Soviet history show, when lying is syst atic within an authoritarian regime, lies become more than lies – to stay in 
power the removal of truth is necessary, and the same is true for contemporary 
Russia, which becomes more and more like a late-Soviet regime, rather than a post-Soviet 
one. People inside the system, from the lower levels up, are not encouraged 
to tell the truth to their superiors: they risk being dismissed and substituted with 
plenty of officials ready to stick with the desired truth in exchange for the ben fits of being a high-ranki g member of the regime’s nomenklatura. The sanctions 
imposed by the West against the more prominent among Putin’s oligarchs, business en, and opinion-makers, were in some way an attempt to force the Kremlin 
to face the truth, to change its mind about its own power and impunity, to see the 
limits of its narrative about Russia “rising from its knees” ( Manaeva 2019 ), and 
the partial failure of these sanctions derives from a system where acknowledging a 
truth is equal to failure. The side-effect of this mindset is that the system is gr ually cleared of the most bright people, i.e. those capable of critical and analytical
thinking, and then it lacks the resources to correct the mistakes, which is the first 
rule of a functioning system, and the first and only condition to survive in the long 
term. We see that the priority of Russian politics is not to achieve concrete goals 
of any kind – we saw it in Ukraine and in Syria, two wars that are very expensive 
for the Kremlin from any point of view –, but rather to impose its own truth, to 
show they were right: defining reality through an official narrative is something 
that is seen as a source of legitimisation. 
One of the most beloved taglines for Russian nationalists is ‘Truth is with us’, 
‘Our strength lies in the truth’. The main Soviet newspaper was even called Pravda – 
the truth, nothing less – while the greatest dissident to challenge the regime, 
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, gave one of his political manifestos the title Live Not By Lies 
( Solzhenitsyn 1974 ). Having access to an alternative version of the events, which 
often meant knowing the truth, was something thousands of Soviet citizens were 
searching for, listening to Western radio broadcasts or reading banned books in the 
samizdat network. In a way, the fight between the regime and its adversaries, in 
USSR and abroad, had at its heart the collision between two alternative versions of 
reality, the clash between truth and false, and hiding the truth was one of the main 
activities of the repressive branches of the government. The Communist regime 
collapsed when the truth about it was gradually revealed, when the perception of 
a faked history, faked success, faked superiority, of a country-sized myth, became 
widespread, especially when confronted with the much more easily available information about life in the Western countries. 
The problem in the Soviet Union was the censorship, the physical unavailability 
of the truth, which was the most prized and hard to find in the Soviet world of 
perennial shortages of anything. Having the truth on your side was seen as quintessential to win. Starting with a president who proudly described himself as ‘pragmatic', 
in 20 years Putin’s leadership evolved into a quasi-Soviet regime which 
feeds on ideology and assertions, almost religious in their being undebatable. The 
current Russian regime uses the old tools of propaganda and censorship together 
with a very modern and smart implementation of the contemporary tools of media 
manipulation, including television and social networks ( Pomerantsev 2019 ; 2015). 
Information manipulation is a mainly domestic product, whose export is a side-activety 
of the government’s core business of building a reality that voters would 
like and vote for. 
Under Vladimir Putin, Russian public opinion has been shaped for 20 years 
to stick with an alternate version of facts concerning the Soviet and post-Soviet 
history, which at some point also became a diplomatic issue. A case in point was 
the short-lived Commission in charge of fighting the ‘distortions’ of the history 
of the Second World War, 5 founded by the Russian government 6 to impose its 
own vision internationally in order to justify Moscow’s claims to control former 
Soviet territories and parts of Eastern Europe, something hardly possible once the 
Red Army was considered an occupation rather than liberation force. Something, 
again, that a wide majority of Russians, voters and politicians alike still believe, 
considering it a truth quintessential to assert the ‘greatness’ of their country. Putin’s 
obsession with the annual Victory parade, which the Kremlin was reluctant to 
postpone even in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic, has transformed it into 
one of the main moments of the political year in Russia, and the list of the preferences for the foreign leaders depends greatly on the ones who accepted the 
invitation to join the show in the Red Square (and the ones who didn’t). These 
differences in the interpretation of the past (and of the present), eventually, have 
produced a diplomatic stall in the relations between Russia and most Western 
diplomacies: it is nearly impossible to have a negotiation or a deal if you disagree 
even on the basics, and in recent years the role of the head of Russian diplomacy, 
Sergey Lavrov, has become more of a spokesperson than a Foreign minister, c i  to international meeting just to state his government’s position and express his 
indignation towards whomever stays on different grounds. 
The truth as a battlefield 
In this Orwellian context where words and narratives take on supreme importance while facts and evidence are devalued, the efforts of opposition leaders, first 
of all Alexey Navalny, are concentrated on the demolition of the faked version 
of reality offered by the regime. Navalny is the most vivid example of this battle 
line between false and true: his main activity is the debunking of the propaganda 
myths and the spreading of revelations about corruption and illicit conduct of the 
members of the power elite in Russia. Born as a ‘classical’ politician, an activist of 
the then parliamentary party Yabloko, he later became a blogger, then went offline 
for some months during the street protests in the winter of 2011–2012. He has 
emerged again in the last four years as the founder and head of something that we 
can call a sort of opposition media holding; 7 an alternative television show working 
on the YouTube platform, with even a weekly news broadcast where the p osition leader acts as an anchorman, telling people news they wouldn’t hear in the 
official media. His ‘offline’ projects – the Anti-Corruption Foundation 8 and the 
party Russia of the Future – would not exist without this media communication, 
which to some extent is (at least in present Russia) its main goal. 
The battle to impose its own truth and hold the monopoly on its own version of 
the reality is still central to the survival of Putin’s power in the Kremlin, as it was in 
the USSR. But there are two substantial differences. The first one is that Russia is 
now formally a democracy and it holds regular elections. Rigged, manipulated, or 
forbidden to the opposition, the vote is still something to conquer, as the source of 
the 20-year-long reign of Putin was in the first place his overwhelming popularity, 
obtained in an undisputed context of propaganda and censorship, but still uthe tic. Putin’s Kremlin is eager to be recognised in the Wes , Putin’s oligarchs want 
to live, shop, and invest in the West, so the option of becoming a closed totalitarian regime, like the Soviet Union or contemporary North Korea, is not attractive 
to the leader, nor to his supporters. In a system that somebody called a ‘managed 
democracy’, or an ‘illiberal democracy’, the carrot is more important than the 
stick, and you have to convince – even by deception – your voters, instead of just 
threatening them. We saw Putin bringing the media under his control, especially 
television, much earlier than the oil assets: his rule would be impossible without 
the monopoly on the news, including faked and manipulated news. 
The second difference, which Russia shares with the Western world, is that 
today a lot of people, the so called ‘ordinary people’ – which means readers and 
voters – refuse the truth even when confronted with it. The problem in contemporary Russia, and now also in the West, is that all the facts are readily available, 
at least on the web, but people do not want to look for them. Instead, they search 
for comfortable lies. The perestroika was, in a way, an eye-opening political process, 
and both in Russia and in the West this moment of revelation was seen as crucial 
and self-sufficient: once you saw the truth, everything else would work in the right 
way. This magic does not work anymore. If we look closer at the discontent of the 
Russian public, which has become widespread in the last two years ( Kolesnikov 
and Volkov 2020 ), we can see that there is a share of voters who would desire a 
shift towards the Western standards of democracy – freedom of speech and asse bly, free elections, and rule of law. This desire is increasing within the society
and it has been expressed mainly by the most wealthy part of the middle class, 
the intellectuals, the youngest generations of westernised Russians. During the 
street protest of the 2011–2012 Vladislav Surkov, Putin’s ideologist, called the people 
belonging to those groups “angry urban communities” ( Earl 2011 ). These ‘angry 
urban’ young people are growing in numbers, because of a natural generational 
turnover, but also because they don’t see many opportunities in the increasingly 
conservative Russian society. They are mostly immune to the language and to the 
cultural codes Putin shares with their parents, they have not experienced the shock 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and they are not susceptible to the narrative 
that ‘anything is better than going back to the ’90s’. They don’t watch TV, they 
are digital natives, and Internet taught them not to trust anything and anybody, at 
least not unconditionally. They are the Millennials that we have recently seen le ding protests against unfair elections and unjustified arrests, searching and spreading 
alternative information on the web. We saw them also becoming the main targets 
of the police and of judiciary repression ( Dixon 2020 ). 
Other Russians, the majority, just protest against widespread poverty, corru tion, and other social issues, without a clear poli ical programme they would trust 
and support. But reading on social media, for now one of the few measurement 
tools of a submerged discontent in Russia, you can see also a lot of people violently 
criticising Putin for not being Putin anymore, willing for a return of a paternalist 
and powerful national leader – in other words, willing to have back the narrative 
of the ‘Russia great again’ that they have started to perceive as fake. They do not 
like the way Putin and his court are managing the reality they live in, but they still 
stick with the myths and narratives the government has created in the past years, 
included the one of Western malevolence and interference. Essentially, they are 
asking to remain inside the fake propaganda picture, even when confronted with 
facts. 
We see the same weakness of the facts in Western public opinion. Stating what 
is considered as a fact did not work with the Anti-Vax movement, for example, 
and it doesn’t work well in the debates on the economy – as a former vice minister 
of the Italian populist Five Star Movement put it when confronted with risks of 
inflation and growing debt burden by a professional economist, “It’s your words,” 
cancelling with one sentence years of research and empirical experience on a highly 
specialistic field. 9 The psychological and political mechanism of Western populists 
and sovereignists is similar to that adopted by the Russian regime: you have to creat  an alternate reality, to leave rational grounds and make potential voters believe 
it, because otherwise it would be impossible to play on the adversary’s ground 
where you can differ in opinions or interests you advocate, but not on the basic 
principles of what is rational and possible. 
This brings us to the possible solution of the fake news problem, which is 
not only a problem for journalists and politicians. In the first Cold War, the goal 
was to let the truth about the regime slip across the border: the fake reality of 
Communism would shatter in pieces and the ‘evil empire’ would fall. It worked. 
During the new Cold War of fake news, we have to fight simultaneously on two 
fronts, because we have the same problem at home. We are finding out that the 
immune defenses of European and Western democracies are weaker than we had 
thought and the vaccination must come from the school system, from cultural 
institutions, from governments. But these are all long-term processes while we 
are dealing with the news, so we have to respond quickly. What do we have to 
do as journalists? We have to do our job: verifying our sources, crosschecking 
information, trying to be impartial, and using less adjectives and more data. It can 
sound too simple, but if in a lot of Western countries we are facing the risk of a 
potential interference of the Russian official and unofficial media actors aiming 
at conquering a share of the public, and the risk of domestic political forces using 
the same method (aided or not by Moscow), it is because we didn’t do our job 
well enough. Legal tools to stop possible Russian interferences are needed, to be 
applied by governments, media outlets, and social networks, but they will be not 
enough without a solid counter-narrative. Again, during the Cold War Moscow 
invested a lot in the propaganda, sustaining news outlets like Novosti agency (of 
which the RIA Novosti is the heir) or Communist newspapers, courting influ tial opinion-makers (writers, filmmakers, painters) and moving puppet p rti s, movements, and NGOs. But he Soviet propaganda efforts were efficiently 
blocked by a widespread information on the crimes of the Communist regime and 
on the hard life most of the Soviet citizens led, which resulted in appealing to only 
a minority of Western public opinion. 
Russia has this strange role of being a sort of mythical place to part of the 
Western audience, something to look at as an alternative to the existing order, but 
from a distance ( Applebaum 2019 ). Today the pro-Russian public in the West is 
no longer a network of left-wing sympathisers; Putin’s supporters in the West mainly 
support right-wing parties and movements. Instead of a realm of equality, welfare, 
and wellbeing for the ordinary people, Russia is perceived today as a rich, powerful 
nation, invulnerable to the problems of the contemporary world – globalisation, 
migration, and secularisation. Instead of being seen as the radiant future of Communism, Putin’s Russia is now perceived by many Westerners as a heaven where 
the good old past still survives, where there are no immigrants, LGBT people, 
pacifists, feminists, and environmental activists; a country which is faithful to the 
‘traditional Christian values’, with white males still firmly in control of their f milies, and clear and undisputed hierarchies. Both narratives are nothing more than 
propaganda myths, or fakes, as they could be called nowadays. The only way to 
fight them is to tell the truth. Cognitive dissonance is the most powerful weapon 
against ideology. 
What to do? Some final remarks 
Informed people are harder to force into believing without questioning. H w er, it is hard to see ho  information, critical analysis, and propaganda interact 
in a horizontal world, where everybody can create and spread information and 
opinions. Journalists must convince the public to listen to them because they 
have an expertise. This is what makes them different, this is what makes them 
professionals. Even if they do not know everything, they are trained to deal with 
information and to recognise it as fake or true, and to know whom and how to 
ask when they do not know something. They have to attract the public’s attention 
on relevant issues; nothing is given anymore as a birthright, journalists of long-established 
media outlets are no longer considered as particularly trustworthy. 
They have to train their readers not to trust anybody blindly, not even journalists. This task requires a good dose of old-school journalism: not infotainment, 
not partisan spirit, not gossips, not click-baiting. Journalists must use as a rule of 
thumb – for example, not considering politicians’ tweets as news, especially when 
it comes to the populist and authoritarian ones. Doing this just helps them to reach 
a larger audience. Media must learn what to tell and what not to tell, not because 
of a censorship, but to set rules: pulp news, TV shows that rise their ratings by 
inviting political freaks, fear and hate speech and morbid passion for disasters and 
catastrophes – it might sound out of fashion, but our media shares the responsibility for the fake news epidemic and we have to acknowledge it. At least in Italy, 
we do. In a world of perfect journalism, why would people look for fakes and 
believe them to be true? 
What media and journalists must do is not only to debunk, find out, and expose 
fakes. In this way, they will be only following others’ initiative. Speaking of Russia, 
they have to produce and propose alternative facts and views, to inform, to show 
different aspects of Russian life. For example, speaking more about the reform of 
the Russian retirement system or of the healthcare system than about Putin’s new 
car or the last military parade – showing more grim reality and less Kremlin gl m ur, in other words, to avoid falling for the propaganda that media professionals
are supposed to fight against. As hard as this may be, we need to clearly distinguish 
between fakes and facts, facts and opinions, opinions and propaganda. A clear set of 
rules for dealing with information must distinguish certified journalists from other 
media and paramedia producers. We have to be there not only to fight fakes; we 
need to be there before fakes arrive, and do our job. 
Notes 
1 From a private conversation between the author and one of the members of the d leg tion, at the time a high-ranking member of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). 
2 On 17 July 2014, a Boeing-777 of Malaysian Airlines was shot down over Donbass while 
performing a flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur (MH17). All 283 passengers and 
15 crew were killed. The Dutch-led international Joint Investigation Team concluded that 
the aircraft was downed by a Buk surface-to-air missile fired from the territory controlled 
by the Russian-backed separatists, been brought and controlled by Russian military from 
the 53rd Anti-Missile Brigade of the Russian Federation. After years of investigation, the 
Dutch Public Prosecution Service started a trial hearing in March 2020, with several of 
the Russian military being charged for the downing of the MH17. The Russian government always denied any responsibility and/or involvement. Moscow didn’t offer an alt r ativ  exp ana ion. Instead, from the very first hours after the disaster, different officials 
and commentators suggested a different hypothesis, attributing the guilt to a Ukrainian 
fight jet, Ukrainian surface-to-air missile, a bomb placed on board, and even a statement 
that the aircraft was filled with dead bodies by some Western intelligence service which 
then shot at it to put the blame on Donbass separatists (a plot clearly borrowed from the 
Sherlock series). 
3 See on YouTube the video shared in 2018, ‘Vladimir Putin Shows Oliver Stone a Fake 
Video’, www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ZGx9XtPUrw 
4 On 18 August 1991, a group of conservative high-ranking Communist Party officials, 
ministers, and intelligence officers launched a coup against Mikhail Gorbachev and his 
plan to sign a new Union Treaty that would decentralise power in USSR. The coup’s lead rs formed a State Committee on the State of Emergency, imprisoned Soviet President 
Gorbachev in his Crimea dacha, suppressed freedom of speech and gathering, brought 
tanks into Moscow, and tried to arrest liberal politicians and Russian Federation Preside t Boris Yeltsin. The widespread campaigning of civil resistance in Moscow, led by 
Yeltsin, and the refusal of special units commanders to assault the Russian Parliament 
which became the headquarters of the resistance, brought the attempted coup to collaps . Gorbachev returned to Moscow and was reinstated in power on 21 August. The 
coup discredited the Communist leadership and the Communist party was outlawed. The 
coup leaders were arrested. In the three days of turmoil in Moscow most Soviet republics 
declared independence, and the coup that aimed to save the Soviet Union instead ac eler te  its collapse, formalised by the Supr me Soviet of the USSR on 26 December 1991. 
5 The Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify 
History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests was founded by a decree from the then 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in 2009, and included several top-ranking gov r m t officials, members of Parliament, military and intelligence officers, and historians 
heading the State research centres. The Commission’s goal was to counteract ‘revisionist’ 
attempts from foreign countries and Russian opposition to ‘re-write’ the history of the 
Second World War, especially in regard to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. The C mmissi n was disbanded in 2012, but Russian d plomacy continues to veheme tly attack 
any statement which goes against the ‘official version’ of history. 
6 See the official news on the webpage of the Russian President: http://en.kremlin.ru/ 
events/president/news/4121 . 
7 Navalny.com , Navalny Live YouTube channel, FBK (Anti-Corruption Foundation) social 
accounts, and some other online resources are all expressions of the opposition group led 
by Alexey Navalny. They function both as a political platform and as alternative media 
outlets which produce documentaries, shows, and news critical of the official propaganda 
version, with special attention to exposing the corruption of the Russian government 
and governors. Navalny himself stars in different videos and is the host of a weekly show 
commenting on the main news, while explaining to his followers how to organise the selve  to count ract the wrong-doing he reveals. For further reading and watching, www. 
navalny.com blog contains all the activities of Alexey Navalny and his allies and links to 
all other resources of the group, which acts only on the web, the last partially free media 
environment in Russia. 
8 This is the website of the Anti-Corruption Foundation: https://fbk.info/english/about/ . 
9 This is the video of the discussion, broadcasted by a popular TV show on Italian national 
television. The video of the confrontation between Laura Castelli and Pier Carlo Padoan 
became viral for its grotesque tone: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7f2imlR6xI . 
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Playing the Russian 
Disinformation Game 
Information operations from Soviet 
tactics to Putin's sharp power 
Francesco Bechis 
Information operations (IO): a review of the doctrine 
Like any other major power, Russia has become an efficient actor in the cyber- 
domain. Information operations (IOs) and state-led propaganda play a primary role 
in Russian cyber warfare. This is not surprising, given the fact that state-sponsored 
disinformation has been in place as long as there have been State-actors. Yet during 
the last two decades, the digital revolution has provided Russia with new tools and 
tactics that have put the country at the forefront of global information warfare. This 
process has been accompanied by a continuous evolution of Russian military doctri e on unc nventional warfare that has considerably accelerated throughout the 
last decade. 1 State-guided weaponisation of information has often been referred to 
by Western academics as ‘hybrid warfare’. 2 When it comes to definitions, though, 
one cannot but note how slightly Russian and Western military doctrines over 
IOs differ from each other. Terms like ‘hybrid warfare’, ‘new-generation warfare’, 
and ‘cyberwarfare’ have little room in the Russian military science glossary and 
sometimes are even at odds with it. There are two main reasons why in Moscow 
one hardly hears discussion of ‘cyberwarfare’ (kibervoyna) or IOs in the same way 
as Western academics and pundits. First, Russia has a truly different view of IOs 
than the United States or Europe. As Rand Waltzman (2017: 4) has noted, Rus i  military elites conceive IOs as a “continuous activity, regardless of the state of 
relations with any government.” This means that they see information warfare as 
an endless state of warfare that is non-reliant on any casus belli, but instead is a pillar 
of a long-term power strategy. Western states, a glossary provided by the Russian 
Military Academy of the General Staff explains, rather tend to think of IOs as t ctical activities that need to be undertaken in case of hostilities. The second difference 
lies in the attribution of this kind of operation. Russian military and political élites 
tend to refer to hybrid warfare as a Western-rooted strategy aimed at undermining 
its enemies’ cohesion. Stating that key elements of the Russian military doctrine 
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are instead part of the Western vocabulary seems to be a recurrent method that 
dates back to the Soviet times. In fact, the Russian government’s attention to 
hybrid warfare came to be world-known after one of those articles Russian top 
generals wrote seven years ago. The author was General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, 
Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, still 
one of the most prominent figures in the Russian military establishment. Since the 
21st century had seen a tendency “toward blurring the lines between the states of 
war and peace”, Gerasimov (2016: 24) noted at the time, traditional warfare had to 
be re-thought by exploring the possibilities of the new information warfare, which 
provides States with a competitive against their adversaries. “The role of non ilitary means of achieving political and strateg c goals has grown”, the general 
observed, “and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons 
in their effectiveness.” 
The 'Gerasimov doctrine' in the Western debate 
The article soon sparked a lively debate in Western academies over a supposed 
‘Gerasimov doctrine’. Some scholars like Keir Giles referred to it as one of the 
turning points in the recent evolution of Russian military doctrine, others argued 
it was no more than a resumé of Soviet-style military theories ( Giles 2016 ). In an 
article published in the magazine Foreign Policy, Mark Galeotti claimed to have 
been the real ‘inventor’ of the expression back in 2013 ( Galeotti 2018 ). Truth may 
lie beneath. Whilst Gerasimov’s impact on Russian strategic thought must not 
be overrated, Galeotti’s article nonetheless showed the world how deeply rooted 
hybrid warfare was in Moscow’s military doctrine and how the debate had grown 
inside the Military Academy. Moreover, Gerasimov’s references to a new kind of 
asymmetric warfare in the information space that paved the way to “wide asym etrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy” revealed the 
Russian government already had a clear idea on how to use information as a tr t gic weapon in the cyber-domain ( Gerasimov 2016 : 27). Russian doctrine on IOs
has since passed through a significant evolution. Other terms, like new generation 
warfare (NGW) or new-type wars (NTW), have taken the stage in public debates 
and studies promoted by the General Staff ( Thomas 2016 : 555). 
During the last decade, the Western debate over Russian IOs and asymmetrical warfare has grown remarkably. Among the hund eds of prominent scholars who gave an in-depth description of how Russian State-led disinformation 
and cyberwarfare work today, there is a group of US researchers from the NED 
(National Endowment for Democracy) who coined a new term to address Russian 
attempts to exert influence in the information space: ‘sharp power’ ( Cardenal et al. 
2017 ). Presented at first in a report in 2017, this interpretation has gained ground 
throughout the academic world and had a vast media echo ( Messa 2019 ). While 
‘soft power’ 3 means the ability to attract and co-opt through appeal and attraction, 
sharp power, the authors argued, is the ability to wield influence that “pierces, 
penetrates, or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted 
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countries” ( Cardenal et al. 2017 : 6). This seems to be a regular practice for authoritarian states, which came to learn how to turn the advantages of globalisation into a 
weapon. More precisely, they managed to exploit a ‘glaring asymmetry’. Globalisation 
and the digital revolution have widened the openness of democratic systems. 
Major authoritarian powers like Russia and China, though, have exploited these 
spaces on a global scale, while raising barriers and narrowing communication and 
information spaces at home. Russia has been particularly active in taking advant ge of the opportunities provided by the globalisation era and, as mentioned, has 
learned how to turn this asymmetry into strategic leverage in the information war. 
The information sphere, though, is not the only domain where authoritarian 
states’ sharp power comes into action: trade, foreign direct investments, energy 
supplies, schools and universities, international political and cultural institutions, 
think tanks, foundations. Mastering control and coercion in all these domains is 
useful to win over the public opinion of a foreign country and getting leverage in 
its political system is a valid weapon for sharp power. As the name suggests, it is a 
‘sharp’ form of influence, as it penetrates the targeted national system just as a dag er penetrates flesh. Form and method might even perfectly resemble a classic ‘soft 
power’ operation, but sharp power has its own distinctive features, as argued by 
Cardenal and his colleagues: whatever the tool used, the final goal has little to do 
with cultural exchanges or public image ( Cardenal et al. 2017 ). Sharp power aims 
at maximising political leverage. 
Even though the NED’s work has faced some opposition from top scholars, like 
soft power’s father Joseph Nye, who disputes the idea that sharp power represents 
a new form of influence ( Nye 2018 ), it deserves credit for having shed light on the 
ongoing challenge posed by authoritarian states with a new face of the information 
competition through conventional and unconventional means that is not ‘soft’ nor 
comes close to what Joshua Kurlantzick called a “charm offensive.” 4 
Russia's 'active measures' 
As noted before, the concept of information warfare is not new to Russia’s trategic thought. Indeed, it has always been a key component of what Russian intelligence officers, military chiefs, and policy makers have historically referred to as 
‘active measures’ (aktivnye meropriyatiya), or, to cite a well-known definition by 
American Kremlinologist George Kennan, “measures short of war” (MSW), a set 
of measures aimed at undermining the enemy’s resilience through covert p rations in the economic, military, cyber, and information fields. Nevertheless, the 
tools and tactics that the digital revolution has introduced demand a new theoretic l framework to read Russian IOs. Before entering into details about the Russian 
government’s approach to information warfare, it is worth noting how it fits a 
well-established practice. 
Since Soviet times, in Russian military doctrine active measures have been 
indicated as a set of three main concepts: disinformation (dezinformatsiya), ece tion (maskirovka), and reflexive control (refleksivnoe upravlenie) (Connable et al. 
2020: 25). None of these is a stand-alone tactic, as they concur to create a holistic 
approach to warfare within the field of information. Among the three, maskirovka 
is the oldest, as it first appeared in Russian military academia around 1904, when 
the Czar and his family were still alive and in charge. To understand how deeply 
institutionalised this notion is, it suffices to recall that from 1904 to 1929 there has 
been a school, the Higher School of Maskirovka, where Russian military officials 
were provided with the basics of this tactic through textbooks and dedicated l s ons ( Thomas 2004 : 239). A comprehensive definition ca  be found in the work of 
Roger Beaumont, one of the leading scholars who has studied Soviet disinformation techniques in depth. Maskirovka, he argued, “encompasses a diverse spectrum 
of stratagems employed to warp the enemy’s view of Soviet positions, designs 
and missions, and to alter the perceptions of their own side and their clients as 
well” ( Beaumont 1982 : 3). Recently, Keir Giles has defined it as “the complex of 
measures devised to confuse the enemy regarding the presence and disposition of 
forces, their condition, readiness, actions and plans” (Giles 2018: 10). Deception 
and camouflage are two recurrent elements of any country’s military doctrine and 
hitherto should not be overlooked. What has really made maskirovka a peculiar 
feature of Russian State action though is its transversal use both in the military and 
in the political and civilian world. Born in the military academia, the concept has 
become a State paradigm that encompasses the whole spectrum of government 
activities. Even though maskirovka is an old-fashioned Soviet-era strategy, some 
authors maintain that it still has its place in Russian hostile measures. Galeotti, for 
instance, has described the operations of the ‘little green men’ who fled Crimea in 
2014 before it was annexed by Russia as a classic case of maskirovka, as the c f si n and fear they sowed among the Ukrainian military establishment and forces 
bought time to the Russians and to their local allies, allowing them to gain the 
commanding positions in Crimea. 5 
Disinformation and reflexive control 
Russian dezinformatsiya is “the practice of misinforming or misleading adversaries 
(and others) with false information, typically to slow, degrade, or stop effective 
responses to an associated Russian activity, such as sabotage, cyberattack, or limited military incursion” ( Connable et al. 2020 : 27). Despite building on Cold War 
tactics, contemporary Russia’s State-led disinformation presents unique features. 
This is not just due to the use of social media and new technologies, but also 
because it has changed scope, speed, and volume. Today Russian disinformation 
campaigns can count on a wholly new set of tools. Social media platforms and 
the pro-government media environment provide them with a much higher level 
of discretion than the Soviet ones, making it more difficult to trace them back to 
government agencies. Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews (2016) have defined 
the contemporary model of Russian disinformation as a “Firehose of falsehood”, 
as it presents two distinctive features: “high number of channels and messages and 
a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright factions.” Multiple 
sources and channels help today’s Russian government disinformation efforts reach 
their targets with much greater efficiency and speed than before. The simultaneous 
use of government-related media outlets, social networks, and automated bots and 
trolls grants these campaigns an audience once inconceivable. Moreover, unlike 
Soviet-era propaganda operations, present disinformation campaigns do not come 
out as a response to isolated events or threats, but instead they are part of a continuous flow of information channelled both through official and unofficial means. As 
several studies in the experimental psychology field have shown, repetition helps a 
message to be successful and accepted by the targeted audience ( Petty et al. 2005 ). 
In the words of Paul and Matthews, “repetition leads to familiarity, and familiarity 
leads to acceptance” ( Paul and Matthews 2016 : 4). 
While dezinformatsiya is a relatively recent concept, refleksivnoe upravlenie or 
‘reflexive control’, has much deeper roots in Russian military literature. Its first 
appearances date back more than 30 years ago. Maria Snegovaya has described 
it as the ability to force a “stronger adversary voluntarily to choose the actions 
most advantageous to Russian objectives by shaping the adversary’s perceptions 
of the situation decisively” ( Snegovaya 2015 : 7). A similar interpretation has been 
offered by Timothy Thomas, who defined reflexive control as “a means of conv ying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him 
to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the 
action” ( Thomas 2004 : 237). Both definitions insist on the same aspect: Russian 
reflexive control operations are aimed at altering the enemy’s perceptions, in order 
to make him think what they want him to think and do what they want him to 
do. These operations can leverage different tactics, from isolated military measures 
to acts of disinformation and diversion (diversiya), which is the tactic of diverting 
the adversary’s attention to divide its forces. To be successful, they usually need 
to exploit pre-existing vulnerabilities in their targets, which can be individuals 
(i.e. decision-makers, military chiefs, influential personalities) or wide sections 
of the population. In the words of Thomas, “chief task of reflexive control is to 
locate the weak link of the filter, and exploit it” (ibid.: 241). Several cases can be 
borrowed, both from past and recent times. During the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union used to set up parades of fake-ICBMs in Moscow to convince the US the 
Soviets had the latest generation nuclear missiles, altering the enemy’s perception of th ir nuclear arsenal. Knowing dozens of US d plomats, attachés, and 
undercover agents used to attend these parades, as they provided them with p blic information over Russian military capabilities, the Russian government filled 
them with fake missiles, hoping the attendants would then report to domestic 
intelligence agencies (ibid.: 253). 
When theory meets practice: The war 
with Georgia and Ukraine 
Concrete examples of how the tactics described above have been translated into 
actions can be drawn from the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, a conflict which is 
considered the first and most significant test bench for Putin’s hybrid warfare and 
Russian IO. As stressed by Giles, the way this confrontation ended provides a 
clear example of how Russian reflexive control works and can be effective ( Giles 
and Seaboyer 2018 : 13). Tensions arose after the maxi-military drill Kavkaz-2008 
ended on 4 August. The ongoing movement of Russian troops at the border u relate  to the Russian conting nts of the CIS (collective peac keeping forces), along 
with the evacuation of civilians in South Ossetia to Russia, let the Georgian government led by President Mikheil Saakashvili, as well as most of the international 
community, believe Russians were on the edge of storming Tbilisi and overthrowing the government. Rumours and fears eventually led to the evacuation of the 
city on 9 August. This contributed to the creation of a sense of urgency among 
EU countries, which ultimately led to the ceasefire agreement signed on the 
12 August. Thus, the terms dictated in the peace plan, Giles and Seaboyer wrote, 
“resulted from a false perception that Georgia could be lost altogether” (ibid.). 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s mediation helped Russia get away with an 
unexpected set of concessions: not only was Moscow allowed to keep its troops on 
the ground, but it was also given an additional ‘security-zone’ across the borders of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This was a textbook case of Russian reflexive control. 
By letting its adversaries believe a military invasion of Tbilisi was about to happen, 
Russia got away with more concessions that it could have ever hoped for. 
A more recent case where the Russian government has made extensive use of 
reflexive control techniques is the ongoing war in Ukraine, which started with the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014. As Snegovaya (2015: 7) pointed out, “the Ukrainian war may well turn into the most relevant testing ground for Russia  reflexive 
control tactics ever.” Although not all of the objectives set by Moscow have been 
accomplished so far, it is undeniable that Putin has achieved some considerable 
results, notably the decision taken by Western countries to avoid a direct intervention into the conflict, not to mention the divisions sown among NATO allies in 
one of the toughest tests for the Alliance cohesion. 6 As in the previous cases, the 
Ukrainian crisis has seen the deployment of a wide range of strategies from Russian 
authorities. Denying the presence of Russian forces on the ground and of any link 
between the Federation and the ‘little green men’ who poured into the Ukrainian 
territory six years ago; convincing EU countries that Russia’s tools and resources 
were scarce and therefore the Russian army presence in Ukraine was somehow 
tolerable; at the same time, promoting an unprecedented set of disinformation 
campaigns and cyber-warfare operations to spread the narrative of Russia as a ‘saviour', 
the only actor capable of allowing Crimean citizens to rightfully reclaim 
sovereignty from a corrupt country. 
Social media: The disinformation chain 
After this brief overview of the Russian disinformation strategic pillars, it is 
worth noting how theory meets practice today. Whether the cited notions are 
still acknowledged by the Russian military and political elites or not, what allows 
the reinterpretation and the putting of these old Soviet-fashioned approaches into 
practice is the range of new techniques and tools that digitalisation and the Internet 
have brought. Among these, social media plays a central role in modern Russian 
State-led IOs. This seems nothing extraordinary at a first glance. Yet, things change 
when one looks at how institutionalised the Russian government has made its 
use of media outlets and social media for propaganda and targeted disinformation 
purposes. Of course, this institutionalisation did not happen overnight. Rather, it 
is part of a well-established strategy that reflects President Putin’s perception of the 
information landscape as well as his ideas about how it should be controlled. Back 
in 2013, Putin gave an unambiguous explanation of his long-term plans to put 
Russia at the forefront of the information competition worldwide. While visiting 
the new RT (one of the major Russian broadcasters, previously known as Russia 
Today) headquarters in Moscow, he expressed his hope that Russian media could 
soon manage to “break the Anglo-Saxon monopoly on the global information 
streams” ( Messa 2019 : 43). Later that same year, at the annual news conference, 
commenting on the future of State media outlets, Putin left no doubts about how 
he conceives the freedom of information: “There should be patriotically minded 
people at the head of state information resources” – he told reporters – “people 
who uphold the interests of the Russian Federation. These are state resources. 
That is the way it is going to be” ( Dougherty 2015 ). As Paolo Messa (2019: 43) 
noted, “Post-Soviet Russia’s media strategy is a case that is well-known (and very 
relevant today) of how subtle the boundary can be between political propaganda 
and information.” 
There are many reasons why today’s social media allows a government to t rg t its adversary in a way that was inconceivable before. First of all, their target 
is much wider than any information campaign in the past. As Giles pointed out, 
they can hit entire populations, and reach people “in their natural environment” 
( Giles and Seaboyer 2018 : 34). Second, social media campaigns are far harder to be 
exposed. Last but not least, they are relatively low-cost compared to the old kinetic 
techniques through which IOs were carried out. All these features made Putin 
bet heavily on the social media potential in the information war. The difference 
between Russia and other major Western countries is the scale, the extent, and the 
sophistication behind its social media State-led disinformation strategy. 
A recent report from RAND Corporation describes the “disinformation chain” 
underpinning the Kremlin’s use of social media to achieve its foreign policy objectiv s ( Connable et al. 2020 ). On top of the chain is the Russian government. This 
indeed is what emerged in July 2018 from US special counsel Robert Mueller’s 
‘Russiagate’ final report, where 12 Russian agents from the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff), a long- stablished Russian foreign military 
intelligence agency, were indicted for the massive hacking of the National Democratic Committee and US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton’s campaign staff. 
Intelligence agencies, however, are not the only players in the Russian disinformation game. Evidence shows that the majority of the disinformation campaigns 
channelled through social media are pursued by entities that are not formally linked 
to the government. This category, which represents the second ring of the chain 
and includes popular media outlets like RT and press agencies like Sputnik, is 
formed by actors which receive public support from the government and have a 
key role in conveying the Kremlin’s disinformation campaigns, both domestically 
and abroad. A third ring is then represented by a wide set of entities whose links 
to the Russian government are often hard to find without an intelligence inquiry. 
This group includes thousands of webpages and blogs committed to shaping the 
Russian government’s disinformation efforts spreading fake or misinformed stories 
and injecting fake news into the targeted audiences. The Internet Research Agency 
(IRA), a well-known troll factory (i.e. an agency specialising in the creation and 
diffusion of fake social media accounts) based in St. Petersburg, with dozens of 
employees working daily to fabricate false stories and spread them online, is a major 
player at this level ( Chen 2015 ). It was cited in the final report of the ‘Russiagate’ 
investigation by the US Special Counsel Robert Mueller, which was delivered to 
the Attorney General William Barr on 22 March 2019. The report defined it as 
“a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin”, then one of 
the most prominent Russian oligarchs, and accused it of having conducted “social 
media operations targeted at large US audiences with the goal of sowing discord in 
the U.S. political system.” 7 
Who did what? The attribution dilemma 
Another lens through which the Russian disinformation scheme can be understood is deniability. Disinformation is fuelled by a wide range of actors, going from 
those whose attribution is easy to those that are much harder to relate. State-media 
giants such as Sputnik News, Channel One, Ruptly, and the All-Russia State 
Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) belong to the first group. 
Some of these government-related media outlets, alongside officially independent 
media like RT, can rely on an amount of resources second to none of the many 
other world-known broadcasters. RT, for instance, has an outstanding presence 
on social media, especially on YouTube, where it counts more subscribers than 
BBC or Fox News and broadcasts in various languages such as German, French, 
Arabic, and even Mandarin. However, their level of independence has little to do 
with the one enjoyed by other global media outlets. To put it in Daniel Fried and 
Alina Polyakova’s (2018: 4) words, “they are arms of the Russian State no more 
independent than Pravda was during the Soviet period.” As a matter of fact, despite 
a broad offer, the Russian State media environment does not seem to have much 
room for challenging views of the government’s action. This is also due to a strict 
legal framework that has recently been tightened by a new set of laws introduced 
in March 2019 establishing fines up to 1.5 million roubles (20,500 euros, approxi ately) for those who disseminate ‘false information’ through the media landscape 
and do not remove it at the request of the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (R skomnadzor). These 
laws allow for “the censorship of online journalism and online speech”, OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir noted. 8 
As noted above, official media outlets are just the tip of the iceberg. Their 
strength comes from a broad audience. Their weakness lies in their easy attribution. Hence, a second link of the disinformation chain is needed. Blogs, websites, 
and online newspapers that are not officially affiliated to the Russian government but that nonethel ss clearly side with it can prov  to be very effective 
force multipliers of disinformation campaigns. These include news aggregators, 
data-dump websites, far-right and far-left blogs, often easily recognisable by conspiracy theories a d click-bait headlines. Together, they form a ‘grey zone’: u ful for inflating propaganda, they lack direct links to Russian public authorities 
and yet play a key role in shaping their views and disinformation. Records show 
that the great majority of these outlets is active in the dissemination of divisive 
content, mostly with a strong anti-Western bias. Depending on the geographical 
context, they can exploit different pre-existing cultural and political divisions. 
For instance, in the so-called ‘near abroad’, a term that has historically indicated 
ex-Soviet States such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, 
but also states of the Trans-Caucasus region such as Georgia or Armenia, these 
sites usually insist on the widespread discontent of local populations towards the 
Western, US-led cultural model and the presence of strong, deeply rooted R ssian speaking communities. On the other side, in Europe, they frequently use 
issues such as immigration, Islam, and sovereignty as leverage against an elitist 
EU or a declining NATO. 
Force multipliers: When bots come into action 
Finally, the lowest level of attribution is reached by the last link of the chain: a twork of fake social media accounts, both human-led (trolls) or automated (bots), 
which are especially useful for amplifying the disinformation and for spreading it 
on the web while keeping their cover. Here the lines between the information 
and the cyberspace become blurred. Trolls and bots carry different tasks. The 
former have a more consolidate presence in the Russian information space. Their 
main objective is to create content, not just to spread it. In recent years, notably 
after Putin’s return to Kremlin in 2012 and the impressive wave of mass pr tests that followed, there has been a continuous record of pro-government trolls 
targeting opposition leaders, opinion-makers, and bloggers. Content created by 
trolls does not necessarily have to be faked. Indeed, it can well consist of a mixture 
of realistic claims and fiction, so long as it is presented as credible to the targeted 
audience. Records show that several disinformation campaigns carried out by 
pro-Kremlin trolls were built on highly detailed information that was hacked 
from their victims. This was the case for Sergei Maksimov, a Russian hacker 
known through the name of ‘Torquemada Hell’, who, for years, has attacked 
anti-government bloggers, stealing data and information through spear-phishing 
and then spreading it with the help of trolls and bots. He was convicted for his 
crimes in Germany (Sanovich 2017: 10). 
Unlike trolls, the core task of bots is to act as force multipliers of disinformation. Their distinguishing feature, as the name explains, is to be fully automated. 
They usually consist of fake social media accounts, especially on Twitter, and act 
simultaneously, publishing content on a schedule and expanding the reach of R s i n trolls as well as State-media content. As previously noted, the more coordinated the disinformation chain, the higher the chance for the message to reach its 
target. Not surprisingly, most Russian IOs that have been unmasked by Western 
intelligence in recent years have shown a high degree of coordination between 
the three levels of the chain. A celebrated textbook case is the ‘Lisa case’. On 
11 January 2016, in Berlin, during mass migrant public unrest in the city of Cologne, 
Lisa, a 13-year-old German girl with Russian origins, did not come home from 
school. Soon after her disappearance was reported to the media by her parents, a 
journalist from Channel One, a Russian-language Kremlin TV broadcasting in 
Germany, suggested that the girl had been raped by migrants while she was out. 
Once Russian outlets, such as RT Deutsch and Sputnik, picked up the news, it 
quickly broke through the mainstream media. Eventually it prompted the Russian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to condemn Germany’s reluctance to 
investigate the case. In a few hours, a diplomatic case broke out, and the story r pidly entered social media, relaunched by pro-Kremlin Twitter users and Facebook 
groups and igniting a street protest from hard-right groups in Cologne. The day 
after the German police revealed that the whole story was fake: Lisa had spent the 
night at her friend’s home. Other examples can be drawn from recent events. The 
Covid-19 virus worldwide outbreak in February 2020 offered another chance for a 
widespread disinformation campaign carried on by Russian State media and social 
media accounts. A report from the EEAS (European Union External Action Servic ) noticed an increase of disinformation efforts from providers based in Russia 
or linked to the Kremlin ( Rankin 2020 ). Conspiracy theories describing the virus 
as a Western plot to benefit pharmaceutical companies appeared on the website 
of RIA FAN federal agency, while the pro-Kremlin REN TV claimed the virus 
could be a ‘biological weapon’ used by US forces against China. This seems to be 
part of a new path that Russian State media have taken to disseminate false claims 
against Western countries. Instead of fabricating the fake contents themselves, the 
EU report shows, they increasingly tend to refer to conspiracy theories originated 
elsewhere, to avoid accusations. It is a new form of maskirovka but translated into 
the media sphere. After all, some good old Soviet tactics never get old. 
Conclusion 
One of the most common arguments the disinformation ‘skeptics’ tend to resort 
to goes as follows: ‘should we really care?’ Why should we fear that a few Twitter 
bot accounts or a handful of conspiracy blogs might really have a visible impact on 
one state’s political and information environment? While the question is no doubt 
legitimate, it is also misplaced. As our review tried to demonstrate, websites, blogs, 
and social network accounts are just the tip of the iceberg. Or, in other words, they 
are nothing but the last links of the disinformation chain. At the top of it, there 
often might be a highly sophisticated direction from state actors. No one could be 
so naïve as to believe that every worldwide state-led disinformation campaign has 
the Kremlin’s stamp on it. As we recalled, disinformation has been in place as long 
as there have been states. However, the Russian case is one worth studying, for 
two main reasons. First: it can count on an institutional architecture no other state 
can claim today. Second: as we showed, today’s Russian disinformation relies on a 
long-standing tradition of Soviet-era military tactics. This has become even clearer 
after Mr Putin came to power. Proof is the extraordinary attention Russian military 
élites have increasingly devolved to the reinterpretation of the old Soviet ‘active 
measures’ during the last decade, and the impressive sophistication of Moscow’s 
‘sharp power’ techniques in the social media landscape. This, along with the progressive disintegration of some of the pillars that govern globalisation and multilat- 
eralism due to the global Covid-19 pandemic and, therefore, the increasing danger 
for the resilience of democratic states and their institutions, should be enough for a 
clear, ultimate answer to the question above: we should definitely care. 
Notes 
1 See, for example: Chekinov and Bogdanov (2012) ; Kartapolov (2015) ; Andrianov and 
Loyko (2015). 
2 The term ‘hybrid warfare’ describes a strategy that builds both on conventional military 
force and irregular and cyber warfare tactics. For an overview, see Murray and Mansoor 
(2012) and Lanoszka (2016). 
3 Soft power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attracti n rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power is built on its culture, values, 
and policies. The first definition of soft power was coined by Harvard scholar Joseph Nye 
in 1990. See Nye (1990). 
4 In his book, Kurlantzick describes “charm offensive” as the way China uses soft power 
to appeal to its neighbours and to distant countries alike. The author contends China 
has wooed the world with a “charm offensive” that has largely escaped the attention of 
American policy makers, thus allowing Beijing to take advantage of American foreign 
policy mistakes. See Kurlantzick (2007). 
5 The phrase “Little green men” indicates masked soldiers of the Russian Federation w ring unmarked green uniforms who entered Crimea in February–March 2014. While 
the Russian government initially denied they belonged to the Russian Armed Forces, it 
eventually confirmed its military presence in Crimea. See Galeotti (2015). 
6 On 3 March 2014, two weeks after the Russian invasion of Crimea, EU foreign ministers 
met in Brussels but could reach no clear agreement on a shared road map to sanction 
Moscow. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski told reporters that “the rest of the 
Europe is sometimes half a phase behind us” ( Faiola 2014). 
7 See the full report: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/18/politics/full-mueller-report-- 
pdf/index.html . 
8 Full text of the OSCE press release: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-- 
media/414770 . 
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Myths and Realities of Putinism 
in Post-Truth Politics 
Mara Morini 
Introduction 
In 2016 the Oxford Dictionaries selected the term “post-truth” as the “word of the 
year” to describe the emergence of “an era of boundless virtual communication” 
which characterises a battle between facts and lies in different arenas and policies. 1
Post-truth politics has been defined by The Economist as “reliance on assertions that 
‘feel true’ but have no basis in fact” and are based more on emotions than rationality. 2
In contemporary democracies this term also refer to the use of fake news and 
populist protest/movements as a reaction to the establishment’s policies which are 
considered unaccountable and unresponsive in comparison with citizens’ needs 
and demands. These new political movements try to delegitimise democratic i stituti ns in order to pave the way to a new poli ical order so that elements of d ce ti  and misinformation can be considered as a potential and effective threat to 
liberal democracies. 
In the early 2000s, the Internet was considered a tool for more participation, 
freedom, and democratisation. Nowadays, the Internet has become a real threat 
due to the increased number of people who prefer getting information online, 
where fake news and fake accounts are more present than in newspapers. The 
post-truth era is also characterised by the repudiation of science-based facts, bjectivity, expertise, evidence, and statistics which undermines the community of 
scientists. 
The main effects of fake news are political and social polarised debates which 
shed light on moral crisis, individuality, reinforcing people’s beliefs among those 
who share the same opinion, and the rejection of scientific principles, analyses, 
research dealing with health, environment, education policies, and so on. Nowadays, the Internet has revealed the dark si e of the online community, i.e. a large 
amount of web-based information that could be harmful and dangerous for the 
audience who are more oriented to believe information that appeals to their beliefs 
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and emotions. The ‘production of confusion’ 3 is a real problem for governments, 
industries, and private firms which must implement literacy skills for better meaningful learning and understanding of information consumption. 
In foreign and domestic policies this attitude against the truth based on evidence 
has determined the growing feeling of anti-globalisation, xenophobic attitudes, 
and nationalist politicians who challenge the liberal order and create fake news in 
order to make people anxious and insecure about their own future. So, fake news 
can determine a sort of distrust in political elites and democratic decision-making. 
We have some examples with the false claim on the extortion of money by the EU 
which paved the way to the Brexit decision, as well as the news that the Ukrainian 
government crucified a child which was spread on social media by the Russian 
government ( Oates and Steiner 2018 : 2–5). 
Nevertheless, we share Ostrovsky’s opinion (2017) about the importance of 
a conceptual distinction between ‘post-truth politics’ and ‘fake news’. While the 
two terms seem interchangeable, there is a need for clarification in regard to what 
they mean and involve in non-democratic political regimes, and in the Russian 
political environment in particular. In doing so, this chapter aims to provide 
an analysis of the Kremlin’s role in taking advantage of the post-fact/post-truth 
sphere, both in the domestic policies dealing with social, political, and economic 
issues and as a political/strategic tool in the international setting. As far as the latter 
is concerned, in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, and particularly since 
the election of Donald Trump as President of the US, many scholars and journalists 
are exploring Moscow’s manipulations of the Western mediascape ( Orttung and 
Nelson 2018 ). Its foreign manipulations range from biased coverage of events, taki  sides in political controversies, intentional securitisation of narratives, hacking, 
information warfare (cyber politics), and direct lies. 
Secondly, a description of the Russian media landscape and peculiarity and 
its rapid change in recent years, influenced especially by the rise of digital media 
across the globe, is necessary to better understand who the main actors able to influ c  the political debate are and how this develops. Special attention will be also 
devoted to Internet governance policy and to its role in weaponising lies to face the 
domestic/foreign political dimensions between the matters of fact and the matters 
of concern in Russian politics. 
Fake news and Russian propaganda 
Strategic narratives have always been used in Soviet times. Miskimmon, 
O’Loughlin, and Roselle (2017: 3) define strategic narratives as “tools that political 
actors employ to promote their interests, values, and aspirations for international 
order by managing expectations and altering the discursive environment.” They 
are based on a system of stories that in politics represent the intersection of com unication and power. Kenez in his work on Soviet propaganda, The Birth of the 
Propaganda State (1985), underlines that propaganda was part of the larger Soviet 
system. 
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Contemporary Russia has also invested in mass media propaganda because 
Russia’s government relies on high domestic consensus to maintain its legitimacy 
( Petrov, Lipman, and Hale 2014 ). Although there are still some independent voices 
such as Ekho Moskvy radio station, Novaya Gazeta, an alternative newspaper, and 
online video producer Telekanal Dozhd, the analysis made by “Reporters Without 
Borders” ranked Russia as only 148 out of 180 countries assessed for its “World 
Press Freedom Index” in 2016. Journalism became deprofessionalised in Russia, 
while in the past it had always been considered a truthful speech based on accuracy, 
willingness to stand by one’s words, sincerity, seriousness, and courage. 
Roudakova admits that “what we are observing in Russia today is what the 
world looks like when journalism is made superfluous” (2017: 219). Nowadays, 
propaganda is more dynamic and organic and takes advantage of new channels of 
communication (the Internet and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter). 
After the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the narrative maintained the legacy 
of the past, i.e. the struggle against the West which does not respect and recognise 
Russia as a global player in the international setting. The West against Russia n rr tive has been used to make people aware of the fact that the West do s not want
“Russia resurgent as a Great Nation” ( Oates and Steiner 2018 : 3). 
Consequently, Russian media construct modern narratives based on some sp ific stories of the West against Russia. The most famous concerns the term Russophobia, which was created by a Tsarist diplomat in the 19th century to stress that 
Russia was marginalised by the West in every political affair ( Darczewska and 
Zochowski 2015 : 9). Nowadays this term is used by Putin to underline the We t r  attempt to make Russia weaker in the international setting, focussing on the 
emergence of a Western prejudice against Russia. We can find some examples in 
the hashtag #Russophobia on Twitter, as well as the publishing of “Russophobia 
Digest” articles and opinions. 4 As of 1 December 2018, the phrase “Russophobia" 
appeared 790 times on the RT website and 855 times on the Sputnik News 
website. 5 
A recent verbal meme used on Russian Twitter narratives is “highly likely”. 
This hashtag derives from a sentence pronounced by Theresa May’s after the poi o ing case involving Sergey and Yulia Skripal: she asserted that “it is highly likely 
that Russia is responsible.” Foreign Minister Lavrov responded this was “highly 
likely as a new invention of the British diplomacy to describe why they punish 
people – because these people are highly likely guilty, like in Alice in Wonderland." 6
The divergence of media narratives between Western and Eastern media is 
a crucial part of a new kind of hybrid warfare, or postmodern warfare, where milit ry actions, propaganda, political activity, and online campaigns are combined. 
In 2017, Lavrov stated that “propaganda needs to be clever, smart and efficient” 
( Isachenkov 2017 : 5). Another example is the campaign started by Rossotrudnichestvo, 
the state agency responsible for Russians living abroad, titled “Highly Likely 
Welcome Back” to invite Russian students studying in foreign universities to go 
back home, in order protect them from “the negative influence of Russophobic 
attitudes”. 
Another analysis elaborated by Tatiana Dubrovskaya shows how media 
debate on sanctions imposed on Russia as punitive measures have been represented and have cont ibut d to the construction of an IR debate: 7 “The debate 
on the sanctions in Russian media exemplifies how ideologically opposed forces 
make sense of the facts and attach different meanings to them, at the same time 
as contributing to the construction of Russia’s international relations as a whole” 
( Dubrovskaya 2018 : 11). Consequently, this narrative of the West against Russia 
is very dynamic and characterises the legacies of the past in contemporary for ig  affairs. 
While policy analysts, journalists, and governmental agencies are trying to 
understand to what extent Russian hackers were able to influence the 2016 US 
presidential election campaign and many speculations and official investigations 
took place, it is also noteworthy that television remains the Russian public’s pri ary source to get information. 8 Television news is trusted by 49% of Russians, 
while only 24% trust online publications, and 15% social media. 9 So, the narr tiv s Russi n broadcasters use are extremely important in influencing domestic and 
international perceptions of the Unites States and the EU, for instance. 
Nevertheless, Sarah Oates stresses the fact that “we need audience studies to 
determine the degree to which these narratives have a direct effect on citizens in 
the West.” As a matter of fact, “this discussion of Russian strategic narratives c n ot offer any evidence of the audience reception of these messages. While we can 
observe the nature of Russian strategic narrative, trace its flow through the media 
ecosystem through key words and even computational linguistics” ( Oates, Barrow, 
and Foster 2018 ). In such a context, Russian media play a critical role in sprea ing half-truths and non-truths related to the dissemination of the Kremlin’s viewpoi ts in ord r to face any attempt to destabilise the regime’s stability. As Mejias 
and Vokuev (2017: 1) underline: “Citizens themselves actively participate in their 
own disenfranchisement by using social media to generate, consume or distribute 
false information.” This sort of ‘peer-to-peer propaganda’ is produced by ordinary 
people sharing posts and comments. 
In March 2019, the Russian State Duma passed a set of controversial laws t rg ting journalists and Internet users for ‘spreading fake news’ and ‘disrespecting 
the authorities’. The penalty for publishing false information ranges from 30,000 
rubles (450 dollars) to one million rubles (15,000 dollars), while for disrespect it is 
300,000 rubles (4500 dollars) and 15 days in jail for repeat offenders. As a matter of 
fact, Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) presents the findings of 
a survey on “life without Internet”. 10 The share of Russians using Internet in 2019 
is around 84%, and 64% of them on a daily basis. Younger people (18–24) with 
higher education, high income, and living in Moscow and St Petersburg are the 
main users. On the contrary, 16% of respondents do not use any online resources. 
11% of users cannot imagine their life without Internet while half of them would 
be able to adapt their life. 
In April 2019, a second survey was based on the spreading of fake news in Russia: 
31% of respondents have come across fake news, especially on television (20%), 
newspapers (7%), and radio (5%). 11 When confronted with fake news, most of 
respondents (62%) thought that they might be fake stories; 31% realised that they 
were probably wrong only later. According to the survey, 74% of Russians think 
that fake news is published deliberately (84% of 33-44 year olds), and 17% think 
that fake stories are journalists’ mistakes (especially among youngsters). 
And what about Russians’ opinion on a new ‘fake news’ law? The survey shows 
that 78% of the respondents are aware of the fake news law and 42% think that 
it is impossible to distinguish reliable from unreliable information. Nevertheless, 
83% of Russians consider that this law is extremely important for the country in 
order to face threats to human life. 12 Moreover, 57% of respondents believe that 
after the law will be implemented the amount of fake news will be reduced; on the 
contrary, 29% do not believe that anything will change. 
The Russian hybrid warfare 
The attempt to introduce order and political/economic stability in Russia has 
been translated into a new ‘ideology’ (Putinism), able to strengthen the relationship between politics and people. The starting point of this new “ideology to the 
people” rather than “by the people” dates back to the legacies of Soviet history, 
such as patriotism, claims related to the Soviet power, political order, and the idea 
of a nation able to leave “Russia’s doors shut on the Soviet Union’s sins” ( Sakwa 
2008 ), and paves the way to the charismatic leadership appealing to the myths of 
the past. 
The politics of memory through the narrative based on re-Stalinisation and 
the securitisation of societal identity played a crucial role in reformatting Russi ’s relations with various others – be they internal others, designated as the 
‘fifth column’, ‘national traitors’, ‘enemies of the people’, ‘Western spies’, or 
external others, firmly identified with the West in general and the US in particul r. The divergence of media narratives between Western and Eastern media 
is a crucial part of a new kind of hybrid warfare, or postmodern warfare, which 
combines military actions, propaganda, political activity, and online campaigns 
( Mitrokhin 2015 ). 13 
There are different terms used to describe hybrid warfare, 14 such as ‘Fourth 
Generation Warfare’ or ‘Full Spectrum Warfare’ in respect to the description on 
how Russian military forces conducted operations in Ukraine in 2014 and in Syria 
in 2015. 15 Many scholars agree with the fact that it is time for a reevaluation of 
Russia’s place in the world, where new forms of power are used as cyber tactics as 
well as the use of energy politics. “Russian cyber power is considered to be one 
of the savviest and most technologically advanced in the world. Along with China 
and the United States, Russia is considered one of the ‘heavyweights’ in its abilities 
to deface websites, steal information, and cripple states’ infrastructure via the web” 
( Maness and Valeriano 2015 : 1). 
Cyber conflict is the least costly tool for Russian foreign policy. Cyberspace is a 
new dimension of conflict and Russia has applied it in the realm of foreign policy. 
The downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 flying over Eastern Ukrainian territory 
on 17 July 2014 with 298 passengers led to severe reactions in the international setting. The Ukrainian issue is very important for Russia because the shift of Ukraine 
towards Western institutions and influence would be considered a threat to the 
great power identity of the Russian modern state since Russian origins are traced 
back to the Kievan Rus’ clan. 16 Consequently, coercive measures were adopted to 
avoid such a path, ensuring that Ukraine remains in Russia’s political orbit. 
Although the use of cyber warfare has been increasing during the last decade, 
it has had some noticeable antecedents during the previous decade. In April 2007, 
the Estonian government put “The Bronze Soldier of Tallinn”, a Soviet era grave 
marker, in a new place far from the city centre where it used to be. This statue 
represented the Soviet struggle against Nazi invaders during World War II and is a 
symbol of Russians’ pride. The Kremlin reacted, relying on well-organised cyber 
operations attacking the private and public Estonian networks which provoked a 
two-week offline status of banks, businesses, and social networking. Many bserv rs declared that this Russian operation was one of the most sophisticated to date. 
As a matter of fact, Estonia became the international leader in developing cyber 
norms and defense tools. While the international community condemned this 
attack, the Estonian government hosted the International Conference on Cyber 
Conflict, becoming a global leader in the field. 
A similar cyberattack took place one year later in Georgia, where – during the 
South Ossetian crisis – Georgian government websites were hacked, with pictures 
of President Mikheil Saakashvili appearing as Hitler, and many other services were 
shut down. The main consequences were to reveal the Georgians’ incapacity to 
decipher what was actually going on with the movement of soldiers and military 
hardware. It was the first time that such a cyber action was implemented during a 
military campaign. Analysts state that Russia does not use cyberattacks very often, 
and when it does, they are usually aimed at preventing retaliation in post-Soviet 
states. Cyberattacks can be defined either as “hostile actions in cyberspace that have 
effects that amplify or are equivalent to major kinetic violence” or as actions of 
“penetration of foreign networks for the purpose of disrupting or dismantling those 
networks, and making them inoperable” ( Nye 2011 : 20–21). 
So, Russia is reemerging with new forms of power which are summarised in 
Table 10.1 . 
The Russian General Staff defines cyberattacks as “disruption of the key enemy 
military, industrial and administrative facilities and systems, as well as bringing 
information-psychological pressure to bear on the adversary’s military-political 
leadership, troops and population, something to be achieved primarily through the 
use of state-of-the-art information technologies and assets” ( Maness and Valeriano 
2015 : 87). Russia’s offensive capabilities are also impressive since it was a Russian 
firm labelled Kaspersky Labs that funded the infamous Stuxnet and Flame malware 
incidents in Iran. Despite the Soviet system, which did not pay much attention 
to the cyber capabilities, Putin’s administration invested in the cyber sector and 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to this doctrine, “The national security of the Russian Federation depends on a 
substantial degree on ensuring information security, a dependence that will increase 
with technological progress.” 
In this respect, the FSB (Federal Security Service) monitors all Internet users 
within Russian borders: it requires service providers to install hardware; also, companies such as Microsoft are asked to share source codes with the FSB. The FSB 
relies on Kaspersky Labs, which has over 300 million customers worldwide, but 
tracing the origins of its hackers is difficult; as a matter of fact, it is still a matter 
of discussion whether or not Russia was involved in the Estonian and Georgian 
incidents. Russia is considered one of the most dangerous states operating in 
cyberspace, competing with the USA, China, Iran, North and South Korea, Great 
Britain, Israel, and Germany, although its ranking in the Global Cybersecurity 
Index declined from 12 in 2014, to 10 in 2017, and then 26 in 2018. General 
Valery Gerasimov stated the “the very rules of war” changed, especially the role 
of nonmilitary means. Without a clear declaration of war, it seems that Clausewitz 
concept of the ‘Fog of War’ applies: while originally it referred to the context of 
the battlefield, it can be used in different contexts, such as a virtual environment. 
Nevertheless, there is a shared opinion that “Russia is not a ‘geopolitical’ threat. It 
is a regional power that challenges United States in its sphere of influence, which 
is post-Soviet space” ( Maness and Valeriano 2015 : 88). 
Conclusion 
As Holzscheiter (2014: 144) notes, “facts do not speak for themselves”, and “facts 
have to be represented . . . to become socially real.” The Russian representation of 
both international events and domestic issues which can be related to the Russian 
public opinion towards the West is based on the main tools that the post-truth era 
has given birth to: fake news as the legacy of the Soviet propaganda and hybrid 
warfare measures aiming at weakening contemporary democracies. Both of them 
are strongly related thanks also to the role played by Russian mass media. 
In Western societies, post-truth represents a dangerous surge of populism with 
implications that are not ‘just’ ethical but also destabilising for domestic politics and 
geopolitics: it is an emerging security challenge and governments must cooperate 
to cope with it. 17 Taking advantage of new technological tools, populists have 
come up with new strategies in the framework of post-truth politics. It is also true 
that some Western populist leaders (Orbán, Le Pen, Salvini, Voigt) see Putin’s R sia as a model, where “Putinism and populism are mutually re nforcing phenomena 
with some shared components” ( Oliker 2017 : 16-20). 
Putin was able to attract people’s trust thanks to the evolution of a new 
Russian nationalism, which combines both historical tradition and the us i  Orthodox Church and advocates conservat ve values, opposing them to 
the values characterising European liberalism (equal rights for LGBTQ people, 
women, religious minorities, and so on), which are considered to be disruptiv  for the social order. Putin is considered as an embodiment of “strength, 
racial purity and traditional Christian values in a world under threat from Islam, 
immigrants, and rootless cosmopolitan elites.” 18 Therefore, it does not come as a 
surprise that analysts and observers have underlined the relationship between the 
Kremlin and many extremist right and left parties in Europe. Russia challenges 
the United States interfering in elections and influencing public opinion with a 
new narrative based on anti-Western attitudes, to do so, it relies on Internet and 
social media campaigns. 
The question to be better explored is whether Russia is using fake news and 
supporting populist opposition movements in Europe in order to determine the 
crisis of liberal democracies in the hope they will give birth to new types of regimes 
which are more similar to the Russian one. On the contrary, Russia could try to 
position itself in the international setting in such a way that Western populism is a 
tool to threaten the cohesiveness of NATO and the EU ( Oliker 2017 : 19). 
Notes 
1 See: www.oxforddictionaries.com/press/news/2016/12/11/WOTY-16 . The Oxford 
Dictionaries dates the first use of the term to 1992 and an essay by Steve Tesich, a 
Serbian-American playwright writing in The Nation following the Iran/Contra scandal. 
It was also used by a journalist stressing the way politicians deny scientific claims about 
climate change more than 20 years ago. In 2004, a book written by Ralph Keyes, The 
Post-Truth Era, warned that lies are told without any fear of impunity, arguing that this is 
the new social and human challenge to be defeated for the future of democracy. 
2 See www.economist.com/leaders/2016/09/10/art-of-the-lie ; www.economist.com/brief 
ing/2016/09/10/yes- id-lie-to-you . 
3 To better understand the effects of the ‘production of confusion’ it is necessary to analyse 
the role of journalism in the sphere of fake news as suggested by Jay Rosen, a professor 
of journalism who describes the attempt by Trump’s White House to manipulate news 
outlets and the administration’s knowledge of the ‘deep grammar’ of journalism. See: 
Cooke (2018). 
4 ‘Russophobia: RT Rates the Top 10 Kremlin Critics & Their Hilarious Hate C m aigns’, RT International, 28 September 2017, www.rt.com/uk/404930-russophobia- 
kremlin-critics-paranoia/ (last consulted on 29 November 2018). 
5 Google search within the domains: www.rt.com/ and www.sputniknews.com/ , co ucted on 1 December 2018. 
6 Lavrov, S. (2018) ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with BBC HardTalk’ 
4 April 2018. See a transcript here: http://rusisworld.com/en/interview/transcript-sergey 
-lavrovs-interview-bbc-hardtalk/ , in Oates and Steiner (2018). 
7 These sanctions were introduced in 2014 and extended till 31 January 2019 after the 
Ukraine crisis and the ‘annexation’ (term used by Westerners)/ reunification (term used 
by Russians) of Crimea. 
8 An August 2018 survey by the Levada Center found that 73% of Russians consult tel isi  n ws more than any other information source. 
9 In August 2009, this question was formulated as follows: “Other Internet sources”. 
Source: representative opinion polls by Levada Center, August 2009 to 23-30 August 
2018, www.levada.ru/2018/09/13/kanaly-informatsii/ , published on 13 September 2018 
10 See https://wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1659 . 
11 See https://wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1654 . 
12 See https://wciom.com/index.php?id=61&uid=1644 . 
13 “The term ‘war’ is not meant as a war in the traditional sense but as a tool to use in foreign policy” to alter behaviour ( Maness and Valer ano 2015 : 87). 
14 So these terms are used to describe conventional and non-conventional conflicts (conventional, irregular, terrorist, criminal, cyber, economic, diplomatic, political, social). 
15 It was also used following the aftermath of the 2006 Israeli war in Lebanon against 
Hezbollah. 
16 Kievan Rus’ is the first East Slavic state which consisted of several clans struggling for 
the princely throne of Kiev. 
17 So far, numerous countries have tried to tackle this independently. The Spanish and 
American governments have arrested a Russian hacker (alias Severa) for his involvement 
in the US 2016 elections with his fake antivirus software which functioned as a spam, 
infecting between 70,000 and 90,000 computers and sending up to 1.5 billion spam 
messages a day 
18 See Feuer and Higgins (2016). 
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Responding to Alleged Russian 
Interference by Focussing 
on the Vulnerabilities That 
Make It Possible 
Giorgio Comai 
Introduction 
In recent years, the legitimacy of electoral processes in Western democracies has 
been repeatedly put into question by alleged Russian interference. As abundantly 
described in journalistic reporting and official investigations, actors associated with 
Russia have been involved in the production and spreading of disinformation as 
well as in social media manipulation; moreover, they have waged cyberattacks in 
the run-up to the US presidential elections of November 2016 ( Mueller 2019 ). 
Even if the direct impact of Russian efforts has likely been minor, the very fact that 
meddling was both plausible and possible has been cause for significant concern in 
Europe and North America. The events associated with Russian meddling have 
not only highlighted the increased willingness of the Kremlin to use a wide vari ty of tools in its geopolitical confrontation with the Wes , but have also served 
to expose in vivid form newly shaped structural vulnerabilities of contemporary 
democracies: vulnerability of our information environment to the spread of disinfor ation and the vulnerability of computer systems of political campaigners to 
hacking by malicious actors. Widespread calls for policy responses duly ensued (e.g. 
Cherto and Rasmussen 2019 ). 
This chapter firstly defines ‘Russian meddling’ as a distinct phenomenon that 
emerged at the time of the US presidential elections in November 2016 based on 
a media analysis of mainstream Western media. 1 It then proceeds by putting the 
preoccupation with Russian interference in the context of contemporary West- 
Russia relations and it discusses what is specifically Russian about Russian me dling. Finally, it outlines the work conducted by expert groups and dedicated 
committees to find policy responses to the vulnerabilities exposed by alleged Ru sian interference. As will be argued, there is a growing consensus on the structural 
nature of these vulnerabilities, and an appreciation of the fact that they must be 
approached without unduly focussing on the Russian component. 
Giorgio Comai 
Defining Russian meddling 
The events surrounding the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the 
United States in November 2016 generated a significant and unprecedented media 
hype around ‘Russian interference’/’Russian meddling’ (the two expressions will 
be used interchangeably hereafter). The confrontation between Russia and the 
West has become increasingly apparent since Vladimir Putin first became president 
of the Russian Federation in 2000, but before 2016 the issue of ‘Russian interference’ simply did not exist as a consolidated discourse in Western media. As appears
from a quantitative analysis of mainstream English-language media such as The 
New York Times and The Guardian, mentions of ‘Russian meddling’ were unco mon before 2016, and alm st without exception referred to events in Ukraine and 
Georgia rather than in established Western democracies. References to ‘Russian 
meddling’ became less frequent in The New York Times after the release of the 
Mueller report in April 2019, while on The Guardian they had a new surge in the 
run-up to the UK general elections of December 2019 in relation to a new set of 
scandals. 2 
An analysis of publications on German weekly Der Spiegel and Italian daily La 
Repubblica point at similar patterns: references to Russian meddling appear almost 
exclusively starting in 2016, and mostly in reference to US politics or to domestic scandals associated with the same narrative. 3 In the full online archive of Der 
Spiegel, available from the year 2000, there is a grand total of three articles mentioning Russian interference (russische Einmischung) before 2016, in reference to 
the 2008 war in Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the war in Syria in 
2015; almost all others (about 30) refer to the fallout of events related to the 2016 
US presidential elections. 
FIGURE 11.1 Articles mentioning ‘Russian interference’ or ‘Russian meddling’ in a month 
in The Guardian 
Russian Interference and Others’ Vulnerabilities 
It is too early to tell if the media attention toward Russian meddling/interference 
will wane; what this brief media analysis shows, however, is that the preoccupation with ‘Russian meddling’ is a distinct phenomenon which appeared 
in late 2016, largely in relation to the US presidential elections. There is scant 
indication of any continuity between the discourse around Russian meddling 
and the growing tension between Russia and the West that has become increasingly apparent, in particular after Russia’s annexatio  of Crimea in 2014 ( Trenin 
2016 ); ‘Russian meddling’ as a media discourse is specifically linked to interference into domestic political processes in W stern democracies and on both 
sides of the Atlantic has been heavily influenced by the framing established by 
US media. Before dissecting the main components of ‘Russian meddling’ and 
possible responses to them, the following section places them in the context of 
West-Russia relations. 
What is specifically Russian about Russian meddling? 
The fact that an external state actor may have successfully interfered in domestic 
political processes has come as a shock to the United States in 2016. On the c ntrary, concern with foreign meddling has been a major issue in Russia for a long 
time. The whole concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ formalised by Vladislav Surkov 
in 2006 and strongly associated with Vladimir Putin’s tightening grip on power has 
been widely understood as a response to the preoccupation with Western interference in domestic politics in its ‘near abroad’ and in Russia itself (McFaul and 
Spector 2009). 4 
There is an established narrative in Russia according to which all activities associated with ‘Russian meddling’ were ultimately reactive or defensive in nature. 
After all, even the infamous article that gave the name to the non-existing ‘Gera- 
simov doctrine’ – a troubled expression often used as a shorthand for Russia’s 
supposedly new hybrid war tactics – ultimately described what it perceived as the 
Western approach to interfering with domestic affairs in other countries ( Galeotti 
2019 ). By using and perfecting similar tactics, Russia would simply be updating its 
repertoire to include practices that the US had been using for a long time not only 
in Central or South America, but also in other regions, such as the Middle East, 
especially during the Arab Spring and, most importantly from the Kremlin’s point 
of view, in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ and in Russia itself. 5
As Russia’s neighbours know all too well, Russian interference in the domestic 
affairs of other countries did not start in 2016. Even the West’s preoccupation 
with the specific tactics at the core of the post-2016 Russian meddling narrative 
is not new. In 2015, the EU launched its East StratCom Task Force known for 
its controversial “EU vs. Disinfo” project targeting Russian disinformation, well 
before Donald Trump’s election in the United States. 6 Yablokov (2015) published 
an academic article on conspiracy theories as a Russian public diplomacy tool: pr moting controversial points of view to instil distrus  in liberal elites was not a new 
idea for Russia in the fall of 2016. Politically motivated, large-scale cyberattacks 
had been used by Russia in its neighbourhood for a decade before they became a 
major issue in the US (Pernik 2018) and they continue to be a source of concern 
(UK Foreign Office 2020). 7 
The vulnerabilities exposed by Russian meddling 
What is actually new about the post-2016 preoccupation with Russian meddling 
is a widespread realisation that modern technologies have brought newly shaped 
structural vulnerabilities to established Western democracies themselves. In one 
form or another, disinformation may be as old as humanity and it certainly had 
nefarious and even violent consequences at different point in times in history, 
but social media and the current model of the Internet have turned it into a funda entally new challenge for liberal democracies. The increasing ubiquity of 
digital technologies in everyday life and communication has immensely increased 
the potential impact of cyberattacks even in comparison to only a few years ago. 
Indeed, even if Russia did exploit these vulnerabilities, there is little that ties them 
specifically to Russia. 
As argued by Tufekci (2018) , Russian meddling is only a symptom: “to heal, 
we need the correct diagnosis followed by action that treats the underlying diseases.” In other words, rather then focus on Russia, it may be more sensible to 
take a more comprehensive approach that mitigates the vulnerabilities exposed by 
the scandals concerning Russian meddling. The Mueller investigation confirmed, 
providing abundant details, the existence of Russian attempts at interfering in the 
US 2016 presidential elections. Two operations were undertaken: a campaign of 
disinformation conducted through social media and a hacking-and-dumping op r tio  against the Clinton campaign. The following sections will consider these 
two components and outline some of the responses that have been proposed in 
recent years to tackle these issues. 
Information operations, disinformation, and social media 
Given the sheer amount of resources poured into presidential campaigns in the 
United States, it is close to impossible that a (relatively speaking) tiny information 
operation run from the outskirts of St Petersburg in Russia had a substantial impact 
on the outcome of the vote. 8 Yet, the way that social media facilitates the spread of 
polarising contents has been cause for concern well beyond that much debated 
operation. Indeed, if the object of that campaign was “to provoke and amplify 
political and social discord” ( Mueller 2019 : 4), it may have just contributed to what 
social media had already been doing for years ( Neudert and Marchal 2019 : 15). 9 In 
this specific instance, disinformation may have been spread by Russian actors, but 
profit motives have proved to be powerful drivers, pushing both domestic and f r ign actors to produce junk news on many other occasions (e.g. Burger et al. 2019; 
Bradshaw et al. 2019). More broadly, the current model of the Internet – averse to 
privacy and largely relying on unaccountable platforms – has come under increased 
scrutiny, in particular after new scandals such as that related to Cambridge Analytica 
and its mishandling of private data obtained through Facebook ( Cadwalladr 
and Graham-Harrison 2018 ). 
As appears from this brief overview, the concern with foreign meddling in 
time of elections quickly escalates to systemic consideration about the chall nges to democr tic societies coming from the increased digitalisation and pri- 
vatisation of our public arena. The complexity of these issues, as well as the real 
risk that rushed regulation may cause more harm than good, should, however, 
not serve as an excuse for inaction. Indeed, researchers, working groups, and 
committees at various levels have worked to develop sensible policy proposals 
that mitigate these vulnerabilities. The devil may well be in the details, but at 
least on some aspects there is a broad consensus. For example, in many c untri s regulation on political campaigning has never been updated to include 
digital spaces, and, as a consequence, many of the transparency and accountability requirements that traditionally accompany elections do not currently stand 
online; well-meaning legislators should start from there, including co prehensive transparency obligations as well as limits on micro-targeting (Dobber,
Fathaigh, and Borgesius 2019). 
Comprehensive policy-oriented reports such as ‘Protecting electoral integrity i  the digital age’ written by the K ofi Annan Comm ssion on Elections and 
Democracy in the Digital Age (2020) serve as key points of reference and vi g  sensible policies that would not only contribute to mitigate the risk of foreign 
interference, but also to foster an enabling environment for domestic democratic 
processes. Calls for stronger transparency requirements and considerable efforts to 
promote digital and media literacy are included, among other things, in official 
recommendations issued by the European Commission (2018), in reports for the 
European Parliament ( Neudert and Marchal 2019 ), or in studies resulting from the 
work of parliamentary committees conducted at the national level (e.g. UK House 
of Commons 2019 ; Canada House of Commons 2018 ). Even when they refer to 
foreign interference or specifically to Russian meddling, all these reports argue in 
favour of structural responses, rather than focus on a specific external actor such 
as Russia. 
Hacking and dumping 
The second component of Russian meddling, as characterised by the Mueller 
report, is the hacking-and-dumping operation against the Clinton campaign. 
The coordinated efforts at maximising the visibility of the exfiltrated materials 
has fundamentally contributed to the impact of the operation, and it is no less 
important than the hacking operation itself. Readers who do not have a keen 
interest in cyber-security issues may well not even have heard that Chinese hack r  violated the computer system of both the Obama and McCain campaign in 
2008 ( Isikoff 2013 ) or that Russian hackers exfiltrated data from the computer 
networks of the German Parliament ( Beuth et al. 2017 ): what is particularly new 
about the hacking of the US Democrats and the Clinton campaign in 2016 is, 
ultimately, its very notoriety. 
Even when hackers do publish online the private communication of politicians 
they have illicitly obtained, the media reaction may be muted. For example, when 
more than 20 GB of emails from the servers of Lega, a prominent right-wing 
party in Italy, were hacked about a month before the Italian political elections of 
May 2018, the news barely featured in the media ( Martelli 2018 ). Other scandals 
involving hacked personal communications of politicians in Europe did achieve 
some visibility in the media, but they had hardly any political impact ( Soesanto 
2017 ; Franceschi-Bicchierai, Koebler, and Maiberg 2019 ). Insisting that journalists 
fully consider the ethical implications of reporting on illicitly obtained materials 
may be relevant, but explicit regulations on this issue may be both useless (i.e. ineffectiv  in the age of social media) and damaging (i.e. used to silence investigative 
journalists). 
Also, in the case of cyber-security in time of elections there is a considerable 
consensus on viable policy options that should be pursued, as summarised for exam l  in the relevant report by ENISA, the European Union cyber-security agency 
( ENISA 2019 ). The first basic concern in this context is to ensure high cyber- 
security standards for the very infrastructure used to conduct elections. At its core, 
this is a technical and organisational issue to be approached through established best 
practices ( NIS Cooperation Group 2018 ), enhanced cooperation between government agencies ( van der Staak and Wolf 2019 ), and further exchange of experiences 
and information among partners ( ENISA 2019 : 11; Pope 2018 ). 
A second specific vulnerability relates to the computer systems and the internal 
communication of political parties and campaigns. Although they are extremely 
high-value targets for both domestic and foreign actors, they do not seem to take 
their own cyber-security seriously enough. This is not necessarily by ill will: 
in comparison with corporate environments, decentralised organisations that 
involve volunteers may find it more difficult to enforce tight cyber-security practic . Even if they may eventually hold the keys to the state coffers and m ag  considerable resources, many political organisations operate on a shoe-string 
budget: having to decide between more electoral posters and expensive cyber- 
security consultants, they have strong incentives to prefer the former. For that 
reason, ENISA (2019) argues in favour of the introduction of mandatory high 
cyber-security standards for political organisations and proposes to assist them 
throughout the adaptation process. Such initiatives are already taking place in 
various European country ( Maurer and Brattberg 2018 ), and previous experience 
may well serve as a source of inspiration in other countries, keeping in consideration local needs and sensitivities. Guides for pr ctitioners ( Belfer Center for 
Science and International Affairs 2017 ) are useful tools and educating individuals 
is indeed an important element of a comprehensive cyber-security strategy, but 
political campaigners should not be left alone to fend off attacks from advanced, 
state-sponsored malicious actors. Assistance should come with the understanding 
that widespread default solutions, such as relying on foreign big tech companies, 
may be politically unacceptable. 10 
Finally, Russian meddling has once again highlighted the importance of defi ing a framework for reacting if a cyber-attack can be convincingly attributed to 
a foreign actor. 11 The European Union has been working for a few years on its 
cyber-diplomacy toolbox which may become a useful point of reference in time 
of need (Moret and Pawlak 2017; Ivan 2019 ), and more dialogue along these lines 
is needed at the international level. Any such initiative should, however, include 
mechanisms that prevent quick escalation, also considering Russia’s own aggressive 
use of cyber-operations in recent years ( Greenberg 2019 ). 
Secret deals and illicit funding 
This chapter deliberately focussed on aspects that were directly related to the 
impact of new technologies on the information space due to their prominence 
in the Russian meddling narrative as epitomised by the Mueller report. How v r, perhaps the most hotly debated part of that investigation was aimed at 
determining – as it turned out, inconclusively – if the Trump campaign actively 
“conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities” ( Mueller 2019 ; Bullough 2019 ). 
In continental Europe, somewhat similar shenanigans involving Russia have 
revolved around actual or attempted transfers of money from Kremlin-related 
actors to friendly political forces. For instance, in 2014 Marine Le Pen’s National 
Front obtained a loan for 9.4 million euro from a Prague-based, Kremlin-linked 
bank that had been used for unrelated money-laundering operations, in a deal that 
according to media reports was related to the Russia-friendly stance Le Pen took on 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea ( Gatehouse 2017 ). In what turned out to be an el b r t  set-up, in July 2017 Austria’s Freedom Party leader Heinz-Christian Strache 
was recorded on camera as he negotiated support from a woman he believed to 
be the niece of a Russian oligarch ( Al-Serori et al. 2019 ). In July 2019, Buzzfeed 
News released secretly recorded audio of a meeting which took place in Moscow in 
October 2018, reported in a cover story published on the Italian weekly L’Espresso. 
During the meeting, three Russian and three Italian individuals were conspiring 
to use an oil deal to syphon off 65 million USD to be used to finance the political 
campaign of Lega ( Tizian and Vergine 2019 ; Nardelli 2019 ). The issue of funds of 
dubious origins flooding political campaigns obtained particular prominence in the 
UK in recent years (e.g. Ramsay and Geoghegan 2017 ) and there may indeed be a 
Russian connection: a dedicated report by the UK Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is due to be published in 2020 ( Bullough 2019 ). 
Scandals related to specific individuals make for media-grabbing headlines, but 
do not lend themselves as easily to more generalisable patterns. Yet, even these 
stories shed some new light on contemporary vulnerabilities to Western de ocracies. In the case of the UK, its role as a co nerstone for the global offshore industry 
makes it particularly vulnerable to the corrupting influence of ‘dark money’; klep- 
tocratic regimes in the post-Soviet space are a well-known source of such funds 
( Cooley and Heathershaw 2017 ; Bullough 2018a ), but this is a global problem – an 
under-appreciated “dark side of globalisation” ( Bullough 2018b ) – rather than anything Russia-specific. Elsewhere, concerns about illicit funding may well serve as 
a reminder of the importance of transparency requirements for political campaigns 
and other actors such as foundations and thinktanks that in many countries are 
playing an increasing prominent role in domestic politics. 
Fundamentally, the recent preoccupation with Russian meddling that emerged 
in late 2016 is not related to the cosy relationship between leading politicians 
and the Kremlin; For example, the explicit pro-Russian stance of leading figures 
such as former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder or former Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, as well as their flaunted friendship with Russian 
president Vladimir Putin have called for some criticism, but they have not been 
denounced as a case of Russian interference. There is also no sensible policy 
proposal that could (or should) deal with the personal preferences and political 
choices of politicians, as long as they remain within the boundaries of the law. 
There are, however, sensible policies that would reduce the risk that dark money 
interferes with domestic political processes. 
More broadly, when thinking of policy responses to the concerns stemming 
from stories about ‘Russian meddling’, looking beyond the Kremlin is the safest 
approach for making democracies less vulnerable to foreign interference (from 
Russia or elsewhere) as well as more resilient to the challenges of domestic 
spoilers. 
Conclusion 
In recent years, Russian meddling has obtained extensive media attention and has 
led to increased pressure on policy makers and big tech companies to find ways 
to protect democracy from undue external interference. The preoccupation with 
foreign meddling is understandable, but it should also come with an appreciation 
of the fact that there is little of specifically foreign (or Russian) in the vulnerabilities 
that made Russian meddling possible, or at least plausible. Domestic spoilers – 
motivated by politics or by profit – have used and will likely continue using some 
of the same techniques to a much greater extent. 
Liberal democracies have no acceptable way to protect themselves from these 
kinds of operations without dealing with the newly shaped structural vulnerabilities 
that have come with the uptake of digital technologies. Fortunately, expert groups 
as well as national and international committees tasked to investigate these issues 
have put forward a number of meaningful policy proposals. At least on some of 
them, there is an extraordinary degree of consensus. Policy makers should know 
where to start and ensure that the preoccupation about these matters that emerged 
with Russian meddling isn’t wasted. 
Of course, Western governments would also do well to reason on a sensible 
course of action to manage the current confrontation with Russia ( Trenin 2016 ). 
Countries bordering the Russian Federation should consider adequate measures 
to deal with Russia’s much more pervasive presence in their information spaces 
while resisting the temptation of outright censorship even under extreme pressure 
( Mijatovic´ 2014 ). These are, however, quite separate matters. When thinking of 
policy responses to Russian meddling into domestic political processes in Western 
countries, the better course of action is to focus on the vulnerabilities that make 
such interference possible. 
Notes 
1 This operationalisation of external – specifically Russian – meddling makes it possible 
to concentrate on a distinct subset of problematic instances of external interference. As 
a consequence, this chapter does not analyse other forms of external influence that are 
generally perceived as legitimate (e.g. transnational networks or regional cooperation 
mechanisms), nor others phenomena that, depending on the context, can be more pr blematic (e.g. different understandings of public diplomacy or democracy promotion). 
2 These include the delayed release of an official dossier on Russian meddling in the UK 
and new revelations about Russian donors to the Tory party; other articles were related 
to the impeachment of Donald Trump in the United States. 
3 The analysis of Spiegel and Repubblica was based on their online archives. For a debate on 
the usefulness of applying basic word frequency analysis to better define a case study, see 
Comai (2017). 
4 Russia vividly denounced the West’s active interference at the time of the “Orange evolution” in Ukraine in 2004 ( Ambrosio 2010). It should be acknowledged that external interference from both Russia and the West was perceived to be improper by large 
swathes of Ukrainian residents ( Shulman and Bloom 2012). 
5 To counter this narrative based on false equivalence, the Kofi Annan Commission on 
Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age (2020: 87) argues in favour of establishing 
an international convention to “develop international norms that distinguish legitimate 
cross-border assistance from illicit or unlawful interventions.” 
6 On criticism of “EU vs. Disinfo”, see for example Nijeboer (2018). 
7 Given both the significant change of context and the distinct temporal hiatus between 
those phenomena and present events, the affinities between recent events and Soviet- 
time practices with some contiguity with them are not discussed. An incomplete list of 
references would include disinformation activities ( United States 1981 ; Martin 1982) , 
“active measures” ( Godson and Shultz 1985) , as well as a specific attention to collect and 
use compromising materials (kompromat) on opponents. 
8 For a debate on the meaning of ‘information operation’ and of alternative concepts, see 
in particular Wanless and Pamment (2019). 
9 As pointed out by Neudert and Marchal (2019 : 15), the attention economy and the r ssure to increase engagement on these platforms had already proved to be powerful i c ntiv s for “the dissemination of partisan and emotionally-charged content that reinforces 
tensions between users.” 
10 On top of a strong security record for all their users, big tech companies such as Google 
and Microsoft provide premium services with additional security to political campaigns 
for free, see Google’s “Protect your election” ( https://protectyourelection.withgoogle.- 
com/ ), and Microsoft’s “Defending democracy program” ( https://m365forcampaigns.- 
microsoft.com .). However, using services offered by US-based conglomerates with dubiou  records on matters such as so-called ‘tax optimisation’, abuse of monopoly power, 
and privacy, may be problematic for political campaigns. 
11 On the issue of attribution of cyberattacks, see in particular Rid and Buchanan (2015). 
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Information Spreading 
and the Role of Automated 
Accounts on Twitter 
Two case studies 
Guido Caldarelli , Rocco De Nicola , 
Marinella Petrocchi , and Fabio Saracco 
Introduction 
Disruptive Innovation: a term that perfectly sums up the impact of social media 
on people’s everyday life. Crucial information can be produced and disseminated 
among millions of people in a flash, even information concerned with real-time 
updates on important events. Unfortunately, new technologies have not only rev- 
olutionised traditional sectors such as retail and advertising, but they have also 
been fertile and ground-breaking even on a much more slippery ground: misinformation, hoaxes, a d propaganda ( National Endowment for Democracy 2017). 
Disinformation, widely defined as “the purposeful dissemination of false information intended to mislead or har ” ( National Endowment for Democracy 2017 ), 
is probably as old as human relationships – in the 5th century B.C., the Chinese 
military theoretician Sun Tzu wrote that “all warfare is based on deception.” 1 
However, the advent and easiness of use of social media has served to enhance the 
scale (capability to reach billions of people), scope (capability to achieve a focussed 
objective, e.g. in terms of a particular audience group), and effectiveness of disinformation ( Bradshaw and Howard 2018 ). 
Moreover, the dis/information diffusion on social media is often supported 
by automated accounts, controlled totally or in part by computer algorithms, 
called bots. Designed to mimic human behaviour online, a dominant and worris me use of automated accounts is far from being benign: they have been often 
used to amplify narratives or drown out political dissent ( Yang et al. 2019 ). 
Recent studies demonstrate that bots are particularly active in spreading false 
information. Among other examples, Shao et al. (2018) report of a highly viral 
fabricated news story titled ‘Spirit cooking’, which claimed Clinton’s campaign 
chairman practiced bizarre occult rituals, and was published four days before 
the 2016 US election, subsequently shared in over 30,000 tweets. Even more 
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worryingly, the Global Inventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation 
reports that bot accounts are being used in 50 out of 70 investigated countries 
which make use of organised social media manipulation campaigns ( Bradshaw 
and Howard 2019 ). 
According to the 2019 report ‘Weapons of mass distraction’ ( Gangware and 
Nemr 2019 ), strategists of false news can exploit – at least – three significant targets 
of the online information ecosystem: (1) the medium: the platforms on which fake 
news creeps in and expands; (2) the message: what is the information that one 
wants to convey?; (3) the audience: who consumes (and contributes to diffuse) 
this information. The work presented in this chapter focussed on the three mention d aspects. Relying on two huge Twitter corpora about (1) migration in the 
Mediterranean Sea from North Africa to Italy, and (2) Covid-19-related discussions, the authors analyse the relevant (i.e. those not compatible with users’ r d  activity) communication and interaction patterns, spotting out the accounts 
that contribute to the effective dissemination of messages. 
Our main results are the following: first, after cleaning the system from the r ndo  activity of users, we detect the main hubs of the two networks, i.e. the most 
effective accounts in significantly propagating their messages, and we observe that 
those accounts have a higher number of bots among their followers than av ra . Second, for the migration topic, the strongest hubs in the network share a 
relatively high number of bots as followers, which most probably aim at further 
increasing the visibility of the hubs’ messages via following and retweeting. As far 
as the Covid-19 topic is concerned, at least at the time of our investigation, the 
presence of bots is more limited, but we expect it will grow when the issue stops 
being only medical and starts becoming political. 
To the best of our knowledge, the existence of formations of bots shared by 
a group of human-operated accounts has never been reported in the literature 
before. 
Datasets 
Our study is based on two large corpora of Twitter data, generated by collecting 
tweets in Italian concerned with migrations and Covid-19-related discussions. For 
data collection, we developed specific programmes which, by exploiting Twitter 
public filter API, 2 provided real-time tweet delivery and allowed the collection of 
sets of data filtered according to specified keywords. For both datasets, we selected 
a set of keywords compatible with recent chronicles. 
The keywords for the dataset about migration have been selected because they 
are commonly used in Italy when talking and writing about immigration flows 
from Northern Africa to the Italian coasts, including the dispute about the holder 
of jurisdiction for handling emergencies involving European countries and NGOs. 3 
We collected 1,082,029 tweets, posted by 127,275 unique account IDs over a 
period of one month (from 23 January to 22 February 2019). By relying on the 
bot detector classifier developed by Cresci et al. (2015) , all the accounts have been 
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classified either as human-operated or as bots. This classification led to 117,879 
genuine accounts and 9396 social bots, representing around 7% of all accounts. 
It may be worth pointing out that the period over which the data was collecte  was characterised by a lively political debate in Italy about the landing of 
the Diciotti ship, which was operated by NGOs and rescued migrants fleeing from 
North Africa to Italy. Rescuing almost 200 migrants on 16 August 2018, it initially 
received a veto to land from the Italian government; it was allowed to do so only 
after ten days. Mr. Matteo Salvini, at that time Minister of Internal Affairs, was 
afterwards investigated for kidnapping and abuse of office; the case was stopped on 
19 February 2019, when the Italian Senate did not grant judges the possibility to 
prosecute him. Right before and after the Senate’s decision, there was an intense 
debate on social networks about migrants and NGOs, and about the role of the 
Italian government and of the European Union (EU). 
The collected tweets concerned with Covid-19 had hashtags related to the 
coronavirus contagion in the text of the tweet. 4 We collected almost 2.5 million tweets in Italian, from 21 February 2020 to 10 March 2020. 5 By relying on 
Botometer, the bot detector/classifier developed at the Indiana University ( Varol 
et al. 2017 ), all the accounts have been classified either as human-operated or as 
bots. This classification led to 265,910 genuine accounts and 16,973 bots, representing 6% of all accounts. Also in this case, it is important o notice that the timing 
of the data collection is significant, as far as the topic and the Italian scenario are 
concerned. In fact, on 21 February the case of the so-called patient one in Lombar y broke out, giving rise to the escalation of the epidemic in Italy. 
Users’ affiliation 
Following previous studies ( Becatti et al. 2019 ; Caldarelli et al. 2020), we used the 
official certification of one account’s authenticity, provided by Twitter, in order 
to get the polarisation of users. Indeed, upon request from its owner, an account 
can be certified by the platform and tagged as verified once its authenticity is 
confirmed. On the official portal, the verified accounts display a blue circle with a 
white tick at the centre, close to their name. 
The intuition behind recent researches on Italian Twitter users’ polarisation 
( Becatti et al. 2019 ; Caldarelli et al. 2020) is that two verified users are perceived 
as similar if their messages are retweeted by the same (unverified) users. In order to 
translate this intuition into a measure, we consider the bipartite network formed 
by verified users (on one layer) and unverified users (on the other layer). A link is 
present in the network if one of the two users retweeted the other one at least one 
time, no matter if the unverified user retweeted the verified one or vice-versa. We 
chose to focus on retweets since they represent the preferred way through which 
users spread messages they agree with ( Conover et al. 2011 ). 
Figures 12.1 and 12.2 show, respectively, the communities of verified users 
found for the migration flows scenario and the Covid-19 one. In particular, the 
network in Figure 12.1 presents a strong community structure. The accounts tied 
FIGURE 12.1 The communities of verified users in the migration flows dataset 
to the Italian government – in office at the time of data collection (Lega and 
Movimento 5 Stelle) – and other right-wing parties are in blue. The accounts 
of the centre-left-wing parties (e.g. the Italian Democratic Party, PD) are in red. 
The violet group includes official media accounts, several NGOs, and left-wing 
politicians. Some official accounts related to the Catholic Church are in orange. 
In turquoise, we represent some smaller groups involved in the debate, such as the 
Maltese Prime Minister Joseph Muscat and some of his ministers, and in green we 
represent a soccer commentators’ community. 
As can be seen, the communities are mostly based on their political inclinations. 
In fact, it is well known that Twitter users tend to be strongly clustered in communities sharing si ilar ideas ( Bessi et al. 2016 ; Del Vicario et al. 2016 ; Schmidt et al. 
2018 ). Figure 12.2 shows a pretty clear correlation with respect to political ideas. 
Orange represents the accounts of the Movimento 5 Stelle. Light blue (on the left) 
are accounts of Forza Italia. The red vertices are those of the Democratic Party, the 
institutional users (embassies, police, carabinieri, ministers, local governments) are 
FIGURE 12.2 The communities of verified users in the Covid-19 dataset 
represented by blue vertices. Purple vertices are related to Fratelli di Italia, Lega, 
and newspapers. Finally, the light green vertices on the right are related to TV 
pundits, journalists, actors, or theatres accounts, while the yellow community on 
the left is composed mainly by sport journals and journalists. 
Verified accounts of politicians can be easily associated with a political party; 
thus, ideological inclination of unverified users can be guessed by considering 
their interactions with the communities of verified ones. Figures 12.3 and 12.4 
show the matrix of online interactions between verified and unverified users. 
In Figure 12.3 , we report the matrix describing the interactions between v rifi d and unverified users for the migration flows dataset. Nodes are coloured 
according to their communities, i.e. violet for NGOs, media accounts, leftwing politicians, and for the Democratic Party community, orange for Catholic
Church-related accounts, and blue for the pro-government users. In grey, there 
are users with lower values of polarisation. Figure 12.4 describes the interactions 
between verified and unverified users for the Covid-19 dataset. Also in this case, 
FIGURE 12.3 Interactions between verified and unverified users for the migration flows 
dataset 
FIGURE 12.4 Interactions between verified and unverified users for the Covid-19 dataset 
the community structure clearly reproduces the cluster of verified users with similar political background. Even in a situation of crisis, people tend to follow advice 
from experts only from a particular side of the political parties ( Bessi et al. 2016 ; 
Del Vicario et al. 2016 ). A striking case is that of medical doctor Roberto Burioni, 
a physician with expertise in infectious diseases (Starr 2020), whose messages are 
retweeted only by the red community. 
Like in a previous study (Becatti at al. 2019), even for the two case studies the 
community structure is strong. 
Significant content exchange 
As anticipated in the Introduction, in the analysis of a complex information system, 
one of the main issues is to skim relevant information from ‘noise’ ( Cimini et al. 
2019 ). Of course, the definition of noise itself depends on the system. In the pr vious section, we obtained the political affiliation of verified users by projecting the 
information in the bipartite network describing the interactions between verified 
and unverified users. 
By applying the procedure proposed by van Lidth de Jeude et al. (2019) , we 
filter the total exchange of content in our datasets after discounting the information 
regarding the activity of users and the virality of messages. Following the approach 
of Becatti et al. (2019) and Caldarelli et al. (2020), we build the network of users 
and messages. A link from a user to a message is present if the user authored the 
message, while there is a link from the message to the user if the latter retweeted 
the message. This network of users and messages is then used to determine the 
connections between the users: for every (ordered) couple of users u and w, we 
consider how many times w retweeted a message authored by u, compared to 
the activity of u as an author, the retweeting activity of w, and the virality of the 
messages. 
At the end of the procedure, we obtain a ‘validated’ network: users in such a 
network contribute to spread the messages in a statistically significant way. The 
filtering procedure returns a directed network in which the arrows go from the 
authors to the retweeters. For the migration dataset, the number of nodes reduces 
to 14,883 users and the number of links reduces to 34,302. For the Covid-19 d ta et, the final network contains 10,412 different users and 14,105 links. 
Figures 12.5 and 12.6 show the structure of the validated networks in terms of 
communities for the two scenarios, respectively. The former figure describes the 
directed validated projection of the retweet activity network. Nodes are violet for 
NGOs, media accounts, and left-wing politicians, red for the Democratic Party 
community, and blue for the pro-government users; other colours identify smaller 
communities. An arrow between a source node and a target node is present if 
the target is a significant retweeter of the source. The dimension of each node is 
proportional to its hub score: the biggest node (in blue) is the account of Matteo 
Salvini, i.e. the leader of a major right-wing party and the Minister of Internal 
Affairs at the time of the data collection. The latter figure describes the directed 
FIGURE 12.5 Mediterranean flows 
FIGURE 12.6 Covid-19 
validated projection of the retweet activity network. In red, the Italian Democratic 
Party, in orange, accounts of politicians and journalists close to Movimento 5 Stelle. 
The violet cluster is divided into two poles: the one of media (in the centre) and 
the one of the extreme right parties (on the right). Interestingly, all communities 
are extremely linked to the core of the media. 
Results 
The effectiveness of a hub can be derived by its ability to reach a high number 
of relevant nodes: this principle is finely implemented in the Hubs-Authorities 
algorithm, originally introduced in Kleinberg (1999) to rate webpages. In the 
original version, the paradigm assigns two scores for each webpage: its authority, 
which estimates the value of the content of the page from the pages linking to 
it, and its hub value, which estimates the ability to redirect to the most relevant 
pages. In the scenario currently under investigation, hubs and authorities are 
Twitter accounts. In the following we will focus on hubs, because they represent 
the driving force of the discussion and are relatively popular users, and even if 
they are not verified by Twitter, we often have reliable information about their 
accounts. 
Migration flows scenario 
Among the top 20 nodes, in terms of hub scores, the first account is owned by 
Matteo Salvini, leader of the right-wing party Lega. The second and the third ones 
belong to two journalists of a news website supported by Casa Pound, a neo-fascist 
Italian party. The fourth is owned by Giorgia Meloni, leader of the right-wing 
party Fratelli d’Italia and former ally, during the 2018 Italian electoral campaign, of 
Lega. Salvini and Meloni have similar opinions on how to deal with migration in 
the Mediterranean. The fifth and sixth accounts belong, respectively, to a jour alist of Il Fatto Quotidiano (a newspaper close to M5S) and an unverified user with 
opinions in line with the ones of the two above mentioned politicians. Notably, 
the top nodes belong to the blue community. The first account with a different 
membership (TgLa7, a popular newscast by a private TV channel, whose account 
belongs to the purple community) ranks 176th in the hub score ranking. 
Remarkably, we observe a non-zero overlap among the bots in the lists of the 
validated followers of human-operated accounts. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first time that such a phenomenon is detected. In our opinion, the use of 
bot squads, retweeting the messages of two or more strong hubs, aims at increasing 
the visibility of their tweets. We have detected two main groups of such accounts, 
the other being composed by a maximum of two common bots. The first one 
includes 22 genuine accounts (nine of which are in the top 10 hubs), sharing 
22 bots. In this set, some users share a relatively high fraction of bots; there is one 
right-wing account that shares all its automated followers with both Meloni and 
Salvini (see Figure 12.7 ). 
Figure 12.7 The relative overlap matrix among the list of bots following the top 20 hubs. 
A matrix entry represents the percentage of shared bots between users i 
and j over the number of bots following node i. There are 12 accounts 
sharing a relatively high number of bots 
Figure 12.8 shows the first group of genuine accounts sharing bots and all their 
bot followers. The subgraph includes genuine accounts (in dark blue) and all the 
bots following them (in magenta). The dimension of the nodes is proportional to 
their hub score but normalised on the subgraph. The biggest node represents 
Salvini’s account. In the picture, there are 22 bots shared by 22 humans. Among the 
latter, nine accounts are among the top 10 hubs. The subgraph contains 172 nodes. 
Notably, the accounts belong almost exclusively to the blue, i.e., pro-government 
community. The genuine accounts sharing bots and all their bot followers belong 
almost exclusively to the blue community, thus we can notice that in this com unity there is a strong cooperation between bots and humans. The hub scores, represented by the dimensions of the nodes, are nearly homogeneous among the hubs. 
FIGURE 12.8 Subgraph of the largest group of users sharing bots 
The incidence of bots in the subgraph of Figure 12.8 is 87%. The number of shared 
bots over the total number of genuine users is exactly 1. Interestingly, the hubs rarely 
retweet between each other in a significant way (in fact, only three links can be 
found among them). They leave it to the bots to spread the content of their partners. 
The topmost panel of Figure 12.9 shows that the main activity of the bots in 
the largest bot squad is retweeting. As expected, they mostly retweet human- 
operated accounts connected to them (see the central panel of Figure 12.9 ). The 
same cannot be said for mentions that may be used either to provoke or to involve 
the target in a discussion. Accounts from different political sides are mentioned 
by bot squads; in fact, the bot accounts with more than 30 mentions point to 
members of the blue community as well as to the official account of the Italian 
Democratic Party (pdnetwork), a centre-left party. It is worth noticing that other 
‘non-partisan’ verified accounts, e.g. the one of the President of the Republic 
(Quirinale) and the one of the President of the Chamber of the Deputies, are 
mentioned there and that, in most cases, the messages containing those mentions 
are sort of invites for the institutional figures to intervene in the management of 
migration flows (bottom panel, Figure 12.9 ). The most striking outcome of the 
analysis, however, concerns the sources cited by the bots in the blue squads: 89% 
of their original tweets (i.e. not replies, nor retweets or quoted tweets), contain a 
URL, and 97% of those URLs refers to www.voxnews.info , a website blacklisted 
as a source of political disinformation by two popular fact-checking websites, 
namely www.butac.it and www.bufale.net . 
Figure 12.9 Statistics of the largest bot squad 
Covid-19 scenario 
The top 20 hubs are mostly unverified accounts, all from the right wing and the 
extreme right wing of the political spectrum (exactly as in the above scenario). 
Among the verified accounts, we have Matteo Salvini, Giorgia Meloni, two right- 
wing journalists, Salvini’s political party, and a politician from the same party; all 
of them belong to the purple community. In the first position we have an u v rified user that we did not spot in the previous analysis, with hub score = 1: this is 
an unverified account that can be put in relation with extreme right-wing parties. 
Interestingly enough, in the top 10 hubs, we found four accounts already present 
Figure 12.10 The retweeting activity of genuine and automated accounts 
in the previous study on migration flows. Salvini and Meloni are respectively in the 
third and fifth places. It should be noticed that the distribution of the hub scores is 
very peaked (the second place in the ranking accounts for a hub score of 0.45, and 
it drops down to less than 0.10 for the 10th place). 
The activity of bots consists mostly of retweeting human users, although there 
is a non-negligible activity of genuine accounts in retweeting automated ones 
(see Figure 12.10 ). Figure 12.10 shows the retweeting activity of genuine users 
in the top panel, while the bottom panel reports the the retweeting activity for 
bots. As it can be seen, the trend of the retweeting activity of automated accounts 
closely follows the one of genuine users. Looking at the scales, the interaction 
between human users and bots is limited. Furthermore, the number of genuine 
users retweeting bots is even smaller. 
Amongst these bots, 300 also appeared in the analysis of the political discussion 
about migration flows. Only 1.7% of all detected bots passed the filtering procedure, thereby representing about 2.8% of validated accounts. Differently from the 
previous analysis, no bot is shared by the first 500 hubs in the network. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, using Twitter as a benchmark, we have analysed the flow of 
information within and between members of different communities, studying 
the dynamics of their interactions and the role of automated accounts in such 
exchanges. For our study, we have relied on techniques developed by physicists 
and computer scientists. In particular, we have filtered the network of connections and focussed on the most effective accounts in tweets propagation by taking 
advantage of statistical physics techniques, and we have used machine learning 
techniques to single out the automatic accounts operating on the network. We 
have demonstrated the impact of our approach by considering the propagation of 
Italian tweets concerned with two topics: migration flows in the Mediterranean 
and Covid-19 related discussion. The analysis has shown that bots play a central 
role in the exchange of significant content, and that the so-called hub nodes (the 
most effective accounts in propagating messages) have, among their followers, a 
high number of bots. This is particularly evident for the migration flows discussion. 
In the Covid-19 discussion, at least at the time of our investigation, the presence 
of bots is more limited, but we expect it will grow when the issue stops being only 
medical and starts becoming political. 
The conclusions we can now draw from our analysis do indeed depend on the 
specific topic of the discussion. As expected, the debate on migrants is dominated 
by the interplay of several communities strongly related to political parties and alli ce  operating in the Italian political arena. In this scenario, a rather clear structure 
of bot squads is present and its effect on the debate is evident. The total presence of 
bots represents 7% of all users, while their contribution to the backbone of content 
exchange reduces to the 2.5% of all validated users. 
For the Covid-19 discussion, a preliminary analysis showed the presence of 
echo chambers too. Interestingly enough, those chambers are related to political 
opinions, even if the subject is mostly scientific. This is not completely unexpected. 
Indeed, the political countermeasures in order to face the Covid-19 contagion 
strongly influenced the public debate; by converse, the already present political 
echo chambers still shape the activity of users on Twitter. The total presence of 
bots represents 6% of all users, while their contribution to the backbone of content 
exchange reduces them to 2.8% of all validated users. In contrast to the migration 
case, we find no signs of a coherent squad of automated accounts acting in the 
discussion. 
Notes 
1 Geoff Nunberg (2019) ‘ “Disinformation” is the word of the year – and a sign of what’s to 
come’, NPR, 30 December 2019. 
2 https://developer.twitter.com/en/docs/tweets/filter-realtime/api-reference/post-sta 
tuses-filter.html . 
3 We searched for the Italian translation of the following keywords: immigrants, migrants, 
ngo, boat drivers as human smugglers, seawatch, barges, illegal immigrants, Libyan coast 
guard, shipwreck, disembarkation. 
4 #coronavirus, #WuhanCoronavirus, #CoronavirusOutbreak, #coronaviruschina, #corona- 
viruswuhan, #ChinaCoronaVirus, #nCoV, #coronaviruses, #ChinaWuHan, #nCoV2020, 
#nCov2019, coronavirus, coronaviruses, ncov, ncov2020, ncov2019, covid2019, covid-19, 
SARS-CoV2, #SARS_CoV2, #SARSCoV2, #COVID19. 
5 We had an interruption of one day and four hours on 27 February due to connection 
breakdown. 
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Radical-Right Political Activism 
on the Web and the Challenge 
for European Democracy 
A perspective from Eastern and Central Europe 
Manuela Caiani and Pál Susánszky 
Introduction 
The radical right 1 is on the rise both in the real world and online, not only in 
Western European democracies ( Caiani, Della Porta, and Wagemann 2012 ; Hutter 
2014 ) but also in Central and Eastern Europe (Buštíková 2018; Greskovits 2020). 
Overall, compared with the 1970s (‘radical right first wave’) and early 1990s (‘second 
wave’), the turn of the century was marked by an increasing activity of radical-right 
organisations in institutional politics (‘third wave’) (Mudde 2017), especially 
after the 2008 economic crisis ( Kriesi and Pappas 2015 ). Yet scholars started to talk 
about the beginning of a fourth wave (of normalisation) of these political forces. 
The radical right is mainstreamed ( Mudde 2019 ). Also, new forms of radical-right 
social movements and protest mobilisations emerged (e.g. Pegida in Germany) 
( Bernhard and Kriesi 2019 ; Hutter 2014 ), which often work as ‘incubators’ of new 
political ideas and radical-right voters ( Minkenberg 2013 ). In parallel, the success 
of radical right-wing online mobilisation has become quite obvious ( Ekman 2018 ; 
Klein and Muis 2019 ; Kluknavská and Hruška 2019 ). As the Europol IOCTA 
2019 report stressed: “the interplay of online [right-wing extremist] communities 
who share the same Internet slang and memes contributed to the widespread dissemination of the content and its digital endurance” (49). In fact, the issues around
which radical-right groups mobilise their followers – such as Islamisation, globalisation, 
immigration, etc. – are highly debated on their websites (for an overview 
on Western Europe, see Caiani and Parenti 2013 ). 
If the “mobilization of the losers” ( Kriesi 2014 ) or “the new cleavage” in search 
of political entrepreneurs theses ( Kriesi 2018 ) are often quoted to account for this 
recent radical-right revitalisation in European democracies, the role played by 
the Internet as a new tool of political mobilisation and communication is also 
gaining serious consideration among scholars (e.g. Bartlett, Birdwell, and Littler 
2011 ), as the book within which this chapter is located testifies. In particular the 
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radical-right use of the web is linked to hate speech and fake news ( Klein 2019 ; 
Monti 2018 ). A recent study on the visual propaganda of the British National Party 
on Facebook, for example, ( Klein 2019 ) stressed that half of the shared pictures 
(50%) were “manipulative” and “framed with selective statistics”, especially against 
immigrants and Muslim people, encouraging online activism against them among 
the followers of the party. 
The topic (i.e. radical-right political activism on the web) appears particularly crucial in Eastern and Central Europe since, as underlined, post-communist 
countries face challenges regarding their membership in the European Union. 
Moreover, parallel with the rise of nationalist radical-right politics, the quality of 
democracy has decayed, ( Minkenberg 2017 : 1–9). 
In this chapter we address this topic by focussing on four Central Eastern 
European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) and 
analysing, through a systematic formalised content analysis (for a similar method 
and tools see Caiani and Parenti 2013 ) on all radical right websites identified, the 
degree and forms of the use of the web by these political actors (from political 
parties to cultural radical websites, to neo-Nazi groups). A particular attention 
will be devoted to the textual and visual forms of radical-right online propaganda, 
as well as differences and similarities across various type of groups and countries. 
A comparison between Eastern and Western radical-right organisations on the use 
of the web and propaganda will be presented. 
Indeed, to date, empirical research on the radical right and their political 
mobilisation, identity promotion and propaganda online is quite fragmented and 
selective, focussing still mainly on political parties (although with some imp rt nt exceptions, e.g. Castelli Gattinara and Pirro 2019 ) and almost exclusively on 
Western countries (for some exceptions, see: Fofiu, 2015; Andreescu 2015; Karl 
2017 ). Moreover, although the current resurgence of the radical right in Central 
Eastern Europe (CEE) has received much scholarly attention in recent years, most 
of these studies focus on offline radical-right activities (e.g. Minkenberg 2015 ; 
Mudde 2017; Pytlas 2015 ; Císař and Štětka 2016; Císař 2017) or online radical-right 
activism concerning single case studies (e.g. the Jobbik movement in Hu gary). Comparative researches on radical-right online political activities in these 
countries are still rare. 
Who are the radical right organisations active online in CEE? How do they 
address and attempt to reach out their supporters through the web? What kind of 
content is spread by radical-right organisations online, and which goals do they 
pursue? This study, with the limit of focussing on solely four Central Eastern 
European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), tries 
to shed light systematically on these questions and offer an empirical contribution to them. 
The chapter is organised as follows. In the first section we summarise the a demic state of the art concerning the rol  of the Internet in radical-right mobilisation. After having illustrated our method and the sources f this study (section 
two), section three shows the comparative (cross-country and cross-organisational 
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type) empirical analysis of radical-right political activism online, and section four 
concludes by critically discussing these findings in light of the challenge to Europea  democracies (in particular as far as CEE is concerned). 
The role of the Internet in radical-right organisations 
Social movement scholars have argued that the Internet offers several advantages 
for the mobilisation of civil society collective actors, including low costs, fast and 
efficient communications for connecting isolated individuals and groups, along 
with tools for coordination and socialisation which are especially helpful to overc m  problems of leadership (see, among others, Bennett and Segerberg 2013 ; 
Bennett, Breunig, and Givens 2008 ; Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010 ). It is said to 
allow new forms of political participation ( Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010 ) as well 
as to organise collective actions more easily ( Dolata and Schrape 2016 ). This is 
even more true for radical actors for whom the web provides a virtual arena in 
which they can have their views and lower the risk of being banned or persecuted 
( Caiani, Della Porta, and Wagemann 2012 ; Klein and Muis 2019 ). Online pl tforms help such movements to disseminate messages, organise and mobilise for 
protests, make symbolic actions, and “provide an opportunity to express oneself 
in ‘online communities’” ( Krämer 2017 : 12). In fact, it has been stressed that the 
Internet may reduce the cost of radical-right mobilisations, also transnational ones, 
such as those organised by Pegida ( Caiani and Kroel 2014 ; Enikolopov, Makarin, 
and Petrova 2016 ; Berntzen and Weisskircher 2016 ) and it can allow these actors 
to build an active and potent self-image with little effort ( Arzheimer 2015 ; Berntzen 
and Weisskircher 2016 ). Finally, studies on social movements argue that the 
Internet can help in generating collective identities by facilitating the exchange of 
resources and information, as well as creating solidarity and shared objectives ( Della 
Porta and Mosca 2006 ) and this is a crucial function for those radical-right p liti l actors, who often feel marginalised from society. As it has been illustrated by 
recent research, “social media” works “as a second home” for radicals, and a form 
of “virtual shelter” for these groups ( De Koster and Houtman 2008 ). 
All these developments may open new opportunities for the mobilisation of 
radical-right organisations (as well as challenges for European democracies), which, 
in the shadow of the great recession, can capitalise on the discontent of the losers 
of globalisation ( Kriesi et al. 2008 ) via the web ( Caiani 2019 ). In this study, among 
the various functions the Internet can play for radical-right actors (i.e. mobilisation, 
identity formation, propaganda, communication, and recruitment, etc; see Caiani 
and Parenti 2013 for an overview), we will investigate the actual degree and forms 
of radical-right online activism in our selected countries. 
Radical-right organisations are, in general, identified according to a common 
definition that includes, as core ideological elements: nationalism – i.e., the strong 
preference for a homogeneous nation ( Minkenberg 2015 ), law and order, racis , conservative values, and anti-system or anti-establishment critiques ( Mudde 
2007 ). In this study, we have adopted this definition too, however, it should be 
considered that these political actors in the CEE have some specificities: a main 
focus on ‘internal enemies’, such as Roma groups or Jews instead of ‘immigrants’ 
as in Western Europe (Pirro 2015b); the communist legacy ( Pytlas 2013 ), which 
made the radical right a more acceptable political actor in the public sphere; as well 
as a peculiar form of national identity 2 ( Minkenberg 2017 ), made of strong nationalism (since most of CEE countries gained their independence relatively recently) 
and xenophobic sentiments more against aforementioned internal enemies rather 
than external immigrants. In this study the identification and classification of v riou  radical-right organisations has been based on the self-definition of the groups 
and the content of the message transmitted through their websites. 
Methods and data 
In order to identify all radical right organisations with an online presence in our 
four countries we used a snowball technique, starting from the most important and 
well-known groups in each country and following explicit web links (e.g. ‘our 
partners’, ‘our friends’) to other radical right groups. 3 This allowed us to identify 
a total of 188 organisations, around 40–50 in each country. We then conducted 
a web content analysis on these radical-right organisational websites, using a for-malised 
codebook consisting of more than 70 variables (open and closed questions) 
trying to capture several different functions of the political use of the web by 
these groups such as: propaganda, mobilisation, internationalisation, communication, and the creation of a collective identity/ideology. For each of these broader 
aspects we elaborated lower level indicators. 4 
Our research design includes two comparative dimensions: cross-national and 
cross-right-wing organisational type. As for the case selection, our four Central 
Eastern European countries have been chosen because, despite some common historical legacies (e.g. the communist past before 1989, the democratic transition in 
the early 1990s, and the accession to the European Union in 2004), they provide 
sufficient variation on the factor we consider relevant for understanding radical-right 
mobilisation (also online). They are: in terms of political opportunities for 
radical-right mobilisation, a different role of the so called ‘allies in power’ (i.e. iff r t strength and duration of the radical-right electoral success) ( Krekó, Juhász and
Molnár 2011 ; for details on different countries, see Caiani and Císař 2018 ); different 
organisational milieu and associational life of the radical right, which offers a differ nt ‘market of consumers’ for their online activism ( Caiani and Parenti 2013 ); laws 
against the Nazi-fascist past; as well as variation in radical-right ideology along the 
history and activity of the radical-right actors ( Minkenberg 2017 ) – which can influe ce the forms and content of their use of the web to do politics. 
Moreover, this study focusses on both political parties and non-party organisations, 
including violent groups. They are: 
(1) radical-right political parties 5 such as the Slovak Nationalist Party (Slovenská 
Národná Strana) in Slovakia, the Jobbik in Hungary; the Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie) in the Czech Republic, the 
National Movement (Ruch Narodowy) in Poland; 
(2) radical-right movements 6 such as, for instance, the Sixty-four Counties Youth 
Movement (Hatvannégy vármegye ifjúsági mozgalom) in Hungary, the 
Endecja Club movement of young intellectuals in Poland; 
(3) neo-Nazi groups 7 such as paramilitary groups – e.g. Troop of Social Bandits 
(Betyársereg) in Hungary, or the Aryan Rebel white supremacy group in the 
Czech Republic); 
(4) revisionist/negationist and nostalgic 8 groups such as, for instance, the Trianon 
Association in Hungary or the National Institute for Education (Národně 
Vzdělávací Institute) in the Czech Republic; 
(5) cultural and commercial organisations 9 such as for instance the Brotherhood 
e-shop in Slovakia or the Hungarian warrior clothes shop (Magyar Harcos); 
(6) subcultural youth organisations, skinheads, music and sports groups 10 – e.g. the 
Sztorm 68 Polish skinhead band, Czech Hooligans group, Hungarian football 
Ultras; 
(7) right-wing nationalists, present especially in Poland, 11 such as the National 
Rzeszow- National Leczna. 
As we will show below, in the CEE countries under examination the radical-right 
area is not a monolithic actor ( Minkenberg 2017 ), and this is also the case online: 
they use a broad repertoire of (visual and textual) online propaganda with different 
intensity and for different purposes. 
Visual and textual propaganda via the web 
As we can see from Figure 13.1 , our analysis focusses on several broad aspects 
that we consider relevant to Internet used by right-wing groups, such as communication, ideology, internationalisation, mobilisation, with a particular view to 
propaganda. With regard to propaganda, the lower level indicators were variables 
capturing the presence of content concerning radical-right online propaganda 
towards both insiders and outsiders, such as: slogans, hate symbols, logos, narratives 
about operations of the groups, the names of the leader, news section, internal 
search engine, documentation material, and hit counter. 
The dissemination of propaganda accounts for, in general, the most extensive 
use of the web by these organisations, across countries and types of groups (data 
not showed). In particular, our data suggests that the Polish radical-right groups are 
very active on their websites and also in their communication (e.g. they are r achabl  to the public, indicating on their websites their offices, information about the 
meeting point of the group, phone and mail, etc); Czech radical-right organisations 
have relatively extended international contacts with actors who operate in 
foreign countries, with a clear goal to use the web to build transnational contacts 
with similar organisations; Slovak groups show an average activity in all dimensions; and, finally, the Hungaria  radical right seems to be in general less active 
FIGURE 13.1 The political functions of radical-right websites in Central Eastern Europe 
N= 188; mean values are showed. 
online, something suggesting that the inverse relation hypothesis is at least partly 
confirmed ( Hutter 2014 ). According to the inverse relation hypothesis between 
institutional and protest radical-right politics, it is not surprising to find a moderate 
level of online activism in the country (Hungary) where the radical right possess a 
super majority in government and in parliament since several mandates. In regards 
to propaganda, as we can see from Table 13.1 , we have distinguished two forms of 
online propaganda: (1) textual and (2) visual. Textual forms of propaganda includes 
textual elements like: slogans, bibliography, conference materials, or articles. While 
pictures, hate symbols, maps, banners or video footage are coded as elements of 
the visual radical-right propaganda. Indeed, if one important function of these 
materials is rank and file mobilisation, recent studies have particularly emphasised 
the important role played by political pictures in online mobilisation ( Kharroub 
and Bas 2016 ; Powell et al. 2015 ). According to a recent study by Casas and Webb 
Williams (2017) , visual materials (e.g. pictures, symbols, banners) are particularly 
TABLE 13.1 Textual and visual online radical-right propaganda, by country TABLE 13.1 Textual and visual online , 
Countries Propaganda (%) Textual propaganda (%) Visual propaganda (%) 
HU 76.4 61.8 67.3 
PL 92.9 81.0 73.8 
CZ 98.0 94.1 92.2 
SK 100.0 95.0 87.5 
Total 91.0 81.9 79.8 
N— 188; mean values are showed. Abbreviations: HU (Hungary); PL (Poland); SK (Slovakia); CZ 
(Czech Republic) 
effective for political mobilisation, since they ‘work’ through mechanisms that trigger emotions (e.g. enthusiasm, fear) addressing the passionate side of politics, and 
spark self-efficacy ( Casas and Webb Williams 2017 ). 
Our data shows that in the CEE countries, online propaganda (both visual and 
textual, 82% and 80% respectively) is widely used on the homepages of radical-right 
organisations and that, beyond the instrumental uses of the Internet (e.g. 
for mobilisation, recruitment, or fundraising), the majority of CEE right-wing 
groups are strongly oriented to propaganda (and therefore the use of the Internet 
for collective identity formation) towards members or sympathisers, 12 offering a 
rich repository of documents, photos, and propaganda material explicitly recalling 
nationalist, xenophobic, fascist, and Nazi iconography and rhetoric. 
However, there are significant differences across the four countries. Slovak and 
Czech right-wing websites are the most active both in textual and visual forms of 
online propaganda (100% and 98% respectively). On the other hand, we found 
less propaganda material on the Hungarian and Polish homepages (76% and 93% 
respectively). 
Examining national differences in further details, about visual propaganda we 
can see that one-fifth of the websites (20.7%) in the countries analysed contain 
‘hate symbols’ such as swastikas, tristikas, and historical fascist symbols such as 
the arrow cross (used by the Hungarian Nationalist Movement) or the short gladio 
sword; 13 photos of nationalist leaders such as Hitler, Ferenc Szálasi or Andrej 
Hlinka; images related to the Third Reich; and flags from the local fascist pasts 
(with local symbols such as the phalanx, arrow crosses etc.). Militarist symbols 
(guns, marching soldiers, historical armed forces’ emblems, etc.) also frequently 
appear, as do Celtic crosses. 14 
Data shows that hate symbols are most likely to be present on the websites 
of Polish and Hungarian radical-right organisations (42.9% and 25.5%), whereas 
Slovak and Czech right-wing websites are the least likely to have them (7.5% 
and 7.8%). These results can be linked to the context of stricter laws against 
the Nazi-fascist past in certain countries. 15 Half of websites contain banners 16 
depicting representative figures, and graphic symbols or seals intended to incite 
hatred against social and/or political adversaries, such as ‘left-leaning clubs’ that 
are targeted by the Polish group Aktyw Północy. Otherwise, banners are most 
frequent on the Slovak and Czech websites (72.4%, 80.5%) and least on Hu gari  websites (7.3%). 
As mentioned earlier with regard to propaganda aimed towards outsiders, the 
main objective is recruitment, and the web is becoming a crucial device for that 
( Street 2011 : 263). Neo-Nazis use the Internet and music primarily to reach out 
to youth members as, for many young people online, communication has become 
the most important tool for exchanging news and views on the world, and it is 
their main source of information. According to our analysis, whose main results are 
synthesised in Table 13.2 , ‘multimedia materials’ are present in half of right-wing 
sites (50%). 
Turning to the textual materials, we find textual propaganda slightly more frequ ntly on radical-right webpages than pictures and other visual information. The 
most frequent element of textual propaganda is the ‘articles’ (66%), a section in 
which the group provide papers, articles, or dossiers. Czech and Slovak websites 
contain more (86.3% and 77.5% respectively), while Hungarian and Polish sites 
cite less of these materials (40.0%, 64.3%). 
One-third of the radical-right websites analysed contain slogans, 17% bibliographical sources, and finally only a minority of radical-right organisations (7.4%) 
have a section in which they cite conference materials. 
Beyond country contexts, however, we noticed also differences in the p liti al use of the web by radical-right organisations according to the ‘type’ of group 
at stake. In particular, movements, neo-Nazi and nationalistic organisations use 
frequent multimedia material (in 23.4%, 19.1%, and 19.1% of cases respectively). 
Political movements and nostalgic organisations most commonly offer ‘bibliographical 
references’ (present in 21.2% in both instances). On the contrary, commercial 
groups and political parties seem the least oriented towards using ‘bibliography’ (in 
6.1% and 3%). 
On the other hand, cultural and commercial organisations are the least, but 
political movements are the most likely to have ‘articles and/or papers and/or d s i r ’ on their pages. 
Some right-wing organisations (often political parties) also provide more 
advanced multimedia materials. Also very common are videos of de onstrations and captions of direct action  (clashes with the police, confrontations of 
the police/‘ordinary citizens’ with refugees, immigrants, Roma people and other 
groups that are targets of hate). 17 The latter seem to play an important role, not 
only in transmitting a message concerning the group’s ideology, but also in emphasising 
the existence of a numerically significant organisation behind the website. 
Video and music downloads characterised by political content are especially 
common in political movements, as well as in Nazi and nationalistic organisations – 
not to mention, obviously, music groups. Moreover, among this content we find 
audio files of sermons and archival speeches (e.g. by leaders of fascist/Nazi regimes) 18 
or podcasts accompanying radical right-wing journals. 
When it comes to subcultural youth radical-right websites, traditional ‘hate 
symbols’, related to the national-socialist past, are less present; instead, symbols 
borrowed from the left are used (on this point, see also Di Tullio 2006 ; not only 
the symbols of the Schwarze Front of the Strasser brothers are in use, but also some 
symbols copied such as Good Night Left Side, etc.). The fact that, in this context, 
the structure of the Internet – and above all its small levels of surveillance – renders 
it legally less dangerous to diffuse extremist or even forbidden views through the 
web is also noteworthy. This is particularly visible in the case of websites of groups 
connected to the Blood and Honour network and subcultural skinhead groups 
that are registered as political parties or associations, where the visual evidence 
collected from the websites could become evidence to be used in court in a delegalisation 
case. In addition, in the case of social media (in particular Facebook), 
the occurrence of hate symbols is less visible and explicit, due probably to the synchronic nature of the networks and a number of anti-fascist activists who monitor 
radical-right fan pages or profiles and report them to the site admins who often 
block the profiles in question and delete content. 19 
Unsurprisingly, hate symbols are particularly present on neo-Nazi and subcultural right-wing groups’ websites (in 35.9% and 25.6% of cases espectively). These 
latter groups are also the most likely to have banners and seals with hate symbols 
(68.4%). This is the case, for example, with a nationalist Czech site 20 where, on 
entering one of the site’s subpages, the viewer is presented with a picture i cludi g a slogan against the Islamisation of Europe and, in the background, there is a 
crescent symbol and a minaret and a woman in a niqab in front. On the website 
of Hungarian Arrabona Crew, there is a picture representing Israel as an oppressor 
in Palestine, calling for “Protest against Zionist world domination”. Similarly, on 
the site of the Polish nationalistic organisation Zadruga we find a banner showing 
two men and a woman as ‘the Germanic ideal’ calling for ‘fight, resistance and 
action’ and a call directed at women to defend their blood and motherland, with 
a drawing of a naked woman wearing the group’s armband, an ammunition belt, 
and military boots. 
Finally, regarding the regional West vs. East comparison we can see ( Table 13.2 ) 
that both visual and textual propaganda elements are, in general, as highly diffused 
among radical-right groups in the CEE region as among the Western European 
countries. However, hate symbols, bibliography, and news sections are more pr val t in the Western European radical-right websites. On the other hand, radical-right 
organisations in the CEE countries place banners more frequently on their 
webpages. According to these results, we can conclude that the radical-right groups 
both in Western and in Central and Eastern Europe use the same forms of online 
propaganda, since we did not find regional patterns in their online communication. 
Notwithstanding there are differences between the regions regarding the intensity/ 
frequency of some propaganda elements, suggesting that CEE countries are in the 
middle of the catching up process with the Western European radical right. 
TABLE 13.2 Radical-right propaganda through the web in Western vs. Eastern Europe TABLE 13.2 adical -ri the web in estern vs. Eastern 
Central Eastern Europe Western Europe* 
Hate symbols 20.7% 40.0% 
Multimedia 50.0% 50.2% 
Banner 50.0%: 30% 
Article 66.0% 62.4% 
Bibliography 17.6% 37.3% 
Slogan 34.6% 28% 
Conference material 7.4% 11.8% 
News Section 29.3% 49.8% 
*Data based on Caiani and Parenti (2013: 84—91). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, building on similar studies focussed on radical-right groups in 
Western Europe ( Caiani and Parenti 2013 ), we have investigated the degree and 
forms of right-wing online propaganda in Central and Eastern Europe, a topic far 
from being developed in (social movement, media and communication) research. 
By focussing on different kinds of radical-right organisations and conducting a 
formalised content analysis of the websites of almost 200 organisations based in four 
countries, our study showed radical-right CEE groups deploy a rich repertoire of 
action and variegated forms of political activism. The organisations under scrutiny 
emerged as fully aware of the new potentialities offered by the web; moreover, 
they appear able to effectively use these tools for their propaganda and mobilisation. Radical-right groups in the CEE region are practising nline propaganda as 
actively as the Western European radical-right organisations. 
First, radical-right organisations in our selected CEE countries use the Intern t to reach their followers, to propagate their ideology and mission, and o build 
and re-affirm radical-right identity. Secondly, our study has also highlighted that 
Czech and Slovak radical-right organisations use visual and textual propaganda 
more actively than Hungarian and Polish ones. However, we found country differences n the usage of some particular elements of propaganda. Banners, hate 
symbols, and articles seem to be less frequent in Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
than in Hungary and Poland. Beyond country differences, our study also emphasised 
patterns of Internet political use related to the type of group at stake: focu sing on the group differences we found that less ‘institutio alised’ groups (such 
as political movements and neo-Nazi organisations) use more visual propaganda 
elements with respect to more institutionalised groups, such as parties. Nevertheless, political parties are also ac ively using textual and visual propaganda on 
their webpages. 
From a normative perspective, we must notice that through the Internet, p opl  can access limitless news and information options. Where radical-right propaganda (e.g. anti-minority, pro-nationalism, advocating law and order, ‘culture of 
obedience’, etc.) and fake news emerge as a significant political force, the relationship between democracy and the Internet may become critical. Various ‘watch-dog' 
think tanks in Central and Eastern Europe ( Globsec Report 2019 ) analysed 
fake news propaganda before the 2019 elections for the European Parliament in 
various CEE countries and found that the online media which spreads fake news 
content often used radical-right rhetoric, e.g. ‘migration as a threat for the Christi n Europe’, Euroscepticism, ‘nationalism as the only solution’. Moreover, these 
sources also often supported by radical-right parties, like Kotleba-L’SNS in Slov ki , SPD in the Czech Republic, or the ruling party Fidesz in Hungary. As also our 
study has shown, hate speech and radical-right (fake) news can be helped in their 
diffusion within society by the increasing Internet use of radical-right organisations 
( Klein 2019 ). This, although still rarely investigated – especially in the East – can 
work as an additional factor explaining the electoral success of the institutional 
radical right (Greskovits 2020). 
Notes 
1 In the media and social sciences, actors on the political right of the spectrum are referred 
to by multiple interrelated concepts, with the term ‘extreme right’ often used interchangeably with labels like ‘fascist’, ‘Nazi’, ‘rightist’, ‘right-wing’, ‘(ultra)conservative’, 
‘(ultra)nationalist’, ‘populist right’, and ‘radical right’, as well as ‘extreme right’ ( Carter 
2017). 
2 In addition, national identity is shaped by the political and economic transformation 
process in the late 80s, and early 90s, which in the CEE countries has been regarded as 
‘modernisation’. This is significantly different than Western European societies’ change 
from industrialism to post-industrialism ( Minkenberg 2017 , ch 2.). 
3 The web content analysis was conducted between January and March 2017 by coders 
(proficient in the language of the specific country) trained in the sampling selection and 
coding procedure. 
4 For a similar method and tool of analysis, see Caiani and Parenti 2013 , but also more 
generally: Gerstenfeld, Grant, and Chiang 2003 ; Zhou et al. 2005 ; Qin et al. 2007 . 
5 In this class we inserted those groups defining themselves as political parties. In the case 
of these radical right parties, scale of importance and popularity is very wide. There are 
small and marginal parties containing just a few members and activists, other parties are 
active at the local level only. However, there are nationwide vivid parties that openly 
partake in elections, and sometimes enter the national assembly (especially in Slovakia 
and Hungary) (see Minkenberg 2017 : 69–72 for a detailed list on radical right-wing 
parties in the CEE region). 
6 Political movements are less institutionalised actors that do not run for public offices, but 
rather “try to mobilize public support” ( Minkenberg 2017 : 25). This category includes 
“party parallel organizations” ( Veugelers and Menard 2018) , referring to associations 
relating to political parties (for example, 64 county youth movement Hatvannégy 
vármegye ifjúsági mozgalom in Hungary, and Endecja Club, a movement of young intellect als in Poland). In the category ‘political movements’, we have included also political 
journals and magazines that are often close to political parties (for example, Dělnické listy 
in the Czech Republic, and the monthly magazine Právo národa in Slovakia). 
7 Neo-Nazi organisations refer to the German Nazis or their ideological cousins in the four 
examined countries (as the Hungarist movement in Hungary) ( Mareš and Stojar 2012). 
Their sites often contain Nazi and neo-Nazi symbols (for example, the arrow cross) and 
references to events and nationalist leaders of the interwar period (Blood and Honour, 
Jozef Tiso, Ferenc Szálasi). Neo-Nazi groups also talk about purity of the Aryan race, 
white power, and racial hatred (for example, prisoners of war in the Czech Republic). 
8 The nostalgic, revisionist, and negationist sites provide document collections on i t ry (mostly on World War II). Revisionists often deny Nazi crimes, and bring vague, 
distorted interpretations of history. The main themes are the rewriting of history and 
documentation of the communists’ crimes. According to Tucker “revisionist attempts to 
confuse knowledge with fiction, and founded on bad philosophy, invalid arguments and 
misunderstandings of contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science” ( Tucker, 
2008 : 3, cited by Pető 2017). In the Hungarian context, there are a bunch of organisations 
referring to the Horthy Era, which spanned between the two World Wars. The main 
characteristics of these groups are the condemnation of the Trianon Treaty, and nostalgic 
feeling for Greater Hungary. 
9 As Veugelers and Menard (2018) highlight, publishers play an important role in the 
radical-right’s non-party sector. There are publishers and online shops who sell cla sical Nazi-fascist texts, memoirs, and also gadgets. The radical right h s its own lifestyle 
which is characterised by specific clothing, clothing brands ( Miller-Idriss 2017) , and 
music styles. ( Pollard 2016) That category is characterised by the commercial nature 
of the sites. 
10 Subcultural organisations contains ‘small groups’ such as football fan clubs, skinhead 
music bands, ( Veugelers and Menard 2018) or graffiti and hooligan groups. Some ER 
groups in Western Europe use the symbols of Celtic mythology or look at a sort of new 
spiritualism challenging the official Christian religion. Pollard (2016) calls it Odinims, 
referring to the ancient German god. In the Central-East European region, there has 
also been a “tendency to appropriate elements of pre-Christian religious mythologies, 
including ancient Slavonic religions” ( Pollard 2016 : 410) In Hungary, pagan mythology 
and symbols are current in all social strata. This subcultural milieu is dominated by c ltu al elements of the early Hungarian history, like archery, horse riding, runic alphabet, 
traditional clothes. 
11 Right-wing nationalist groups are close to the category of what Veugelers and Menard 
(2018) call political sects. “For sects, be they religious or political, the number of members matters less than their worthiness.” (p.420) These groups highlight that morality is 
the most important (for example, the Czech Pro-Vlast). This category includes military 
groupuscules as well as the Polish Defence League. 
12 In our analysis, we have distinguished between propaganda directed towards insiders, 
namely members and/or sympathisers, and propaganda directed toward a larger public 
(outsiders). 
13 See, for example, the website for Droga Legionisty, http://drogalegionisty.pl/ . 
14 We relied here on the FIFA and UEFA catalogue of hate symbols, usually banned from 
stadiums and football games. 
15 After rising popularity of radical right in Slovakia, restrictive legal measures have been 
introduced. (see Strážnická 2017). 
16 Banners are images (GIF, flash) usually in a high-aspect ratio shape, often employing 
animation, sound, or video. 
17 For example, see the website of the Slovak neo-Nazi group: https://vzdoruj.wordpress.com/ .
18 For example, on https://aryanrebel.wordpress.com/ . 
19 Such anti-fascist and watch dog organisations are: in Czech Republic, e.g. Liga lidských 
práv or Nadace Tolerance. In Hungary, e.g. Tett és Védelem Alapítvány or TASZ. In Sl vakia, e.g. European Roma Grassroots Org nisations Network or Amnesty International, 
Human Rights Watch. In Poland e.g. HejtStop organisation focussing on hate speech, 
and the group Otwarta Rzeczpospolita working against discrimination. 
20 www.nationalisti.wordpress.com . 
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14 
When a Credible Source 
Turns ‘Fake’ 
The Relotius affair and the German 
system for combating fake news 
Mihail Stojanoski 
Introduction 
The term ‘fake news’ has been omnipresent in society, particularly in political 
discourse for several years. In spite of its popularity among political figureheads, 
journalists, and researchers (or, maybe exactly because of that), a unified definition 
of the term proves somewhat elusive. It is, of course, quite natural that a term as 
recent 1 and controversial as ‘fake news’ should be used in a variety of (sometimes 
conflicting) ways, which is partly why academia cannot agree on a single definiti . The Cambridge Dictionary defines ‘fake news’ as false stories that appear to 
be news, spread on the Internet or using other media, usually created to influence 
political views or as a joke. 2 Another definition which takes different factors into 
account defines fake news as the deliberate presentation of (typically) false or misl ding claims as news, where the claims are misleading by design ( Gelfert 2018 ). 
There appear to be many definitions around, all of which take various aspects of 
the phenomenon into account, whether it is the presence of intent, the results, the 
environment where it emerges, or something else. 
In any event, there appears to be common ground between the sources that 
measures need to be taken to impede, block, punish, or (better) prevent the spread 
of fake news. Although the risks and dangers which follow fake news are not a 
topic of central interest of this chapter, we would stress that one of the primary 
concerns of legislators seems to be elections, or rather information available to 
voters during election periods. This narrative follows the premise that decisions in 
times of elections are made on a personal level, on the basis of available information. Therefore, if the flow of information cannot be trusted, the whole democratic process, including the result, would be compromised. 3 
In this article, we will examine the recent German anti-fake-news law 
(‘Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in sozialen Netzwerken, 
Netzdurchsetzunggesetz’, or just ‘NetzDG’) in a very practical context. The whole 
When a credible source turns ‘fake’ 
idea surrounding the law, which takes a novel and unique approach, was built 
on the premise that the greatest risk for the flow of information comes from the 
spread of fake news on social media. These platforms have largely replaced tr diti nal media to a large extent as the primary source of news. 4 Meanwhile, op r ti g under the assumption that they can generally be trusted, nobody thought to 
look at traditional media. And why would we? The occasional left or right leaning 
journalist is nothing that old democracies are not used to. The fearful finger was 
pointed at social media, and oh my, were we surprised. 
However, in the defence of the lawmakers, given that the Relotius affair (the 
details of which will be presented below) may not even be considered as fake news 
at its most fundamental understanding, the affair presented somewhat of a sui generis 
challenge for the system, one which was difficult to anticipate. In these circu stances, the chapter touches on issues such as the limits of truth and fact checking, 
responsibility of the State vis-à-vis the individual in the field of free speech and 
the (practical and legal) limitations, which exist as to what can be achieved by 
legislating. 
The chapter follows a two-pronged analysis, with an attempt at a synthesis of 
those two topics in a third, final section. At the outset, factual background is provided in order to explain the Relotius affair, its significance, and its consequences. 
Then, we will briefly analyse the new legal system aimed at combating hate speech 
and fake news in place in Germany as a starting point for any contextual analysis 
of the Relotius affair. Finally, the chapter attempts to reconcile the two ideas and 
develop some observations in that regard. 
The Relotius affair 
Claas Relotius is a German freelance reporter wrote for a number of German- 
language publications, including Cicero, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, Financial Times Deutschland, Die Tageszeitung, and Die Welt. Since 
2017 he had been working as an editor for Der Spiegel (Der Spiegel 2018c ). Durin  his career he managed to collect an impressive number of awards, including 
CNN’s journalist of the year (2014), the European Press Prize (2017), and the 
Deutscher Reporterpreis (four times, including 2018). 
There is little need to introduce Der Spiegel. It is a Hamburg-based weekly news 
magazine with a circulation of around 740,000 copies, which in the past exceeded 
one million ( European Publishing Monitor 2007 ). In addition, it has an estimated 
base of 6.5 million online readers ( Connolly 2018 ). It is widely considered as 
one of the most influential news magazines in Germany and Europe, responsible 
for uncovering several scandals and affairs thanks to its pronounced and thorough 
investigative journalism (Strawn and Hogan 1984/1985). What became known as 
the Relotius affair can be described in the following way. 
Since 2011, when his cooperation with the reputed magazine began, almost 
60 articles written by Relotius were published by Der Spiegel magazine or Spiegel 
Online, its Internet counterpart. The articles reached a high audience, were widely 
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regarded as top-notch journalism and can be directly linked to some of the awards 
listed above. Being an already successful journalist of a relatively young age, he was 
a rising star. 
The first suspicions regarding the veracity of his articles emerged in November 
2018 following the publication of the article entitled ‘Jaeger’s border’ (‘Jaegers 
grenze’) 5 about an American vigilante group that patrolled the border between 
Mexico and the United States. Juan Moreno, who reported the story together with 
Relotius, was one of the first to grow distrustful of his colleague. He had raised 
suspicions about the work carried out by Relotius before the magazine’s editors by 
late 2018, but his concerns were largely ignored. 
Some at Der Spiegel even believed that Moreno was the real phony and that 
Relotius was the victim of slander. Relotius skilfully parried all allegations 
and all of Moreno’s well-researched evidence, constantly coming up with 
new ways of sowing doubt, plausibly refuting accusations and twisting the 
truth in his favour ( Fichtner 2018 ). 
“At the start it was the small mistakes, things that seemed too hard to believe that 
made me suspicious.” Moreno went on to describe how it had been strange that 
some of the protagonists in Relotius’s articles had not wanted to be photographed, 
in spite of being already prominent in the US media. “At some point I just thought 
something is monumentally wrong here . . . I started to do my own research only 
to discover that that [the same] protagonist [who had allegedly refused to be photographed] had already appeared in The New York Times,” said Moreno. 6 
Relotius was eventually confronted by the magazine’s management. By the 
beginning of December, facing a growing pile of evidence and distrust, he made 
a full confession. News of the affair was broken to the public on December 19th 
by Der Spiegel itself. According to the confession, at least 14 articles written by him 
were at least partly fabricated. 7 
Among the articles in question are major features that were nominated for or 
won journalism awards. For example, an article entitled ‘The last witness’, about an 
American who allegedly travels to witness an execution, is among the 14 articles. 
Another two, entitled ‘The lion children’, about two Iraqi children who have been 
kidnapped and re-educated by the Islamic State, and ‘Number 440’, a story about 
prisoners at Guantanamo, also fall within those which, according to the confession, 
contain falsities. In the stories, he included individuals who he had never met or 
spoken to, but he told their stories and quoted them. Instead of actually m ti g them, he revealed that he had based the depictions on other media or video 
recordings. 8 By doing so, sometimes he created composite characters based on 
several actual people, but whose stories he fabricated. He also made up entire lines 
of dialogue and quotes. 9 
As to Relotius’s reasons for fabricating the articles, before handing in his resignation, he said: “It wasn’t about the next big thing. It was the fear of failure. The 
pressure not to fail grew as I became more successful” ( Fichtner 2018 ). 
Following the revelation, Der Spiegel publicly apologised to its readers and 
undertook to conduct a thorough investigation. They called it “the lowest point 
in the 70-year history of Der Spiegel” (ibid.). They created a three-member expert 
commission that was tasked to evaluate the damage and to find ways to prevent 
similar incidents from happening in the future. 10 
The outcry in the wake of these events was enormous. The German Federation 
of Journalists called the case “the biggest fraud scandal in journalism since the Hitl r diaries,” referring to a story that Germany’s Stern magazine published in 1983, 
which was later proven to be fake. 11 
For the moment, all the articles written by Relotius remain publicly available 
on the website of the magazine, with a notification about the scandal added for 
clarity. As argued, they did it to provide the possibility for transparent research on 
the issue (Der Spiegel 2018c ). 
As a final touch, Der Spiegel announced that they would file criminal charges 
against Relotius for fraud with regard to donations collected in the name of Syrian 
orphans, featured in one of his articles ( Klusmann 2019 ). As alleged, he collected 
donations from concerned readers claiming that the money would be used with 
the aim of helping these children, but the money eventually ended up in his own 
bank account. 
Relotius remained silent following the outbreak of the affair, avoiding public 
appearances. However, on 27 December 2018 in response to the claims made 
regarding the alleged fraud, he admitted through his attorneys that the donations 
were made to his bank account, but he claimed that he had never intended to 
keep the money. He had collected 7000 euros from readers, to which he added 
2000 euros of his own and made a donation to a relief agency. The agency in 
question, when contacted by Der Spiegel, confirmed that a donation of the above 
amount had been made by Relotius in October 2016 (ibid.). The proceedings 
are ongoing. 
At the moment of writing and according to the available information, apart 
from breaking his relationship with Der Spiegel, there is no indication of any s nctio s or proceedings against Relotius specifically regarding the falsities contained 
in his articles. 
The regulation of disinformation in Germany 
A recently conducted census representative survey by Dalia Research found that 
34% of Germans using social media have read articles or news that were intentionally misleading or not truthful (fake news), 16% have received offensive messages 
or comments from someone they do not know, 14% have received sexually ff siv  messages, and 3% have received threats. 16% of Germans have also reported a 
user for abuse on social media ( Dalia Research 2018 ). Although the survey is based 
on self-reporting, the results are worrisome. 
Before the introduction of the NetzDG, disinformation was dealt with under the 
existing legislation. Although spreading disinformation was not a crime per se, hate 
speech was prohibited and regulated in Section 130 of the German Criminal Code 
(listed as ‘Incitement to hatred’), and provided for imprisonment up to five years. 
In this regard, the provisions of the EU e-commerce Directive adopted in 
2000 12 should be mentioned. The directive prescribes liability for social media 
that would host illegal content, unless they can prove that they have no actual 
knowledge of, or act promptly to remove or disable access to the content in 
question. 
Recognising a threat in the effect that fake news may have on elections, on 
30 June 2017, three months before the federal elections, the German parliament adopted a law targeting specifically hate speech and fake news, which some 
consider the most extreme reaction to disinformation among Western countries 
( Cerulus 2017 ). The danger of fake news affecting election results, following the 
2016 election campaign in the United States, was explicitly referred to in the government’s reasoning justifying the need for the new law (NetzDG draft bill 2017: 
1). As earlier efforts to curb hate speech had been considered ineffective by the 
German Minister Heiko Maas (ibid.), the primary objective of the new law was to 
improve the otherwise insufficient regulation of the spread of hate speech online. 
Then Justice Minister (and current Foreign Minister) Heiko Maas presented it as a 
means to tackle online hate speech and viral deception: “The freedom of expression also protects offensive and hateful statements. But it is not an excuse to c m it crimes” (Der Spiegel 2018a ). 
Under the so-called Network Enforcement Act (NetzDG), which came into 
effect on 1 January 2018, Germany introduced new obligations for social networks 
aimed at combating hate speech and fake news. 
Among these, social networks with at least two million registered users in G rma y are obliged to create and maintain a procedure for complaints with regard to 
“unlawful content” 13 which is defined as content meeting the elements of certain 
provisions of the German Criminal Code. Among other provisions the NetzDG 
here makes reference to sections § 166 (Defamation of religions, religious and 
ideological associations), § 185 (Insult), § 186 (Defamation), and § 187 (Intentional 
defamation). The Act further makes a distinction between “unlawful” and “mani- 
festly unlawful” content, 14 which remains somewhat unclear. In any event, social 
networks are required to remove or block access to the impugned content within 
either seven days or 24 hours of the user’s complaint. 
Social media are required to decide on the compliance of content with the 
above Criminal Code sections themselves, or externalise the decision to an independent third party, essentially granting them a quasi-judicial role. It should be 
noted that fines for social media are only envisaged for systemic non-compliance 
with the requirements, and not on a case-by-case basis. 
Critics of the new law attacked it for surrendering the control over important 
social issues to private companies. The key concern revolved around the argum nt that in order to avoid being fined, social media would apply a ‘take down 
first, examine later’ policy, which would in turn have a chilling effect on free 
speech. 
TABLE 14.1 Number of reports of fake news and removal rate TABLE 14.1 u ber f r of fake ne s and re oval rate 
Social network Total no. of reports Removal rate 
f'acebook 1704 362 (21.2%) 
Google (YouTube) 241,827 58,297 (27.1%) 
Twitter 264,818 28,645 (10,8%) 
Change.org 1257 332 (26.4%) 
The most relevant feature of the NetzDG for this chapter is that journalistic and 
editorial content were explicitly removed from its scope. 15 This means that online 
news portals, online magazines, journalistic platforms, and the like are not to be 
treated identically with social media. These fall outside the scope of the NetzDG 
and remain regulated under the existing legislative framework. 
The effects of the NetzDG were immediate. On 1 January 2018, the day that 
the NetzDG came into effect, Twitter and Facebook removed a post from a G rman far-right politician who accused the Cologne police (who had tweeted a new 
year message in Arabic) of appeasing “barbaric, gang-raping Muslim hordes of 
men” ( Oltermann and Collins 2018 ). 
When it comes to EU monitoring of unlawful online content and its removal 
in Germany, in January 2018 the Commission reported that “companies have 
strengthened their reporting systems, making it easier to report hate speech, 
and have improved their transparency vis-à-vis [. . .] users in general”. Subsequent rounds of EU monitoring demonstrated steady improvements in content 
removal rates across the EU. In Germany, the average rate of removals for Face- 
book, Twitter, and YouTube combined went from 52% in December 2016 to 
100% in the third monitoring exercise the following year ( Echikson and Knodt 
2018 ). It should be noted, however, that this 100% figure, although somewhat 
concerning, in practice refers to a little over 200 pieces of content taken down 
pursuant to requests made by two accredited German flaggers, who are at the 
origin of this data (ibid.). 
Since the above events, blocks and removals under the NetzDG have failed to 
draw significant media attention. As far as it could be established, there have been 
no reports of controversial false positives, and no fines for the social media pr vi rs have been imposed under the law. The total reports and removals for the first 
six months from the four social networks currently affected under the NetzDG are 
shown in Table 14.1 (ibid.). 
Conclusion 
For more than a year, the selfie of a Syrian refugee with Angela Merkel has been 
coursing through the social networks, combined with the lie that the refugee in 
question was an Islamic State assassin. The person in question has sued Facebook 
and the original photo montages have been eventually deleted. In spite of this, a 
number of people will nevertheless remember an image of Angela Merkel posing 
with a terrorist ( Beuth et al. 2017 ). Similar reports can be found everywhere and 
they cause great harm, with the reputation of public persons and politicians being 
at the front line of fire. 
Initial results of the implementation of the NetzDG testify that there is very 
little evidence of mass take-downs of content (see Table 14.1 ). The German courts 
have already had time to produce case-law on the application of the NetzDG, 
which, although not entirely coherent at the moment, underlines the c mpl xity of the issue. 16 It should also be said that the removals concerning defamation 
and insult make for around 19% of the total removals done by Google for the first 
six months of the application of the NetzDG. Furthermore, 75% of these were 
removed under Google’s community guidelines, which means that they would 
have been removed in spite of NetzDG. 17 
Getting back to the Relotius affair, it would seem that, given the explicit exclu ion of journalistic content from the scope of the NetzDG, the Act would simply 
not apply in this case. The criminal charges for fraud (which are not a direct consequence of his false reporting) cannot lead to a diff rent conclusion. 
On a side note (and with some irony), it would appear that the NetzDG’s scope 
would extend to the articles in question, had any of them (or conclusions based on 
them) been shared on social media. 
Given the above, questions arise as to the effectiveness and level of protection 
against falsities under the current German legislation. If we take a look at comparable legislation in neighbouring France, 18 it should be noted that the Fr nch l gislativ  reform brought online platforms (including journal stic platforms and social 
media) under the already existing obligation of the Consumers Code to make 
any financial links, sponsorship, or contractual obligations with regard to content 
public. 19 Further to this, new interlocutory proceedings were introduced where a 
judge can order any proportionate and necessary measure against Internet service 
providers and hosts to stop the spread of fake news. 20 
Observing the above measures one cannot but note that much like its German 
counterpart, the French legislation also addresses fake news in a responsive manner. 
Neither Germany nor France have enacted legislation which aims at preventing 
the appearance of fake news or strengthening media literacy. 21 
Could the French model have suppressed the fraudulent articles published by 
Relotius? Doubtful. Analysis of further models, such as the one proposed in the 
United States, or the one in force in Russia, do not reveal an alternative approach 
that could have prevented an event such as the Relotius affair. 
It is beyond doubt that the harm caused by Relotius’s articles is serious and 
significant, to the point that it may have shaped the opinion of readers and i dividuals in ways that we cannot beg n to comprehend. How did the articles shape 
long-term societal values, political views, and by extension, election results? At 
this point we can only speculate that the damage is at least comparable to the one 
caused by articles such as the ones which fit the prima facie definition of fake news, 
presented at the beginning of this chapter. 22 
If the damage is significant and the existing legislation does not cover the ex mpl  at hand, is this something which can be solved by further regulation? Most 
likely, not. What is the solution, then? 
Der Spiegel has one of the most advanced and dedicated fact-checking systems in 
Europe ( Southern 2017 ), which can only serve to testify as to the dedication of the 
magazine to truthful reporting, but that did not help them in preventing the Relotius 
incident. This is primarily due to the nature of the articles that the reporter wrote, 
the fact that he intentionally covered his tracks, but also the nature of investigative 
journalism in general. To put it simply, what a Syrian child said to a foreign reporter 
in a dusty alley in a small town in eastern Turkey is simply beyond the scope of 
fact-checking as such. However, some facts that were clear fabrications and could be 
fact-checked (for example, some of the facts surrounding the article ‘Jaeger’s border’ 
described above), were the ones that led to Relotius’s downfall. So, the obvious, 
inherent limitations to fact-checking as a process should not discourage society’s 
pursuit for responsible journalism, and by extension, truth. Should we simply come 
to terms with the fact that embellishing, misrepresenting, and even straight out fabrications are inherent to journalism? Can Der Spiegel be blamed for their failure? Not 
unless we put our finger on where they failed. And it seems that they did an excellent 
job at dotting all of their i’s and still let a big one slip through. 
Responsible journalism cannot be regulated any more than it already is without 
infringing on the freedom of expression. This is why the ultimate responsibility 
lies with the news consumers themselves. They (or, rather, ‘we’) need to be aware 
that the system of news reporting and journalism is essentially dependent on a 
human element, and is therefore bound to inherit human imperfections as such. 
The alternative would be a completely regulated flow of information and filtered 
truth, and although that did not happen in 1984 as some had anticipated, the risks 
are very much present today. 
Notes 
1 The term is somewhat recent. The concept, some would argue, is hundreds of years old. 
To this end see: Sol (2016). 
2 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fake-news . 
3 Some examples capable of influencing the outcome of elections include the allegations 
that German soldiers had raped a young girl during a NATO operation in Lithuania, that 
NATO had put 3600 tanks into position against Russia, that 700,000 Germans had left 
their homes because of Angela Merkel’s refugee policies, or that 1000 immigrants had lit 
a church in Dortmund on fire. Needless to say, none of these are true. For these and other 
examples, see Beuth et al. (2017) . 
4 For example, around 20% of adults in the United States stated that they “get news often” 
through social media. See Perez (2018). 
5 The article was, of course, published in German. Some argue that this, along with his 
reluctance to have his work translated into other languages was deliberate, as the language 
gap between his readers and his interviewees, who were mostly foreign, made it easier for 
him to maintain the deception. See: Slyomovics (2018). 
6 Statements from a video released by Juan Moreno, cited by the Guardian in Connolly 
(2018). For more, see: Carbajosa (2019). 
7 Der Spiegel has since provided ample information on the development of the case (Der 
Spiegel 2018 c). As the affair develops, further information is made available by the magazin  itself, which is now attempting to rebuild its former reputation by taking r sponsibility and dealing with the affair head on. 
8 For example, in one of his earlier articles Relotius wrote about an American town called 
Fergus Falls. In his article he wrote that the movie American Sniper had been running in 
the local cinema for two years consecutively, at the entrance to the town there had been a 
sign saying ‘Mexicans Keep Out’, a school was protected with a metal detector and three 
armoured glass doors, and much more. All of this was eventually established to be false. 
9 Sources are various articles published by Der Spiegel following the affair, all of which are 
cited in the References. 
10 For more information on the commission and its composition, see: Der Spiegel (2018 b). 
11 The diaries were later found to be forgeries ( Sharman 2018). 
12 It is the Directive 2000/31/EC, Directive on electronic commerce, available at: https://- 
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0031 . 
13 See Section 3, paragraph 1 of the Act. An official English version of the NetzDG – 
‘Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks (Network Enforcement 
Act) – is available on the German Ministry of Justice website, at: https://www.bmjv.de/- 
SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.pdf?__blob=- 
publicationFile&v=2 
14 The wording used in German is “offensichtlich rechtswidrigen Inhalt”. The distinction 
between the two appears to be of crucial importance and, up to the point of writing, 
nothing to clarify this issue has been made available by the government. The NGO Articl  19 has been particularly critical of th s ( Arti le 19 2017 : 19). 
15 This is clear from the outstart of the approved text: see Article 1, paragraph 1 (1). 
16 A few examples are provided in Echikson and Knodt (2018) , p.11. 
17 Not all social media platforms submitted detailed reports on their activities under the 
NetzDG specifically as to the heading under which the content was removed. That is 
why the analysis is limited to Google (which includes Google+ and YouTube), which was 
a rare example of providing pondered data by sections of the Criminal Code. It should be 
noted that although the obligation to submit such reports stems from the NetzDG, the 
level of detail of the data in those reports is not specifically prescribed. Therefore, it could 
be said that Google exceeded the requirements of the law in this regard. 
18 ‘Loi relative à la lutte contre les fausses informations’, No. 799, Article 1, inserting Article L. 
163–2 in the French Electoral Code, from 2018. 
19 Code de la consommation - Article L111–7, paragraph 2, subparagraph 2 
20 The list of measures presented here is not exhaustive. 
21 This conclusion is, of course, notwithstanding any ongoing campaigns for media literacy 
which are not strictly the consequence of the laws in question. Such campaigns were 
promoted by several journalistic associations and NGOs, which is a topic better left for 
another time. 
22 See note 4 above. At this point it appears important whether the current definitions of 
‘fake news’ may or may not cover the articles written by Relotius. There are several lem nt  that need to be taken into account before a final decision is reached on this issue, 
such as the existence of intent, the effect, the medium where the news was published, to 
name just a few. Every country, in line with its margin of appreciation, will decide on a 
definition. In any event, reaching a decision on this point is not the aim of this chapter. 
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“But Verifying Facts is 
What We Do!” 




This chapter presents ethnographic material on journalists’ experiences, routines, 
and views regarding fact-checking and fake news, based on field studies conducted 
at three Swedish media organisations on a local, regional and national level. The 
studies are part of a Swedish project aimed at developing a digital tool that can 
assist journalists in their everyday news work. Through interviews and participant 
observation, the field studies considered the need for and interest in this kind of 
tool. The findings were then used as a pre-study to inform the development of the 
broader fact-checking project. 
The project was organised as a collaboration between researchers and representatives from comp ting sectors of the Swedish media industry. It thus re onates 
with the kind of open boundary work that has come to characterise the recent rise 
of a global fact-checking movement ( Graves 2018 ). Although this project did not 
seek to create a specific fact-checking institution, but instead attempted to upply journalists with better resources for verification in the digital communication 
landscape, the project can nonetheless be related to academic discussions about 
fake news, verification as key to journalistic professionalism, and, more generally, 
on journalistic authority in a so called post-truth news ecosystem ( McNair 2018 ). 
In terms of the findings of the field studies, the journalists expressed both the 
need for and interest in a digital fact-checking tool, but also a fear that institution- 
alised forms of fact-checking could infringe on professional autonomy, involvi g an increased control over employees from their employer’s perspective. This 
indicates that the context in which the field studies were pursued is contingent 
with social and cultural aspects and dimensions that goes beyond a straightforward 
technical solution to a pressing problem. 
In this chapter, I take the opportunity to present the project and set out the 
ethnographic material that formed part of the basis on which the project was 
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developed. I start out by describing the project and particularly the objectives and 
specific features of the main product: The Fact Assistant – a web app meant to help 
journalists verify the legitimacy and validity of claims, media, and sources that 
appear in their everyday newsroom work. I present the background to the project, 
how it developed during its process, and some of the problems it has encountered. 
I proceed by situating the project within academic debate regarding fake news and 
fact-checking, and then turn to the ethnographic material gathered during the field 
studies. 
The Fact Assistant project – collaborating towards 
enhanced verification routines 
The research and development project named “Faktaassistenten” (The Fact Assist t) ran between March 2018 and April 2020 at the Department of Journalism at 
Södertörn University in Stockholm. It was carried out as a collaboration between 
the university and different Swedish news organisations who are all participants in 
a media industry partnership, “Framtidens Journalistik” (Journalism of the Future). 
This partnership is led by a consortium coordinated by the public service Swe ish Television. Both private and public service media operations are included in 
the cooperation, and the Fact Assistant project was partly funded by the state-run 
innovation agency Vinnova, as part of the agency’s programme “From analogue 
to digital.” 
The main goal of the project was to improve procedures by journalists regarding 
the verification of digital content and to develop a web app that can be used by 
journalists for fact-checking in their newsroom work. Once its prototype was fully 
developed and tested, the app would be available to utilise by consortium members 
to help their journalists verify news content on the web as well as in routine verification processes needed for day-to-day journalistic tasks. 1 The app was designed in 
such a way that it could be integrated into the news-making process. In addition to 
providing journalists with methodological steps to verify online content, including 
pictures, videos, and text, the app enables journalists to store and share their fact- 
checks and allows them to evaluate the credibility of media and sources. The indi i ual fact-checks contribute to the construction of a knowledge bank, designed to
become a resource for journalists in the future. When they subsequently encounter 
a particular text, picture, or video in their work they can look up whether it has 
already been fact-checked or not. If it has not, then they would have the opportunity to add and review it. The project aimed at making online content verification 
a solid and well-established part of journalistic work by facilitating access to tools 
and data when the need for quick verification arises. 
The Fact Assistant app is based on a systematisation of verification in three 
stages, focussing on three different objects: (1) media content (pictures, videos, 
statements, etc.); (2) the media in which the statements are published (the website, 
institutional social media account, etc.); and 3) the sources behind the claim (b sically the person or entity that posted the claim). In the app, journalists go through 
“But verifying facts is what we do!” 
a step-by-step process connected to each of the three objects. The steps basically 
consist of series of questions posed in relation to the object under investigation. 
Within each step, the app has a section titled “resources” that points to various 
relevant tools that can be used for assessment and analysis (such as Google Reverse 
Images to establish whether an image has been used previously). The process can 
be made more or less extensive depending on how much time the journalist has 
and depending on the claim that is being fact-checked. The investigations can also 
be saved before completion and then picked up at a later stage. At the end of the 
process, the user has a basis for assessing the validity of the claim he or she wants to 
fact-check. The final assessment is something that every journalist can do – the app 
is just a help along the way. The result of each fact-check is stored in the system. 
The individual user can choose whether to keep the fact-check private or share 
with other app users in the same media organisation or with the public at large by 
publishing the results in an article that embeds machine-readable hyper data in the 
ClaimReview. 2 
As for the procedure of the project, a first preparatory step finished in November 
2018. This included the field studies of journalists’ interests and needs generating 
the material to which this chapter refers. In December 2018, development work 
began with meetings with editorial managers drawn from three media organisa- 
tions: SVT (Swedish public service television), SR (Swedish public service radio), 
and Dagens Nyheter (the largest national daily newspaper in Sweden, commercial 
with a liberal editorial standpoint). At these meetings, the idea of The Fact Assistant 
app was presented and discussed, and suggestions on the component parts were 
made by the participant media, regarding matters such as usability and the degree 
of sharing that would be appropriate for the accumulated results of the fact-checks. 
Step two involved developing the prototype for the web-based app. Responsible 
for this technical part was Walid Al-Saqaf, a lecturer in journalism and researcher 
at Södertörn University who specialises in the use of Internet and media technology for journalism. In April 2019, there was a first version of the prototype and 
the testing could start in workshops organised by the university for a small number 
of journalists. The prototype was placed under Södertörn University’s domain on 
a server that belongs to the University’s shared network. Initially, students in the 
journalism programmes were included in the testing. Approaches were made to 
further involve individual journalists in the development work as their comments 
were seen as instrumental to the project, and they were asked to test the prototype 
in their day-to-day news work. However, this proved impossible, as outside the 
confines of the workshops, the journalists who had been introduced to the app 
were fully occupied with their daily work and could not contribute further. There 
was, however, a positive attitude to the project and the idea of a digital assistant in 
the work environment, but despite this encouraging reception, the plan to further 
involve journalists was postponed. An improved version of The Fact Assistant app 
was launched shortly after and journalists were again invited to test it in real news 
work. However, after the initial enthusiasm from journalists, this new version did 
not spark any further interest or involvement from individual journalists. 
The third and final step took into account the results from the surveys after 
the workshops, along with input and feedback from the steering board. The main 
focus was to further develop the prototype to make a more attractive and user- 
friendly app to accomplish testing in real editorial environments. Yet another versi  of The Fact Assistant app wa  launched in April 2020 and journalists were 
invited to test it in their day-to-day news work. However, due mainly to changing 
work routines as a consequence of the Covid-19 pandemic, there was no opportunity to carry out these real newsroom tes s, and instead a number of usability tests 
via Zoom were carried out. The results confirmed earlier conclusions that j urnalists were positive about the functioning of the app and deemed it a relevant tool 
for verification work. 
To sum up, The Fact Assistant project addressed the need for improvement 
in the fact-checking procedures of practicing journalists by specifically targeting 
everyday news work and routines. Journalists were thus viewed as the professional 
group under whose authority the fact-checking institution ought to be placed 
and strengthened. The project was based on the development of a technical soluti , and its organisational form was interdisciplinary with academia and media 
businesses working collaboratively, and with academia furthermore integrating its 
own development and research activities with teaching. One surprising result arisi  from the project was the reluctance of journalists to engage fully in the app 
development process. Lack of time was pointed out by journalists in the follow-up 
surveys as the main reason, but also a degree of technique fatigue – statements were 
made that there are simply too many newsroom tools available right now. Whether 
the latest and more user-friendly version of The Fact Assistant will attract jour alists t  start using it remains to be evaluated. 
Post-truth fact-checking and the crisis of 
journalism in academic debate 
The lack of time and technique fatigue referred to by journalists participating in the 
workshops can be seen against the background of profound changes affecting the 
conditions for journalistic production, well-known and thoroughly researched by 
scholars of media and journalism across the world during the last decades (see e.g. 
Croteau and Hoynes 2019 ). A decline in journalistic authority and debate about 
journalism in crisis has followed, but there is little consensus among scholars, media 
professionals, and commentators on what this means for the future of journalism 
and for democracy more broadly (see e.g. Curran 2011 ; McChesney 2012 ; Wais- 
bord 2016). Fake news appears as a central and symptom-like but certainly not 
exhaustive concept in this context. Rather, studies on fake news and fact-checking 
are merely part of a larger research area on journalism’s credibility, position, ideals, 
and routines in a digitised and ‘post-truth’ era ( McNair 2018 ). 
The changes which have been debated include topics such as: technology 
developments, competing forms of information provision, convergence of media 
outlets, and tougher economic conditions. Moving from analogue to digital, the 
speed of news production has increased substantially. “Liquid journalism” ( Deuze 
2008 ) has replaced linear news models, and journalists need to produce more m t rial on more platforms in the multimodal environment that characterises today’s 
journalism, resulting in “softer attitudes towards verification” (Nygren and Wid- 
holm 2018: 39). Current values of immediacy, interactivity, and participation are 
altering what it means to do journalism today, with key players such as web design rs and computer programmers entering the newsroom side-by-side with jo r alists ( Usher 2014 ), contributing to a de-professionalisation of journalism (see e.g. 
Witschge and Nygren 2009 ). 
The Internet and social media have caused the evolution of an “inflationary 
public sphere” ( McNair 2018 : 42), resulting in a proliferation of journalistic forms 
and the possibility for basically anyone to produce news and share information on 
a massive scale. The gatekeeping role previously confined within the borders of 
the journalistic profession has thus decreased ( Bruns 2005 ), opening up for the possibility of fruitful cooperation and engagement with audiences, e.g. through citizen 
journalism (see Reich 2008 ), as well as antagonistic media criticism from populist 
and far-right alternative media where especially the credibility of legacy media is 
severely questioned ( Figenshou and Ihlebael 2019 ). 
Responses to the changes by the media industry have contributed to the g ral decline in trust for journalistic authority: managerialism, audience metrics, 
commercialisation through native advertising, downsizing of work force, and 
a reduction of fact-checking prior to publishing – not necessarily damaging in 
themselves, but potentially compromising established journalistic norms and id al . Thus, to a degree the decline in journalistic authority is partly self-inflicted 
( Reese 2018 ). Added to these can be repeated incidents of ethical misconduct 
(Allan 2005; Otto and Köhler 2018 ; Allern and Pollack 2019 ), exemplified by 
the phone-hacking scandal involving UK newspapers which lead to the Leveson 
inquiry in 2011–2012; a public, judicial review into the general culture and ethics of the British press ( Elstein 2013 ). 
Furthermore, the changes and responses have not only resulted in a biguity within journalistic ranks regarding their role-conception and authority ( Vos 
and Thomas 2018 ), but also in a “culture of insecurity” regarding their positions 
( Ekdale et al. 2015 : 383). Layoffs and closings are common phenomena, and convergences and technology development have resulted in different forms of employment based on principles of flexibility, multitasking, and cost efficiency, leading 
to what Deuze (2013) calls “precarious labor”. Bunce (2019) points to a flip side 
of audience metrics – while (on the positive side) aggregating news consumption 
habits, providing advertisers with more exact information, and making journalis  more responsive to its audiences, it also allows managers to more efficiently 
monitor and discipline their journalists. Reinardy (2011) documents an increase in 
burnouts and Ekdale et al. (2015) suggest that journalists who believe their jobs are 
at risk are resistant to change. 
There is thus ample ground for talking about a ‘crisis of journalism’, but the 
way scholars depict and analyse this crisis varies. On the one hand, there is a kind 
of relief that a crisis has finally arrived, so that journalism can be reinvented in a 
better form (see Curran 2011 ; Wasserman 2019 ). On the other hand, there is confidence in the ability of professional journalism to solve the crisis and endure as the 
authority for the provision of truthful, reliable, and sustainable news (e.g. Schudson 
2018 ). Zelizer (2015) cautions against the use of the notion of “crisis” in the first 
place, arguing that “it misses an opportunity to recognize how contingent and differentiated the futures of journalism might be” (ib d.: 888). Tong (2018) suggests 
that many news organisations are successfully adopting and possessing digital and 
technological skills and can defend their journalism, not least by regrouping around 
certain norms such as fact-checking. Others point out that even if mainstream 
media have problems, there is much to indicate that the crisis has also meant a 
strengthening of journalism, at least regarding its ideological frame ( Wiik 2009 ; 
Waisbord 2018 ). 
A more holistic and cultural perspective has gained ground. Scholars following 
this direction make use of theories that pitch journalism within a larger societal and 
cultural context. Carlsson (2018a; 2018b) takes a ‘metacommunication’ perspective and r flects on the future of journalism in terms of boundary-making processes
and increased self-reflexivity among journalists; Vos and Thomas (2018) talk about 
internal and external contingencies of the discursive construction of journalistic 
authority; Kreiss (2019) investigates the social identity of journalists, constructed 
both by themselves and for themselves by others in distinct socioeconomic co t xts. In her study of media and participation (e.g. through citizen journalism), 
Ahva suggests “viewing journalism as a structure of public communication that is 
enacted through the practices of various actors at sites that go beyond the newsroom” 
( Ahva 2017 : 242, my emphasis). In these approaches, journalism is conceptually 
brought out of its status as a single institution practiced by professional journalists 
and analysed in terms of the meaning-making processes of public communication 
more broadly, not least through new and hybrid forms of cooperation ( Peters and 
Broersma 2013 ; Pickard 2019 ). 
This brings me back to The Fact Assistant project. The project can be seen as 
resonating with a growing occupational reform movement on an international scale 
where journalists work together with non-journalists to stem the spread of fake 
news and disinformation ( Graves 2018 ; Allern 2019). Graves (2018) documents 
and explores this movement in detail by attending the two first global summits 
of fact-checkers, in 2014 and 2015, gathered in the International Fact-Checking 
Network (IFCN). He suggests that the births of US institutions such as FactCheck. 
org, PolitiFact, and Poynter Institute mark important events that set the movement 
in motion from 2003 and onwards (cf. Amazeen 2020; Allern 2019 ). These quickly 
developed into dedicated fact-checking organisations, conducting their own 
research, participating in audits during election campaigns and, as a token of their 
relevance on a transnational level, assisting in the establishment of fact-checking 
institutes and routines in countries around the world (including Sweden). The 
movement has gained further momentum since the beginning of the Trump-era 
during which claims that legacy media are elite, corrupt, and the main provider of 
fake news became a worldwide phenomenon. Graves points to differences in the 
objectives, procedures, and organisations of particular fact-checking initiatives, at 
the same time identifying areas of convergence among them. Differences lie, for 
example, in the presentation of findings about fake news, be it misinformation or 
disinformation. This can be done either in public or privately with involved p rties, it can employ rating systems such as PolitiFact’s Truth-O-Meter, or by using 
descriptive and more nuanced terms like ‘misleading’, or instead lengthy explanatory articles. 
There are also differences in the organisational form the fact-checkers take. 
Some are incorporated in traditional news organisations, some are based at an a mic department or formed as an NGO, whilst others are combinations of these. 
Regarding convergence, Graves finds that a broadly shared concern among fact- 
checkers is the promotion of democratic discourse and accountable government. 
Furthermore, while professional discourse generally centres on the assertion of 
difference and the drawing of boundaries between professional fields, he concludes 
that “international gatherings of fact-checkers are most notable for the boundaries not drawn – for the willi gness of professional journalists to share juri dictional 
authority with non-journalists in ways they typically do not” (Graves: 627, emp sis in original). Graves argues that the ideal of objectivity gains relevance here, and 
that strengthening the fact-checking procedures is about maintaining the relevance 
and central position of journalism in the first place. He also points out that different 
organisational structures for fact-checking makes different sense in different journalistic cultures and calls for ethnographic studies to explore how the construction 
of autonomy and authority depend on particular ties between actors. 
Fact-checking institutions in the Scandinavian countries are part of this global 
movement, such as the Swedish Viralgranskaren (The Viral Reviewer), established 
in 2014, and the Norwegian faktiskt.no, which started its fact-checking work in 
2017, both affiliated with the IFCJ. Faktiskt.no subsequently inspired the launchi g of faktiskt.se in Sweden with a similar design involv ng journalists from differe t well-established media outlets teaming up to pursue fact-checking work (The 
Facts Assistant project can be seen as stemming from the faktiskt.se collaboration). 
Although there are differences between Swedish and Norwegian fact-checking 
initiatives, they have much in common and a study of the first 99 fact-checks of 
faktiskt.no (Allern 2019) supplies relevant insights for the Swedish context and for 
the material presented in this chapter. Allern points out that the organisational form 
of the Swedish and Norwegian fact-checking initiatives – a collaboration of private 
media organisations, private and public foundations, and state-run public service 
media – resonates with Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) democratic-corporative media 
model they saw as typical for Nordic countries. He notes that the fact-checking 
activity of faktiskt.no remains situated within traditional journalism and that the 
fact-checking endeavour is regarded by the industry as an instrument to strengthen 
the position and legitimacy of the news media involved. 
Allern (2019) clearly sees the value of stimulating and developing media literacy 
among readerships and members of the political class in the face of a complex and 
sometimes bewildering informational landscape. Yet Allern is predominantly criti al in his detailed evaluation of the actual work that has been pursued by fak- 
tiskt.no. He sees little relevance in fact-checking pieces of information that can be 
regarded as fake news, judging these verifications as having little effect on political 
debate and opinion-making. He argues that there is a risk that many investigations 
come out as an accountant-like preoccupation with unimportant details, issi g the opportunity to focus on central facts with a more profound meaning for 
political choices, priorities, and values. He also notes that investigations of news 
and information with an international scope have been left out intentionally and 
suggests this is unfortunate given that the mainstream Norwegian media has a well- 
known weakness of staying loyal to national security and foreign relations interests 
(see Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2014 ). Allern also questions the organisational format. 
“It is puzzling”, he writes, “that fact-checking as an own genre in a Norwegian 
context is represented by one organization, and thus depends on the priorities that 
are made in a limited editorial environment. For political democracy, there is no 
advantage that media who freely and actively should be able to critically evaluate 
each other’s journalism, outwardly appear as one block in relation to both p liticians and the media organizations that are outs de the fact-checking community” 
(ibid.: 185, my translation from Norwegian). 
This last point of Allern, corresponding with Graves’ note on ties between 
actors, is particularly valid for the Swedish context where the launching of faktiskt. 
se in 2018 stirred up considerable public debate. Editorial writers from a broad 
range of political standpoints (e.g. Linderborg 2018 ; Boström 2018 ), and from 
outside of the faktiskt.se group, pointed to difficulties of the fact-checking method. 
They argued that the first fact-checks done by faktiskt.se concerned issues so multifaceted and charged with ideology that it was difficult if not impossible to deliver a 
true or false verdict, and that faktiskt.se had landed wrong in most of their conclusions. They also questioned the teaming up of several of the leading media houses 
in Sweden and argued that the collaboration hindered them from investigating 
each other, contrary to the idea of journalism’s role in a democratic and pluralistic 
public sphere. Moreover, the financial support by the state-run innovation agency 
Vinnova was seen as problematic since it made the project vulnerable to critique 
not only from established political camps favouring a downgrading of public s rvice media but also from more antagonistic groups linked to alternative media and 
the far right. Despite consensus on the need to stem the spread of mis- and disinformation, and co trary to the intentions of the project, the ties between actors 
involved in faktiskt.se, according to its critics, thus put the credibility and autonomy 
of journalism and the media industry in Sweden at risk. 
Fact-checking in the news field: Needs and ambiguities 
Having thus situated The Fact Assistant within a broader context and academic 
debate, let me now turn to the field studies conducted prior to the launching of the 
project. A central objective of the project was to adopt a bottom-up perspective 
rather than top-down. For this reason, a series of field studies among journalists 
was pursued at a preparatory stage, to involve them in the development of the 
project. The field studies were carried out in three newsrooms in local, regional, 
and national media – two public service operations (radio) and one privately 
owned newspaper, all of whom were members of the partnership Journalism of 
the Future. Taking responsibility for these studies, I organised a program of 1–2 
days with interviews and in-situ observations. I had two general questions in mind 
when entering the newsrooms: (1) what is the interest for some type of digital tool 
or assistant and 2) what are the fact-checking needs? The method used to consider 
these questions was ethnographic and can be roughly divided into three parts. First, 
semi-structured interviews lasting approximately 30 minutes conducted face to 
face with individual journalists. The interviews began with the two questions (in 
connection to which I introduced the basic idea of The Fact Assistant) and then 
pursued a more open-ended approach. These interviews were mostly carried out 
in environments separated from the newsroom. Second, ethnographic interviews 
conducted as conversations with journalists while they were carrying out their 
day-to-day work. A total of approximately 20 interviews were carried out. Third, 
observations in the newsrooms during which little or no conversation took place. 
In general terms, the answers to my questions were that there is both an interest 
in a digital fact-checking tool and a need for such a tool. Against this background 
two associated themes unfolded. One is in relation to the range of programmes 
or digital tools that are available today or currently in development. The second 
theme relates to a more general need for control and continuity in the current 
work situation. 
First theme: The interviewed journalists told me they are quite aware of the 
multitude of technical and software solutions related to fact-checking. The awareness generates different feelings. Som  described it as a constant and overwhelming
stream of innovation and product development. Others expressed curiosity and joy 
in trying out new products. Most said they have enough knowledge of a few of 
them while expressing a concern to acquire more skills, and to get more used to 
the programmes they consider relevant. Examination of the authenticity of images, 
for example, is something the respondents experience as challenging, but they do 
not feel they have problems with fact-checking in this area. Google’s Reverse 
Image Search, for example, is familiar to most and regularly used. At the same 
time however, there is a need for more advanced fact-checking and to establish 
routines in relation to aspects such as finding website owners, their histories, rigin , and respective positions within networks more quickly. Journalists frequently 
use Twitter postings in regular news work but getting beyond anonymous or fake 
profiles and mapping networks is rarely done. In such cases, journalists regarded 
specific programmes that may facilitate more advanced procedures as a good idea if 
they contain a clear work schedule. Tools should be easy to use with easy instructions about how the programmes work. If they also contain updates, short news 
snippets about programmes and recent reviews, then one can easily keep abreast 
of developments. 
Second theme: When it comes to relationships between journalists – the t amwork, the discussions, the handovers, the news process as a collective act – and 
the fact-checking procedures within these relations, there was a general consensus 
on the idea that an assistant could function as a support mechanism. It would help 
systematise processes and make formal the knowledge that is kept in the heads and 
minds of individual journalists, ensuring that knowledge is available to all. In turn, 
all journalists would thus gain more control. Furthermore, it was considered as an 
advantage if specific individual fact-checks could contribute to an easily accessible 
and searchable database, with a system of alerts or red flags on people, organisa- 
tions, and websites. Journalists felt such a fact-check assistant might then be valu bl  since you would save time in your day-to-day work, not having to ‘reinvent 
the wheel’ every time you wanted to check something. 
Moving beyond the general questions about interest for and need of a di it l tool such as The Fact Assistant, lack of time and stress constantly popped 
up during the conversations as features of everyday news work. The journalists 
explained that this is predominantly caused by the fast continuous news cycle, 
with demands on immediacy not only in delivering the latest news but in ke ping an eye on and responding to reactions from audie ces through social media 
and elsewhere. Several of the journalists I spoke to explained that this means less 
time for fact-checking and research, and that the warning bell for incorrect or 
doubtful information is less and less heard before publication. As a result, they 
are relying more on established sources than before, although in cases where 
misinformation has been spread it is not seldom the trusted sources that fail to 
deliver correct information. A feeling of stress is further enhanced by frequent 
reorganisation and turnover of staff, as well as a continuous introduction of new 
policies from management levels and superiors; policies that several of the j urnalists I spoke to feel are developed over their heads. Yet another source of stress 
is technology development connected to so-called deep fakes, i.e. in the sense 
of manipulating moving images and voices. One local reporter commented: 
“frankly speaking, when this becomes available for anyone out there, I don’t 
know how we can keep up with our work.” 
In more abstract terms, stress was also expressed as a result of recent public 
debates over the credibility of established media, paired with uncertainty about 
how to relate to social media that so easily generates hate storms or triggers debates 
that are difficult to control. This has less to do with fake news in its more concrete 
form, as fabricated occasional news. In the local and regional newsrooms I visited, 
journalists regarded fake news as not particularly present in daily work, or not 
present at all. They associated this kind of fake news more with superpower and 
politics on an international level and saw it as a matter for the national media to 
deal with (still, as one local journalist stated, “if it would happen here, then we 
are not really prepared, there is no plan for how it would be handled”). Instead, 
local journalists described a situation where fake news is merely one part of a more 
complex informational climate. Many attested to a clear switch having occurred 
over the course of just a few years regarding social media. Whilst earlier social 
media was seen and frequently used as a source of information and news, it is 
now being handled with more care. The journalists said they experience a kind of 
high-profile climate on social media nowadays where local and traditional media 
are targeted, particularly by local representatives of the Sweden Democrats party 
(populist, national conservative) and their populist and far-right supporters. Obvio sly, mistakes occur every now and then, and this sometimes leads to heated
commentary on social media. But it doesn’t have to be outright mistakes; heated 
commentary frequently occurs in relation to regular reporting as well, especially 
on sensitive and politicised issues such as migration, honour violence, and clim t  change. As one local reporter commented, “it doesn’t matter how well 
you have checked the facts and how clearly you have sourced it, things just go 
out of hand anyway”. The dynamics of situations when things go wrong, several 
journalists tried to explain, tend to spiral towards an eschewed reality description 
where values such as truth and facts have secondary meanings. Journalists and their 
organisations are accused of not being truthful and in the end pictured as disseminating fake news thems lves. A few occasions had occurred among the journalists 
I spoke to where the result had struck them personally, where hateful campaigns 
had been directed at them as individuals. A couple of journalists also told me that 
they had refrained from accepting assignments concerning topics they reckoned 
would trigger this kind of ‘storm’. This decision of theirs had subsequently been 
brought up during yearly negotiations with their superiors regarding their salaries 
as failures to fulfil their duties. During conversations about this complex issue, 
some journalists raised the question of whether a fact-checking app, developed as 
it would be partly by support from a state agency, would not become just another 
argument that could be used against them by their critics in a similar manner as 
with faktiskt.se. 
Many journalists told me they had been regularly following the viral reviewer 
Viralgranskaren and faktiskt.se when they were active, and they saw both of them 
as good initiatives. However, all of those that commented on faktiskt.se felt that 
the connection to the state-run innovation agency Vinnova was unnecessary as it 
affected the credibility, not only of faktiskt.se, but of the public service media as a 
whole. “It was very easy for our critics to point their conspiratorial fingers at us 
and accuse us of being instruments of the government”. one public service radio 
reporter commented. Some also had reservations on the idea of forming a separate 
fact-checking institution. One of them said, “I was a little provoked by the idea 
of a particular fact-checking site since it might give the impression that regular 
journalism does not do fact-checking. But that is exactly what we do, it’s what 
we are good at and what journalism is all about.” Many pointed out that fact- 
checking is about traditional journalistic work. The conversations centered among 
other things on the importance of local knowledge. In a local context, journalists 
are situated in a network of decision makers, public officials, and other kinds of 
authorities on local matters, most of whom the journalists know personally after a 
few years on the local beat. A digital tool, a few of the journalists argued, could in 
this situation be regarded as a kind of overkill when the traditional method to just 
pick up the phone and call people works in most cases. Yet this was problema- 
tised with regards to convergence and increased collaboration across municipal and 
regional boundaries as local newspapers were bought up and integrated into larger 
conglomerates where journalists were expected to cover news in several municipalities. Fact-checking thus becomes more important because local knowledge is 
not enough in such cases. A post-it note on one of the reporters’ pinboards next to 
the phone indicated this, with a list of names of local politicians in neighbouring 
cities and their political affiliations added in bold style, ready to be glanced at durin  work beyond the familiar beat. 
Several journalists also argued that knowledge and competence regarding 
advanced fact-checking is unevenly distributed. A few become very knowledgeable through their own efforts. At the same time, they regarded news work as 
increasingly dependent on people with expert knowledge on digital information 
and communication. Reporters or managers sometimes travel to pursue further 
education but turning their newborn skills into concrete application upon their 
return to the newsroom is rare. On some occasions, experts come to visit and give 
workshops. These workshops are highly appreciated, but poorly followed up and 
thus they turn into isolated events. Unless user-friendly, several journalists r ckoned, a digital tool might play int  the hands of those more skilled members of 
staff – it will be they who use it and their fact-checking work that appears in the 
records. In connection to this, some expressed skepticism or concern that a fact- 
checking tool or assistant would further increase the pressure on the individual 
journalist, and that an introduction of the tool would mean increased control over 
the employees from an employer’s perspective. One local reporter commented: 
“Won’t there be just more statistics and measurement of our work, just like the 
measuring of how many clicks my texts generate?” 
Conclusion 
The field studies presented in this chapter were conducted with a limited group 
of journalists and during a short period of time and further studies are necessary to 
produce more solid documentation of enduring patterns and varieties on different 
levels of analysis. However, the material speaks to several of the issues I pointed at 
in the literature review. A recurrent theme during my conversations was ambiguity 
regarding organised forms of fact-checking. Lack of time and technique fatigue can 
explain a good deal of the reluctance of journalists to take part in the development 
of The Fact Assistant prototype. But there is also a broader set of aspects of the 
journalists’ work environment which contribute to their hesitation and ambiguity toward the specific form of fact-checking envisaged by the project. To some, 
the mere suggestion that they need to strengthen their verification competencies 
provoked their sense of professional integrity. To others, the idea of collecting 
data on the fact-checks was seen as potentially contributing to enhanced control 
and surveillance on a managerial level. Another envisioned risk was that the tool 
itself, financed partly by state funds, would make journalists increasingly vulner ble to critique posed by antagonistic actors outside of the newsroom, a risk which 
had previously materialised through earlier fact-checking projects and the public 
debate that followed. The technical solution in the form of a digital tool, and the 
potential appropriation of it, is thus considered to be ambigous and its reception is 
ambivalent, since it could have applications in several domains: social, professional, 
and political. In the current complex informational and communicational la dsc pe that journalists are part of, and expe ted to report on, sustaining journalists’ 
autonomy and authority is a delicate task with remarkable implications for democracy. Taking measures at impr ving procedures for verification of digital content 
answers to the ideal of delivering accurate and thoughtful information and analysis, 
and thus helping to create an enlightened citizenry. Most journalists subscribed to 
this objective. But just how this should be organised is a more open question and 
responses to The Fact Assistant model show that journalists are prone to take into 
consideration the particular ties involved when such measures are taken. If interpreted by their audiences as com romising their autonomy, they would lose their 
authority to critically scrutinise the powerful. 
Notes 
1 The app is available as open source: https://github.com/wsaqaf/faktaassistenten . 
2 See www.claimreviewproject.com/the-facts-about-claimreivew . 
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The Internet ecosystem has completely transformed the way in which we consume 
information, and the role of social networks and search engines in spreading news – 
the so-called “platformisation of news distribution” ( Martens et al. 2018 : 15) – is 
increasing rapidly. The transformation of the media environment brought about by 
the Internet platforms has weakened the role of journalists as gatekeepers of news – 
as highlighted in the report of the Committee on Culture, Science, Education 
and Media (2017: 3); Levi (2012: 1555–72) talked about “deinstitutionalization of 
the press” – passing this role “to engineers, coders, and designers” ( Carroll 2017 : 
71), and has created a commingling of different phenomena that has been called 
‘information disorder’ ( Wardle 2019 ; cf. Bayer 2019). The main problem with this 
disorder is that the mix of political propaganda, foreign influences, disinformation, 
satire, and other phenomena has undermined the classic legal categories regarding 
the media and the limits on the freedom of expression and information ( Koltay 
2019 : 45). Given the ambiguity of the term ‘freedom of information’ – which can 
mean the right of access to public data or the freedom to inform and receive information and news in a broader sense – it is necessary to specify that this expression 
is given the second of these meanings in this chapter. 1 In this framework, the lack 
of regulation of Internet platforms, 2 and the fact that the rules of journalism do not 
cover them, 3 has led to the spread of fake news (rectius disinformation). 4 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the action of the European Union (EU) – 
in particular the Code of Practice on Disinformation (the Code) – and its limits. 
To do this, the first section will analyse the legal framework of the EU action, 
while the second will study it in comparison with the initiatives developed by the 
Member States. Particular attention is paid here to the issue of the privatisation of 
censorship, which is taken to mean the delegation of powers to private actors in 
The EU Code of Practice on Disinformation 
a field as important as that of fundamental rights. In the Conclusion, some general 
considerations are developed, by summarising the limits of the EU action and by 
looking forward to the development of some forms of control over the actions of 
the Internet platforms. 
The genesis and the limits of the EU action 
in the struggle against fake news 
The effort to contain online disinformation started as a reaction against the p ssibility that there were external influences in the European democratic system. 5 The 
first step was a resolution of the European Parliament (EP) “to analyse in depth 
the current situation and legal framework with regard to fake news and to verify 
the possibility of legislative intervention to limit the dissemination and spreading 
of fake content.” 6 In January 2018, a High Level Group was established by the 
European Commission to develop strategies to counter the spread of fake news and 
finally, in September 2018, the Code of Practice on Disinformation was ‘enacted’. 
The Code is a soft law tool that suggests to its signatories – among whom are the 
most important Internet platforms such as Google, Facebook, and Twitter – some 
possible strategies and practices to avoid the spread of fake news. 
The most important of these actions are: (1) to avoid giving financial supp rt to fake news factories through advertisements; (2) to dilute the visibility of 
fake news and to improve the ‘findability’ of trustworthy content; (3) to prioritise 
relevant, authentic, and authoritative information and to invest in technology to 
reinforce this prioritisation; (4) to ensure there is transparency in advertisements 
and sponsored content; and (5) to remove false accounts and regulate the activity 
of bots on platforms. This summary shows how this soft law instrument is having 
a great impact on the freedom of information (or press freedom), that is, the right 
to impart and receive news and information. 
In this paragraph, the legitimacy of the actions undertaken by the EU will be 
analysed. Given the limited scope of application of Article 11 of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the absence of specific case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) ( Pollicino 2020 : 9), the analysis will look at the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), particularly Article 10. In r l tion to this, one can recall the fact that Article 52.3 of the Nice Charter establishes 
that if there are rights corresponding to ECHR rights, the meaning and the scope 
of those rights shall be the same. Article 52.3 allows us to speculate on whether 
fake news can be considered as a protected expression under the European fr d m of expression and information paradigm – as is the case in the United States – 
by looking at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law. 
Before analysing the issue of the protection of fake news as free speech, it is 
important to stress another aspect of the EU initiative: it is forged in a way that 
does not touch sectors that are not harmonised, and it does not affect the Member 
States’ fundamental rights. 
Matteo Monti 
It is necessary to focus now on the case law of the ECtHR. The ECtHR has 
recognised a right to be informed and to receive news, 7 the urgency of protecting 
pluralism in the media environment, 8 the necessity for journalists to act in good 
faith and to respect the ‘duties and responsibilities’ of journalism if they are to 
obtain the protection of Article 10 of the ECHR, 9 and the need to check information and news sources. 10 The Court has specified that even in the exercise of 
free speech based on value judgments, which is slightly different from the right to 
spread news and information, there are some circumstances in which events and 
facts cannot be invented: 
a distinction needs to be made between statements of fact and value judgments in that, while the existence of facts can be demonstra ed, the truth 
of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. (. . .) However, where a 
statement amounts to a value judgment, the proportionality of an interference may dep nd on whether there existed a sufficient ‘factual basis’ for 
the impugned statement: if there was not, that value judgment may prove 
excessive. 11 
In this sense, it can be concluded that fake news certainly cannot be considered as 
protected speech in the field of the press, that is, if the news is diffused as a piece 
of journalism. More controversial is the application of the concept of fake news 
to political propaganda, which can use lies – within the limits of defamation – in 
its development ( Monti 2018 ). In this sense, it is evident that freedom of information faces more particular limits than does the general freedom of expression, 
being linked to the role played by the press in a democratic society, which is 
the role of the watchdog of democracy, informing citizens, making governments 
accountable, and furnishing the basis for public debate. It is important to stress that 
“[u]nlike in the US practice, European constitutions and the individual legal syst ms actively try to separate the freedom of speech from the freedom of the press” 
( Koltay 2019 : 45). 
As specified in the Introduction, in the digital world the situation is a bit more 
complex since it is not easy to identify whether we are in the presence of a piece 
of news, a political message, or something else. However, extrapolating some principl  from the case law of the ECtHR, it is possible to explore and use the ‘tradi- 
tional’ legal categories to frame some of the new phenomena on Internet platforms. 
The Court, indeed, has, on the one hand, widened the definition of the media 12 
that are constrained by the rules of journalism 13 and has, on the other hand, applied 
the limits of the freedom of information to journalists engaging in activities that 
are different from traditional news reporting (as in the case of comments posted 
on a forum). 14 Thus, taking into consideration the fact that the rules of objective 
15 journalism can be adapted for different types of media, as stressed in the Delfi v. 
Estonia case, 16 the case law of the ECtHR makes it possible to imagine a widening 
of the scope of application of the rules on freedom of information to new media 
such as websites, blogs, and social network pages (which could be classified as types 
of newspaper because of their aim) or to journalists’ activities on the Internet and 
on social networks (e.g. Facebook posts or tweets). 
In this context, however, it is necessary to underline that the types of self- 
produced media content ( Croteau 2006 ; Cram 2015 ) are changing, and that 
more and more often it is possible to see disinformation circulating in memes or 
social network posts without any mention of a website or the work of a journalist 
( Wardle 2019 ; this aspect may be linked to the collective credulity that seems to 
operate on the web: cf. Mocanu et al. 2015 ). Regardless of this, the ECtHR seems 
to have held that even an individual who cannot be defined as a journalist is bound 
by the rules applicable to journalists when he or she is engaged in spreading news 
and information in a public debate: 
[t]he Court reiterates that the protection of the right of journalists to impart 
information on issues of general interest requires that they should act in 
good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide ‘reliable and precise’ 
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism (. . .). The same 
principles must apply to others who engage in public debate. 17 
Additionally, the ECtHR has affirmed that even a self-regulatory body of i ter t service providers has to respect the principles developed for the press in 
some circumstances. 18 A broad application of these principles in the world of 
Internet platforms would lead to a revolution in the regulation of the giants of 
the web. 
Moreover, in the case of Brzeziń ski v Pologne – the first case in which the term 
‘fake news’ was used in a European decision – the Court “admet qu’il est nécessaire de 
lutter contre la dissémination d’informations fallacieuses à propos des candidats aux élections 
afin de préserver la qualité du débat public en période préélectorale.” 19 Even while c nsoring the way in which the Poli h courts managed the issue – an imprecise piece of 
news diffused by a mayoral candidate – the Court seems to have considered the 
censorship of fake news to be consistent with Article 10 of the Convention, despite 
the fake news having been diffused by a political actor in a public political debate. 
In this sense, it seems that the use of the term fake news is a little dangerous in the 
context of political debate, because if we reconnect the term ‘fake news’ with the 
term ‘disinformation’ we are looking at the specific topic of the press, and then 
by applying these terms to political and value judgments we risk misunderstanding 
the categories. It is true that false statements made by politicians could be censored 
(e.g. as defamation), but it is important not to apply the strict press rules to actors 
engaged in spreading political propaganda and not in diffusing news and information as journalists. 20 In this sense, the EU’s action in drafting the Code seems to 
contain a careful separation of the two categories, on the one hand ensuring that 
sponsored political content is clearly understood as such, and on the other favo ri g authentic news. 21 
Therefore, seconding Katsirea’s argument ( Katsirea 2018 : 173) and focussing 
on the case law of the ECtHR, it is possible to defend that the paradigm of the 
press is susceptible to be legitimately applied to the digital world as well. As a 
consequence, fake news cannot be considered as a protected expression under 
Article 10 ECHR. Accordingly, using the words of Pollicino, “[t]he real challeng  in Europe is not then – as in the US – if the issue of fake news can be tackl d leg lly, but rather how this can be done in order to avoid a disproportionate 
restriction on the fundamental rights at stake, above all the freedom of speech” 
( Pollicino 2019a ). 
To conclude, it is possible to state that, so long as the EU does not invade fields 
that are not harmonised, the actions it has taken to force Internet platforms to self- 
regulate and avoid the spread of fake news seem to be consistent with its nature. 
Indeed, on the one hand, the EU’s action does not prevent Member States from 
taking further initiatives and does not infringe on national fundamental rights; on 
the other hand, the EU’s action is consistent with Article 10 ECHR. 
The double challenge of fighting fake news 
and avoiding the privatisation of censorship 
The Code can be framed as part of a broader general trend that delegates to 
Internet platforms the process of balancing fundamental rights online, the so- 
called “privatisation of censorship” (Tambini, Leonardi, and Marsden 2008). For 
instance, the German NetzDG 22 establishes that, after notification to a social twork by any user, hate speech and illegal false c ntent ( Claussen 2018 : 118) must 
be removed by the social network itself within 24 hours (or seven days as required 
by Art. 3(2)), without any check by the public authorities (courts or independent 
authorities). This procedure has been criticised by those who believe that users’ 
fundamental rights to free speech on Internet platforms should be protected.23 A 
very similar delegation of power to private actors would have been granted by 
the two proposed laws developed in the Italian legal order to fight fake news. 
The first one, the so-called Gambaro project, provided (among other articles) for 
the need for Internet platforms to undertake a general monitoring obligation for 
removing fake news and to allow the possibility of complaints by users against fake 
news. 24 The second one, the Zanda–Filippin project, was inspired by the German 
law and required social networks to remove illegal content after a complaint. 25 
Both procedures were devoid of public authority control (by judges or independent authorities). Italian scholars have also u derline  the ‘constitutional’ role that 
Internet platforms would have played in this case. 26 In this scenario, the only law 
embracing a paradigm not involving the privatisation of censorship is the French 
one, 27 which requires a judge to check the nature of online fake news before its 
removal. However, it is important to stress that the French law only concerns 
electoral periods and candidates in an election, 28 thus appearing to be more a law 
regulating political communication in electoral periods than a law on the freedom 
of information. 
Moreover, the Code of Practice also can be framed – partially – within the 
European approach to fundamental rights online, which is highlighted by the 
Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech (referred to here as the Code 
of Conduct) and the CJEU case law on the right to be forgotten. This approach, 
too, involves the privatisation of censorship. From the first point of view, the Code 
of Conduct requires Internet platforms to remove content that includes illegal hate 
speech after a report by a user. 29 The EU Commission has claimed that 
[t]he balance between freedom of speech and what is prohibited illegal hate 
speech is set out in European case law, starting with the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (. . .). It is neither a privatisation of 
justice nor is it excessive to ask all companies to do the same when they are 
notified about the existence of illegal content on their services. 30 
However, despite the claims of the Commission, it is clear that the balance is 
drawn by the Internet platforms, which can decide how to act and can proceed 
to censor content ( Zhen Gan 2017 : 118; Article 19 2016 : 16). In a very similar 
way, the CJEU has legitimised, after the Google Spain decision 31 , the possibility 
of Internet platforms developing an autonomous balance between Internet users’ 
right to be informed and the right to be forgotten (Pollicino and Romeo 2016: 
249). As a consequence, in the European scenario, both at the EU level and the 
level of the Member States, there seems to be a trend that encourages and favours 
the privatisation of censorship. Indeed, most policies of the Member States and 
the European Union appear to be directed away from guaranteeing the freedom 
of expression and information on Internet platforms by not subjecting the actions 
taken by private actors against online content to checks by judges or independent 
authorities (and granting no effective right of appeal against the decisions of the 
Internet platforms). 
Against this background, the Code of Practice on Disinformation is partially 
aligned with this trend by delegating to Internet platforms the obligation to remove 
fake accounts, and by favouring ‘authentic’ news. 
Taking into account the practices developed by Google and Facebook, the two 
main actors in the search engine and social networks markets, respectively, it has 
to be stressed that the Code has delegated important content-based choices to the 
Internet platforms. 
Indeed, both Google and Facebook remove ‘profiles’ that engage in the 
spread of fake news, the first one by giving a negative ranking to untrustworthy 
websites, 32 and the second by removing from social networks those pages and 
personal accounts that participate in campaigns characterised by ‘Coordinated 
Inauthentic Behavior’ (CIB) 33 or that simulate different identities ( Lyons 2018 ). 
These actions have an effect on content, because giving a negative rank to a 
website makes it difficult for users to reach it, and removing a page or a personal 
account from Facebook affects all the content diffused on that page or account. 
These actions involve the actual risk of the removal of political speech or media 
content that are not approved of by the Internet platform or the private actors 
behind it, or simply the removal of content because of pressure by the maj rit  of users and/or for economic reasons. Imagine what a campaign of notices 
against some information and pages or websites by users coordinated by political 
actors could generate. In addition, the risk of the general removal of all reported 
content to avoid any future fines or ‘reactions’ by the EU is an equally dangerous 
perspective. 34 
From the second point of view, privileging some content over other content on 
the basis that it is the ‘most authentic’ news has a strong impact on pluralism. In the 
US, for instance, Internet platforms have been accused of setting their algorithms 
to favour progressive news over conservative news ( Koltay 2019 : 196). The Eur p an system is very sensitive to this matter, and independent authorities usually 
watch over pluralism on the media ecosystem. 
It is, thus, important to underline how the Code of Practice – even if it does 
not encourage the removal of content – ends up increasing private censorship 
in the Internet ecosystem. Regarding the topic of private censorship, it is c ss ry to underline that in the EU framework a specific guarantee against private 
censorship seems to be absent, 35 while in the ECHR system ( Koltay 2019 : 94), 
the Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on Human Rights and the Rule 
of Law in the Information Society 36 and Recommendation CM/Rec(2011)7 37 
on intermediaries committed the Member States to preventing private censorship. Focussing on the recent case law of the two European Courts, it is possible 
to see two different approaches. The European Court of Justice, in the recent 
case of Glawischnig Piesczek v. Facebook, 38 has taken an ambiguous stance. On the 
one hand it has not taken into consideration – contrary to what was proposed 
by the Advocate General 39 – the need for a check on the removal of content by 
Internet platforms (a right of appeal against their decisions) in order to guarantee 
the freedom of expression of users of Facebook, but, on the other hand, it seems 
to exclude the possibility of removal without an automated process. 40 However, 
what is clear is that the Court has not set out a strong defence of the right to 
freedom of expression online. By contrast, the ECtHR has started to explore 
the issue of the privatisation of online censorship, excluding its presence in the 
activities of news portals, 41 because “there are ample opportunities for anyone 
to make his or her voice heard on the Internet.” 42 It seems that the Court could 
consider the presence of a private censorship if there were no alternatives availabl : in this sense, it is interesting to consider whether the reasoning of the Court 
would change if it was contemplating the censorship activities of Facebook or 
Google, given the de facto monopoly under which they operate in the European 
market and their importance for public discourse ( Koltay 2019 : 185; cf. Hind- 
man 2018). 
This position would be very similar to the proposal by certain US scholars 
( Klonick 2018 ; contra: Peters 2017 ) to extend the so-called state action doctrine 43 
to Internet platforms to force them to respect users’ rights of freedom of speech in 
the same way that governments must. 44 
Conclusion 
The Code of Practice on Disinformation is a good attempt to give Internet pl tf r s responsibility, to force them to attempt to counter the spread of fake news, 
and to rebuild the role of journalism on the Internet, with the intention of pr servi g the role of the press – in a broad sense – in European democracies. 
However, the vital task of fighting disinformation online cannot be delegated 
entirely to Internet platforms in the way that the Code provides: the risks that 
dwell in the privatisation of censorship (in this case, the removal of politically 
oriented content instead of fake news, or the prioritisation of conservative news 
over progressive news or vice versa) are too big to be ignored. Indeed, Internet 
platforms have become too important as public forums to remain outside every 
type of legal regulation. In the specific field of fake news and the Code, granting a 
right of appeal to independent authorities against decisions made by platforms and 
establishing a general monitoring system for the operations of Internet platforms in 
the matter of pluralism, with both tasks being assigned, for instance, to the Body 
of European Regulators of Electronic Communications in coordination with the 
independent national authorities, could be sufficient to ensure that Internet pl tf rms do not distort democracy. 
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